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KOMMUNIST

No 8, May 1988

Editorial: What Should Our Home Look Like
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No 8, May 88 (signed to press 17 May 88) pp 3-9

[Text] On the threshold of the 19th All-Union Party Conference the Soviet people are living with a thirst for renewal. Concerns, hopes, arguments, proposals and most important, practical deeds—everything today is connected with the development of perestroika. Henceforth all of our life will depend on how soon the renewal of our socialist home gets under way, the type of fruit it bears and how reliably it ensures its own irreversibility.

A considerable amount of work has already been done, but there are no grounds for complacency. Indeed there is no indication of this as letters to the editors indicate. Their authors are clearly concerned by the specters of past changes in our history—changes for the worse rather than for the better, toward deformation of socialism rather than its consolidation. CPSU member Ye.S. Beletskiy from Chernovtsy writes in a letter to the editors that “if we continue to say one thing and do another, we will not escape from the impasse. We have learned to talk in the spirit of restructuring, but deeds do not correspond to such words for the moment, especially in the main area of the restructuring process in relation to people. Glasnost and democracy will not tolerate demagoguery, after all. People’s needs and concerns, their pain, their demands, and their constructive proposals must be evaluated, and decisions made on them, in a maximally effective way. They must not be passed over in silence for decades! Leaders are still applying the methods of the period of stagnation. The desk-bound method of leadership continues to exist. Instead of the restructuring process, a mere outward appearance is created. Opposition to the restructuring process is gaining strength.”

History, however, rarely repeats itself in the same form, and the development of socialism is now being threatened by dangers different from those of the thirties or sixties. Our readers are, however, right in that dangers do exist, threatening the restructuring process. “A door to a new and unusual expanse of life has, as it were, opened up for us,” noted M.S. Gorbachev at his meeting with leaders of the mass information media, ideological institutions and creative unions. “We are moving along a pioneer path, we are moving ahead. This is the reason for the people’s mixed reactions to the developing processes.”

The wait-and-see standpoint which many people still adhere to presents a very grave danger. Someone who has adopted this standpoint intends to sit on the sidelines and see which side wins. He may have various reasons: from some selfish personal or group interests, to indifference to social affairs and a failure to understand

the critical nature of the historical moment through which we are living. There are also a considerable number of people who are simply not sure whether the efforts which the restructuring process requires of everyone are necessary or inevitable. They have survived so far, after all; perhaps not in wealth, but in peace, taking no serious risk, in any vitally important matter—why can’t we go on like that?

It is important to dispel such hesitation and doubt. It now is clear to any specialist in his field that we cannot go on living in the old way. The obsolescence of the entire system of social production, both material and spiritual, as well as the old and now customary deformations of socialism have led to growing inefficiency. In the final years before April, the economy was already barely capable of ensuring simple reproduction. This was inevitably followed by the national economy being worked to exhaustion, by the aging of its technical base, by the impoverishment of its infrastructure, by the rejection of environmental protection measures, and by disregard for labor safety. This system of work threatens the economy with complete collapse, and many events in our lives show that all this is far from being a thing of the past.

Prospects appeared for a reduction of expenditure in the social sphere, which was fraught not only with a halt in the growth of material welfare, but also with the degradation of society’s spiritual life. In a multinational country, the socioeconomic deformations led to the worsening of relations between nationalities. The progressive loss of socialism’s advantages, which was becoming a real possibility, would have resulted in the loss of its social prestige in the country and abroad. It would, of course, have been possible to simply carry on taking pride in individual achievements, but anyone who attempts to take the old order into the future assumes a heavy responsibility toward the Soviet people.

The April change was implemented at a threshold beyond which a crisis would have developed. We have more than once been convinced of this in the last 3 years as we have discovered more and more weaknesses in the previous strategy of development. The period of stagnation now makes itself felt in the decline in standards which has been revealed in the quality of industrial output (which has to be overcome by an extraordinary measure—the state inspection system); by the economy’s intolerable dependence on vodka sales (this dependence cannot be overcome without losses to the state budget and the market); and by the backwardness of the export structure, which has made our life vulnerable to fluctuations in world oil prices.

The restructuring process is not simply necessary—it is inevitable; it is not simply timely—but is late in coming; it is not simply radical—but is all-embracing, and extends to all areas of social life. We also must reorganize socio-ideological structures, the inertial force of which has been set over decades. The authors of some letters to the editors indignantly ask why such attacks are made on

Stalin if we have seen so many shortcomings in subsequent periods. The point is, however, that the deformations of socialism which we are now beginning to overcome not only took shape in the fifties and seventies. In the years following the 20th Congress we were unable to organize the successful restructuring of inefficient sociopolitical mechanisms, while the leaders in the period of stagnation did not want to organize it. These mechanisms had, however, been created in the thirties and forties under the leadership of J.V. Stalin, who deviated from Lenin's behests in many respects. The historic victories in economic construction and in the country's defense which were won at that time were the result of the selflessness and great sacrifices of the people.

That is the truth. It must be understood and voiced above all in order to recognize the significance, plan, and logic of the restructuring process: everyone must know what we are restructuring, and why. The truth must also be known in order to overcome the temptation to bury one's head in the sand, in order not to shy away from restructuring one's own thinking and in order to overcome the inertia of the old work methods and style.

In the 3 years of the restructuring process it has been possible to halt the economy's slide toward crisis, to develop the basic features of a new economic mechanism, which has already begun to function, to formulate a strong social policy, to achieve a turn for the better in the social sphere, to recognize the comprehensive nature of the restructuring process, and to set about developing its ideology, policy, and theory.

Even in 1986 and 1987, when only individual experiments were being conducted, and especially starting with 1988, when the new economic mechanism began to be widely introduced, there has been an improvement in enterprises' economic behavior. The old desire to swell the number of employees, to build up excessive stocks of materials, to install superfluous equipment, to stretch out the time frames for construction work, and to lower production plans is being overcome. Cost accounting has not really become complete, but it is obviously working.

The consistent and persistent introduction of cost accounting relations and the decisive increase of the labor collectives' independence are not only leading to the invigoration of the whole diversity of interests, and consequently to a stable improvement in the economy, but are also of fundamental social and moral importance. Without this, the working people's sense of proprietorship is shaky and imprecise, and there is less ground for a creative attitude toward work, toward the collective's affairs, and toward the situation in the economy. We can now note that the situation is changing, if only slowly; the awakening of economic interest in the results of work is being transformed into the increasing aspiration by labor collectives to work in a proprietary, zealous, intensive, and of course independent manner.

Nonetheless, considerable difficulties and obstacles on the road of restructuring have been revealed. There is an obvious lack of serious changes for the better in the activity of the areas of the national economy which are not subject to cost accounting—sectorial ministries and central economic agencies. Departmental separatism, irresponsibility and sluggishness in matters of scientific-technological progress; spending-oriented setups, parasitism, and bureaucratism—all of these diseases are still making themselves felt. Unlike the enterprises, the administrative apparatus is, by its very nature, subject to the beneficial effect of cost accounting stimuli only to a small extent. There is less financial control at the various levels of the administrative superstructure—control by means of the instruments of glasnost and democratic institutions should be all the stronger.

In renewing and restructuring our common socialist home we are not only strengthening its economic foundations but also essentially setting up the political superstructure anew, taking the Leninist blueprint into account. According to the Leninist understanding, socialism is inseparable from democracy and inconceivable without it: These are interdependent, intertwined phenomena. This approach to the matter is based on Marxism's original ideas about the essence of the new social system, in which the main role is played by "the people, acting by itself and for itself." (K. Marx and F. Engels: "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 17, p 525).

Seven decades ago the October Revolution settled the key initial issue of revolution and socialism—the question of power. However, no major historical issue can be resolved once and for all, since what is involved is real processes of social development and the grounds for raising this issue have not yet been exhausted. Socialism establishes the power of working people. Its very essence, however, may be emasculated by bureaucracy, subjectivism, a personality cult and the alienation of people from the administration of the country, city, village or labor collective. This has been apparent for decades, when the command-administrative system of management predominated, while socialist democracy was frequently reduced to the observance of formal rituals. For this reason, the renewal of socialism ascribes primary importance to the elimination of various forms of sociopolitical alienation and to the involvement of all citizens in the administration of all social affairs.

Renewing our political superstructure means putting democratization into practice and translating theoretical tenets about democracy, freedom and human rights into the simple language of practical actions aimed at ensuring that every citizen in the country has a life worthy of man in the world of socialism. After all, the main thing for the party and for its restructuring is the people's everyday life, their prosperity, their mood, social condition and dignity.

What is hindering this? The answer to this question lies both in the past and the present. Above all, it is the absence or inadequate development of a democratic tradition and culture in our country's history.

The powerful force of the October Revolution roused millions of people to carry on independent creative work; these people had no practical skills or experience in living and working under the conditions of democracy. From the very first years of Soviet power it was necessary to fight against the weeds of bureaucracy as they sprang up now here, now there. Errors, violations of socialist legality, the prevalence of a trend toward overcentralization in administering all spheres of society's life, and the resulting deformations of socialism in the Stalinist period led to even greater reduction of the opportunities to realize the democratic potential established in 1917. However, the impetus of October was maintained, and it continued in the deeds of the people, who underwent immense hardship, laid the economic basis of socialism, and stood their ground in mortal combat with fascism. It is precisely this breath of air from the Great October Revolution which we have felt in recent years in the invigorating breeze of the April changes.

The present process of renewal must help us to get rid of passiveness and the habit of relying on "the management" to overcome the deeply-rooted mentality of people as "cogs," to inculcate genuine civic activeness, and to restore to socialism its reputation of being a society of enterprising people. It is especially important for us to achieve a situation where the human personality and individuality receive an opportunity to prove themselves to the full, in order for there to be greater social recognition of everyone's personal initiative and contribution. This can be done, the rust from many years of stagnation and apathy can be removed, and social responsibility can be increased only by way of expanding real democracy: It is precisely in everyday practical deeds that democratic culture and a readiness and ability to take advantage of it take shape in a stable and reliable manner.

Full-blown development of democratization is being blocked by obsolete mechanisms which have formed at various stages in the history of our state and political system as a whole. The "friction" that is slowing our forward movement is most perceptible in these same centers and combinations of the state machinery. The deformations which have accumulated in the system of state administration, in the implementation of economic programs, in social life, and in cultural policy have been painfully reflected in a sphere of social relations where we have always been deservedly proud of our achievements: Situations of conflict were discovered in relations between nationalities. Our common socialist home is multinational and no major practical issue can be resolved without careful consideration of the whole diversity of national relations which merge into the nationwide interest of renewing and strengthening our fatherland. The unity of nations and ethnic groups, and the friendship between peoples in the USSR, represent the greatest achievement of socialism which we must preserve and strengthen at all times and by all means.

Since the beginning of the restructuring process a number of steps have been taken to overcome the forces of

deceleration in the state and political sphere. An experiment has been carried out in the electoral system, certain changes have been made in the structure of the state authorities and administration, the range of social associations has been significantly enriched, and the work of mass organizations has been activated. There has not yet been any radical renewal here, however. This applies primarily to all levels of soviets, which must become efficiently operating, enterprising, equal centers of popular power, so that the process of their formation can ensure the real participation by the people and the careful selection of their worthiest representatives in the power institutions.

It is especially important to avoid playing at democracy and formally promoting several candidates if they do not reflect the real interests, attitudes and demands of the voters. Society does not need "activeness" initiated from above or "democracy" by command. The soviets of people's deputies must become genuinely popular in essence and in their forms and methods of action. It is important to ensure the creation of a permanent democratic mechanism for the socialist state of law and specifically to implement reform of the courts and the law.

The expanding field of activity of heterogeneous and independent social organizations and associations which represent virtually all strata and groups of working people within the developing system of Soviet democracy is a reality of the present day. The greatest harm can be done here both by thoughtless prohibition and by the new formalism—the passing of decrees and the artificial propagation of such institutions. It is precisely the reliance on spontaneous initiative and the independent creativity of people, the young above all, which will help to renew the social atmosphere and ensure growing individual freedom and pluralism of views, opinions and action, on the basis of socialist values. At the same time, everyone has a growing responsibility for the fate of the "near" and not so near, and for the destiny of society as a whole. Far from leading to "uncontrolled spontaneity" or "anarchy," democratization and the consolidation and expansion of civil rights lead to growing social maturity, to fuller and more responsible recognition of one's place in life and in the struggle to improve it. In today's conditions this is in fact synonymous with the struggle for revolutionary restructuring, with support for radical changes in words and deeds.

The "sovereignty" and self-esteem of the individual and man's priority in all matters—whether the improvement of everyday social conditions, the accelerated implementation of the housing program, or the expansion of glasnost, the existence of a lively diversity of opinions in the press and the intensification of spiritual life—are characteristic features of socialism as it develops. This also determines new approaches to the party's ideological activity. In our time this work must be organized in such a way as to entirely eliminate useless spouting of eloquent words and other "ideological excesses." The

discussion and interpretation of any issue must be included in the process of seeking practical solutions and must, moreover, serve as a stage in the preparation of such solutions, and as the principle for organizing their implementation. At the same time, the restructuring process demands that every practical step should be interpreted and illuminated by the ideas about renewing socialism in order that day-to-day organizational work should not be turned into narrow-minded pragmatism, but should be of a clear ideological and political nature and contribute to the people's spiritual, social and moral cohesion, and to an increase in their awareness and social activeness.

The development of theoretical problems of renewing society and the examination of our past from the standpoint of truth and Marxist-Leninist historicism are of paramount importance. The period of preparation for the 19th Party Conference has been very full in this respect. Clear guidelines for evaluating the history of the party and Soviet society and for progress on the theoretical front were provided by the documents related to the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution and the February Central Committee Plenum. The provisions which they put forward formed the basis for crystallizing ideas about the essential nature of socialism, where conservative and dogmatic stereotypes clashed with the aspirations of healthy forces in our society to consolidate their forces on the basis of restructuring principles. The editorial "Principles of Restructuring: Revolutionary Thinking and Action," published in PRAVDA on 5 April, has played an important role in strengthening the ideas of renewal and the attunement to action. The qualitative shifts which have taken place in social consciousness, and the genuine support of the clear majority of the people for what the party is doing, provide graphic evidence of the consistently socialist nature of the measures which are being taken: not only are we not deviating from socialism and Leninism, but on the contrary, we are reviving in practice their creative, living and humanist nature, and putting into practice a contemporary model of socialist society which, as the May CPSU Central Committee meeting noted, will be more multifaceted and complex, but which will in no way abandon the principles of social justice, comradeship, and internationalism.

All that has taken place in the development of social consciousness in recent weeks has consistently and fully shown the main adversary of the restructuring process—conservatism, which stands in the way of renewal and which operates by means of deceleration, intimidation, and half-truths. Conservatism is rooted in the consciousness, mentality and interests of a considerable number of people (among whom the functionaries in the administrative apparatus are far from alone, incidentally). It can be nurtured by dogmatic thinking, by habituation to stereotypes, by fear of what is new, and by selfish interests.

Conservatism cannot be fought with the usual device of recognizing only "one's own" and totally rejecting

"other people's" positions, or by the methods of "making the class struggle more acute" which were applied in the thirties. Conservative tendencies and attitudes can only be surmounted by bold and open thought and action, by the arguments of glasnost and democratization, by a search for ways to unite society on the basis of socialist pluralism, and by practical successes in the restructuring process, which are really tangible. We must learn to work in a new way—through specific experience, discussions, changing the standpoints and mentalities of those who still adhere to old ways and comprehensively renewing our socialist home.

The development of a clear view of history, a view based on comprehensive analysis of all the facts, links, interconnections, and contradictions of real life, is of great significance in overcoming conservatism and dogmatism. There can be no pages torn out of history, just as there must be no subjectivist "highlighting" of either bright or dark sides. We are dialecticians, and we stand for realism. We need a multicolored and full picture not only of everything that is happening, but also of everything that has happened. This is necessary for the sake of our moral principles, for truth and justice. It is also necessary for specific political considerations: in order to gain a precise knowledge of what "heritage," in Lenin's words, we are irrevocably rejecting, what lessons we are drawing from the past, and what guarantees we are creating for the future.

Our criticism is addressed to the present as well as to history. After all, many of today's shortcomings and problems are not only burdened with the past, but are also quite plainly connected with the fact that we are making inconsistent, weak, and timid use of the principles of restructuring and are slow to put these into practice. That is the opinion of the readers participating in the roundtable by correspondence which is being conducted in the journal under the rubric "Democratization of the Party—Democratization of Society" on the eve of the party conference. It stands to reason that it is still too early to draw conclusions from the discussion, as the letters are still coming in. The key areas of the public's thinking can be set out already, it would seem. People are above all thinking about ways and means of creating guarantees for the irreversibility of the restructuring and democratization processes, and about how to consolidate the link between party and society and increase the social activeness of all sectors of Soviet society's political system, and of each communist and citizen in the country.

V.F. Penzin, a nonparty communist (that is how he introduced himself in his letter), expressed well the attitudes of many participants in the debate: "The party's health is the health of the entire social restructuring process which we have gained through suffering and which must be saved from those who would distort it by renewing bureaucratism and slowing down the realization of our people's creative forces, and thus also that of new roads in the development of socialism in our

country. Let us not forget that what is involved is the human factor in the ruling party, the banner of which bears the sacred names of K. Marx, F. Engels, and V.I. Lenin."

Indeed, it is precisely the party as society's political vanguard which must lead in the process of radical, comprehensive democratization of our life, a process which expresses the people's demands. The difficult transition to a new stage in the restructuring process—the stage of practical action—demands that the party develop a reliable and scientifically substantiated policy on the basis of correct assessments and forecasts, and that it carry out a great deal of ideological and organizational work. Lenin wrote about this critical period at the dawn of the Soviet system: "Party people must take the initiative in consolidating, combining and intensifying corresponding work at the nationwide level." (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*) [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, p 306.) Today's party people, the heirs of October, are also expected to take the lead in the nationwide struggle against administrative and bureaucratic management methods, and to organize the gathering of crumbs of national experience, as well as support for everything valuable and enterprising—in Lenin's words, everything that advances socialism to a qualitatively new state and helps us to build our new socialist home all together.

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Trade Union Concerns; KOMMUNIST and AUCCTU Roundtable Meeting

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[Text] The AUCCTU Plenum, which was held last December, noted that the period which followed the 18th Trade Unions Congress "leads to the conclusion that a restructuring has been initiated in the activities of the country's trade unions as well."

However, to this day the AUCCTU is receiving letters similar to the many which came during the plenum's proceedings: "We turn to you as a final instance, with the request to consider the activities of our idling trade union committee" (Comrades Shimanovich, Trush and others, a total of 36 workers at the railroad cars depot, Oktyabrskaya Railroad, Leningrad).

Similar views were expressed also by trade union workers, activists, scientists, workers and representatives of ministries and departments, who participated in the roundtable meeting sponsored jointly by KOMMUNIST and the AUCCTU: in recent decades the authority of the trade unions has declined. This conclusion is an indication of many occurrences and, above all, an acknowledgment of the fact that there has been a lack of consistency in asserting the Leninist principles of the trade union movement. It was precisely this that led to the development of bureaucratism, the accumulation of stagnation

phenomena in the activities of trade union committees and the considerable loss of autonomous and self-governing principles in trade union work. By restructuring, the trade unions can and must make a worthy contribution to the enhancement of the economy, the development of socialist democracy, the advancement of production relations and the solution of many sociocultural problems. Such was the view held at the start of the discussion.

The report on this meeting was drafted by V. Katkov, the journal's special correspondent.

On the Efficiency Formula

"...Trade union activities must be such as to involve ever more extensively and profoundly the working class and the toiling masses in the comprehensive building of the state economy" (V.I. Lenin, *Poln. Sobr. Soch.*) [Complete Collected Works], vol 44, p 374).

The following figures were cited at the meeting: today the Soviet trade unions rally 140 million workers, kolkhoz members, employees, students in vocational-technical, secondary specialized and higher educational institutions, and labor veterans. The country has 31 sectorial trade unions, 708,000 primary trade union organizations and 3.9 million trade union groups.

The trade union committees have an extensive field of union concerns, a complex structure and various interconnecting obligations. This makes a consideration of the committees from within, through the eyes of the participants in the discussion, all the more important.

A. Meshcherkin, member of the AUCCTU Scientific Center:

In May 1987 we made a study of four Moscow enterprises. A total of 630 workers and 130 trade union activists were surveyed. We determined that the highest percentage of appeals by workers to the trade union committee (29.5 percent) had to do with problems of daily life: housing, children's institutions, and travel vouchers; 1.1 percent were related to problems of the socialist competition, 5 percent to labor norming and wages and 5.7 percent to production planning and organization.

Even the partial data (some figures were not reported) indicated that the people considered the trade union committee a kind of agency the purpose of which was to control the distribution of "benefits" at the enterprise. Also interesting were answers to another question: "Who would you turn to first if you encountered social injustice at the enterprise?" According to the answers, 47.3 percent would turn to the foremen and 1.1 percent to the director. All in all, only 6 percent of the respondents answered that in that case they would turn to the trade union authorities (1.7 percent to the trade union group

organizer, 2.2 percent to the shop trade union committee and 2.1 percent to the plant trade union committee). The reasons for this are worth considering...

V. Dybal, chairman of the trade union committee, BelavtoMAZ Production Association:

Today the trade union activist is responsible for travel vouchers, kindergartens and the socialist competition, for taking the people to the theater, for celebrating moving into new housing, burials and births. I am exaggerating, of course, but let us speak frankly: the trade union committee, the trade union aktiv cannot cope with the entire range of obligations assigned to it.

Let us consider the very familiar "Regulation on the Rights of the Trade Union Committee of an Enterprise, Establishment or Organization." Virtually all of its 31 articles start with the words "assists," "participates," "implements," "hears," and "approves." All of them pertain to the trade union committee or trade union aktiv which, as a rule, consists of people holding full-time jobs. How many paragraphs include comments on the basic articles in the regulation? There are 589 such articles, each one of them separately assigning us tasks and indicating what to do and how to do it.

The following figure, familiar to the specialists, should be quoted as well: today more than 70 problems pertaining to the life of a labor collective (I am referring only to those reflected in the regulation) require coordination with the trade union committee. Common sense indicates that however strong its desire may be, the trade union committee (some 10 people) is unable to cope with the entire range of such problems...

Ye. Bokancha, cook at the Bender Cannery imeni N.I. Kalinin of the Varnitsa Agroindustrial Association, trade union group organizer:

Every year we draft a collective contract with the administration and every year it includes the following items: open a cafeteria for the night shift, build accommodation rooms for men and women, etc. The result is a deception, for nothing is opened or built.

What can the trade union do if the administration fails to fulfill the stipulations of the contract? The same old thing: to raise the question (on a level not below that of the trade union raykom) on the failure of officials to meet their obligations; or else, through the legal or technical labor inspector, to levy a fine ranging from 10 to 50 rubles. Frankly speaking, this is not very efficient...

S. Arzhavkin, head of the mass production work department and wages, AUCCTU:

The collective contract is one of the practically tried and tested forms of work which regulate relations between the administration and the labor collective on a truly democratic basis. Every year hundreds of thousands of

collective contracts are concluded throughout the country. In 1987, for example, such contracts were signed by members of administrations and trade union committees at 198,000 enterprises, kolkhozes and establishments. However, more than 600,000 of the obligations and measures stipulated in such contracts (totaling some 19 million) were not met. This may seem insignificant, slightly over three percent; as a rule, however, they include "petty matters" of daily life, as mentioned by Yelena Ivanovna. It is scandalous for the worker to lack a decent lounge, and for the worker to be unable properly relax after work, wash or take a shower. There are more than enough problems in this area. In terms of percentage to the standards of availability of sanitation facilities in the country, the figures are the following: locker rooms, 96 percent; showers, 92; sinks, 98; premises for women's personal hygiene, 73 percent. Such figures are an accusation levied at us, trade union workers and activists. The trade union committee must be more active, it must fight for each item included in the collective contract...

This is good advice. According to trade union statistics, collective contracts are being implemented on the 96-97 percent level. Does this mean that virtually everything is as it should be? In fact, however, collective contracts have long lost their former significance. Today we must really revise this institution, making it consistent with the new rights of the labor collectives. In this case the trade unions must play a major role.

F. Prokopenko, senior rolling-press operator, sheet rolling shop, Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine imeni Yu.V. Andropov:

Our shop was built 26 years ago; the equipment has become morally and physically obsolete. The trade union technical labor inspector sniffs around our furnaces: he could draw up a document demanding a halt in the work but realizes that he would thus hit at the pocketbook of the labor collective. The situation of the voluntary technical labor inspectors is the same. It is not envious: they can see the shortcomings and are unable truly to contribute to their elimination. Such documents have no particular influence on the technical policy of the enterprise. Furthermore, what is the nature of such a document? It creates a conflict, the outcome of which, in many cases, is predetermined by no means in favor of the trade union activist. For example, article 20 of the Foundations of Labor Legislation stipulates that in order to replace a manager who systematically violates the conditions of the collective contract the resolution of the trade union authority not lower than the rayon level is required...

L. Bulygina, chairman, trade union committee, Rele i Avtomatiki Production Association in Kiev:

The trade union committees have a great deal of assignments within the framework of mass-production work. This includes socialist competition, labor norming and

wages, communist subbotniks, development of brigade forms of production organization and counterplanning. Frequently there is no counterplanning but ordinary planning, as part of the direct official obligations of planning and procurement authorities. In this case the trade union worker, the activist (as those present here well know), are used as point men. Generally speaking, the idea is accurate: being the representatives of the public, they will not refuse. The result is that we are the envoys to the central and even the Moscow planning and procurement authorities, asking them to help the labor collective. I too have had the opportunity to play such a role. I waited in the minister's reception room and thought: What am I doing here? Is this my business? Who am I: a procurement worker or a trade union worker, an activist?...

R. Livshits, doctor of juridical sciences, associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the State and Law:

Metaphorically speaking, the trade unions serve two gods: the production process and the individual. Theoretically we can and obviously must speak of the combination of interests of the production process and the individual, which is characteristic of socialism, and the production and protection functions of the trade unions stemming from this fact. However, in real life it becomes frequently necessary to choose between the interests of the production process and the workers. In the case of the trade union this should not be a matter of choice, for the protective function, the defense of the interests of the working man must be given absolute priority. The current activities of the trade union do not meet this requirement. The reasons for this are numerous, including some of a historical nature: let us recall the familiar slogan of the age of industrialization: "The trade union must turn to production." Clearly, the time has come to adopt a different approach: "The trade union must turn to the person."...

M. Pulina, trade union committee chairman, Krasnodar ZIP Production Association:

I have been in trade union work for more than 30 years. Let me say that I support this slogan! However, the situation has always been the following: If the enterprise works better it has greater opportunities to meet the demands of the people. Today, under the conditions of self-financing and self-support, this correlation becomes greater. The cost-accounting income of the enterprise and profits are what I think about when I meet with the people, while I read in their eyes the words "kindergarten," "place in the hostel," or "apartment." Frequently, however, there is nothing we can do: the ministries dictate to us rates of withholding and issue orders affecting literally all of our labor resources. Where can we find the funds for sociocultural measures?...

R. Livshits: I deeply sympathize but nonetheless, let me blame you for the following: You think like a production worker, a planning worker, an economic manager but

not as a trade union leader. Probably you are unable to think otherwise and that is where the entire difficulty lies: for many years the mentality of the trade union worker, the activist, was shaped under the influence of purely economic and other concerns which, for some strange reasons, were imposed upon him.

For example, why is it that the organization (I emphasize the word) of the competition is still considered the most important sector in trade union work? Let us not discuss whether this competition is needed at all in its present shape, against the background of formalism which has accompanied its implementation. This is a separate problem. In many socialist countries, however, the competition is a matter for the administration. The trade unions see to it that the competition does not lead to worker overstress. That is the only real function consistent with the purpose of the trade unions in terms of the competition.

Why is it that for more than 50 years the trade unions have been in charge of state social security, which is a purely governmental function? The sad consequences of this functional stupidity are all too numerous, starting with trade union "initiative" of not paying benefits for the first days of a non-job-related accident, for example. Alas, the obligation to handle state funds, which is extraneous to the trade unions, encourages them to pursue that line.

Many such "why's" could be asked. The answer to all of them would be the same: "The trade union is the prompter of the economic manager." This situation must be changed...

N. Tsikorev, chairman, Orel Oblast Trade Unions Council:

In my view, the very model of perception of the trade unions in the public consciousness must be changed. This model took shape decades ago, perhaps in the difficult postwar times, when the trade union committee was essentially the distributor of simple material goods. To this day it is the material aspect that predominates in trade union activities. In itself, this is not bad, but is it sufficient?

For example, all of us are witnessing the intensive increase in the various activities of independent, informal as they are known, organizations and associations. In our oblast alone there are more than 40 of them. I am not saying that they are some kind of alternative to the trade unions but they create (which, precisely, is their objective and positive role) a certain competition: wherever in the past the trade union committee operated undisputed (and frequently, obviously, idled), today independent social organizations have appeared and are multiplying, organizations which react more flexibly to the demands of the people...

F. Prokopenko: It has been accurately said that we are not in step with life. Today, for example, cooperatives are being set up and individual labor activity is developing. The people are saying that such cooperatives and "individual activities" are legalized fleecers. My comrade standing by the furnace, shift after shift, earns 300 rubles, meanwhile some uncle over there, selling cotton candy, puts 1,000 rubles in his pocket. Whatever explanations we may be given, at this point a question of social justice arises.

Therefore, why should the trade union committee of an enterprise not include in the annual collective contract with the administration a special section on the development of the cooperative movement? Today, as we know, in connection with the conversion to the new economic management conditions, people are being laid off. They should be directed toward the production of goods which are so greatly needed in everyday life, trained and helped organizationally and materially. The consumer market must be filled with goods needed by the people and the activities of private individuals must be economically restricted. At that point the cost of having a cooperative movement would not be so steep...

The area of trade union concerns, vast as it were, is expanding. This is natural. Could this largest organization of the working people exist locked within the framework of its own purely "trade union" aspirations, without relating them to the entire course of the tempestuously developing sociopolitical life? This makes even more important the optimizing of areas of trade union activities, which was extensively discussed by the participants in the debate. Clearly, abandoning functions which are extraneous to trade union committees is one of the major prerequisites for achieving a qualitatively new standard in their work.

Social Reserve of Restructuring

—In terms of state enterprises, unquestionably the trade unions have the obligation to defend the class interests of the proletariat and the toiling masses... (V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 44, p 343).

The social reserves of the economy and their stimulating influence on the development of the processes of socioeconomic renovation have still not been understood or suitably evaluated. We speak and think more about the economic and management mechanisms. What about the individual? What is the "mechanism" which would motivate the person to participate in restructuring?

S. Shkurko, director, AUCCTU Scientific Center:

Speaking of the role and place of the trade unions in the radical economic reform, they consist, I believe, of harnessing the social reserves of the production process. Incidentally, this is an important aspect in the restructuring of trade union activities: the participation of the trade union worker, the activist, the trade union organization as a whole, in the various economic concerns of

the labor collective is justified only to the extent to which it defends the interests of the working people as a class, as representatives of a specific social or age group. Such interests do not always coincide with those of the state, the department, the enterprise or even the labor collective.

One could object as follows: "But then the overwhelming majority of the members of the labor collective are members of the trade union organization. Why should there be a disparity in their interests?" Here is an example borrowed from real life: by virtue of the state of affairs the labor collective of an enterprise may be convinced of the advantage of "black" Saturdays, which is usually an argument used by the administration. The trade union committee remains unconvinced, for its main objective, as a unit of the trade unions is, as we know, by no means that of the implementation of the plan but the reproduction of the manpower. Or here is another situation: under the conditions of self-financing the labor collective is interested in the greatest possible reduction in the number of workers. In this case the trade union committee is the ally of the labor collective. Nonetheless, it should be more interested not in the quantitative but the qualitative side of the matter: how are jobs being closed down and does this violate the legitimate rights of the people and their interests? If this does not take place something else, alas, does: illegal lowering of worker grades, unsubstantiated dismissals or administrative arbitrariness...

V. Provotorov, AUCCTU secretary:

I am looking at a typical letter. Workers at the Naro-Fominsk Mechanization Administration No 3 of Glavmosoblstroy report the following: "In our enterprise the rates of all workers have been reduced by two or three grades. The management explains this by quoting the introduction of new rate documents. However, no single worker was acquainted with those documents in advance." Similar cases have taken place in Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk Oblasts, in the Ukraine, in Estonia and even in Moscow. A wage reform is taking place in the production sectors of the national economy, numbering 75 million people. On 1 January 1988 26 million people were converted to the new wage system, or one out of three workers. Another almost 40 percent of the workers thus affected will convert to the new system in 1988.

In short, the question of the positions of trade unions and of every trade union worker and activist become particularly important under these circumstances. We know, however, that the question of such a position is not merely a problem of internal order but also of the fact that this affects the competence, experience, knowledge, and ability to suggest alternative solutions...

V. Pavlov, deputy chief, wage administration, USSR State Committee for Labor:

The economic reform puts economic managers (particularly those who have become accustomed to the com-

mand style of management) in a difficult position. For example, since no one is now providing money out of the budget, many enterprise managers are comprehensively lowering worker grades with the silent agreement of the trade unions. As a rule, this is being done secretly, through administrative decisions signed by the trade union committee. This leads to deformations which distort the purpose of the measures which are being taken for upgrading the well-being of the Soviet people and increasing the efficiency of public production. The implementation of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers and AUCCTU decrees "On Improving the Wages of Scientific Workers, Designers and Technologists in Industry," of 22 May 1985, and "On Improving the Organization of Wages and Introduction of New Wage Rates and Salaries for Workers in the Production Sectors of the National Economy," of 17 September 1986, known to specialists, public figures and economic managers as decrees numbers 462 and 1,115, faced trade union committees with a number of problems. Obviously, knowledge of the content and purpose of these most important documents is the first prerequisite for successful work with them. What is the situation in this respect?

According to selective survey data, 11.3 and 34.3 percent of surveyed trade union workers and activists are respectively familiar with decrees numbers 462 and 1,115; 50.6 and 52.2 percent "are familiar with their content in general," and 23.9 and 8.5 percent respectively are "virtually unfamiliar" with them; furthermore, 10.2 and 5 percent of respondents "found it difficult" to answer this question. Let us frankly say that the low level of knowledge of an essential part of the radical economic reform is at the origins of a variety of deformations in the practices of labor collectives...

S. Raskatov, chairman, Vologda Oblast Trade Unions Council:

The director at one of our enterprises signed an order reducing by 20 minutes the shift for workers in production facilities with a continuous technological cycle. The time was to be used for a quick meal. The workers should have been pleased. Instead, they submitted a collective complaint to the oblast trade union council. In accordance with the stipulations of the legal labor inspectorate, the order was rescinded as unjustified: with a continuing production technology the mealtime is part of the paid working time.

Naturally, the director could not have failed to know this general concept. Why did he nonetheless issue this order? Simply because he tried thus to save on the wage fund by shortening the working time by subtracting the food break and thus producing an "economy," out of thin air. What does this prove? It seems to me that we are underrate departmental morality and consciousness. They are by no means straight. They can assimilate even the most progressive ideas and adapt them to their own needs.

Now, for example, in connection with the conversion to the new conditions of economic management, a great deal is being spoken about state orders: under the current circumstances this is a necessary and sensible step. Many departments, however, in pursuing their objectives, have distorted this idea and have begun to speak of state orders as "state mandates," and "state punishments." The traditional interceding mission of the trade unions in relations between working people and enterprise administrations has become aggravated today by the course of the economic reform and we must take this into consideration...

N. Zinovyev, chairman, Central Committee of the Trade Union of Heavy Machine Building Workers:

One of the sensitive areas of this process becomes immediately apparent: the conflicting nature of relations between central planning and management authorities and the enterprises. To a certain extent (not in its essence but situationally) this conflict is caused by the fact that the conversion to the new economic management conditions is taking place within the framework of programs and assignments of the 5-year plan, which must be strictly implemented. On this point everyone agrees.

However, that is where it ends. What is the main source of friction? The enterprises in the sector have found themselves (sometimes substantially) in unequal economic and social starting conditions: at the time of conversion to self-financing and self-support some were able to restructure and renovate their assets whereas others (sometimes not by their own fault) were unable to do so. The policy of the ministry toward all was uniform. This "uniformity" is manifested most painfully in practice in the rates of withholdings from profits earned by the enterprise as a result of its cost-accounting activities. The ministry is guided by the control figures of the 5-year plan and is unable to provide full financial aid to enterprises which urgently need technical retooling or the building of sociocultural projects. Naturally, this triggers discontent in the labor collectives. On the other hand, moods of dependency appear on the part of many enterprise managers along with the aspiration to conceal reserves.

In all such complex situations the trade unions act as intermediaries, as petitioners. Should the ministries set up a centralized fund for helping the weak enterprises, at the expense of those who have been able to find means for reconstruction? This would eliminate the unevenness in their situation...

Let us consider the situation. It is true that it would be unfair and undemocratic to ignore the situation in which the labor collectives in many enterprises have found themselves. However, should they be helped "at the expense of other enterprises?" This has already happened: the equalization of the front and urging on laggards to reach the level of the frontrankers. Equalization was achieved but not progress. From the viewpoint of the

familiar concepts on the development of the economy, this was considered normal. Would it not be actually better to close down a bankrupt enterprise than to retain it as burden on its neighbor who may have taken perhaps what is the most difficult step leading to economic prosperity? For otherwise the second step would in all likelihood not follow.

V. Dybal: The idea of a labor collective council appeared in our enterprise 3-4 years ago. At that time, however, it did not work: a high level commission blamed us of trying to create a hybrid which would usurp the functions of the labor collective conference and the trade union, for which reason it would be unviable. Today such councils have become widespread.

Obviously, however, the problems related to the initial period in their establishment remain. Specific forms of interaction between the council and the trade union committee are developed in the course of the practical activities of individuals and, for this reason, anything is possible, including displays of personal ambitions and aspirations to power. We believe that for the sake of the usefulness of this project we must not ignore this. We must seriously, on a scientific basis, consider once again the nature of the system of interaction between these two agencies of democratic self-management.

Much here remains unclear. For example, we have left problems related to the preparations for and organization of conferences of the labor collective to the council. However, we naturally cannot stand aside from the work of the representative authority of the labor collective. A kind of duality appears: it is as though now this is an area of concern for the council, an area in which we, the trade union committee, willingly interfere. The question of the limits of this interference arises. It is obvious that the competence of the councils includes problems of production development. Many of them, however, adjoin our interests. For example, norming does not have any direct connection to the problems of improving labor conditions (a function of the trade union committee); however, if we take into consideration that the norm determines labor intensiveness, the problems assume clearly a "trade union" coloring. Many such problems exist...

We can only agree: in the process of democratization of social life and, in particular, the development of production democracy, this line, establishing relations between councils and trade union committees is the least developed. For example, the question of division of rights has always been a sensitive one. Who has more rights? Perhaps the council, for its decisions are mandatory to the administration. However, the trade union committee has a broader range of competence, ideologically and organizationally related to the trade unions as a whole, operating on the Union level, manifested in protecting the interests not only of a given labor collective but broader trade union interests as well, those of metal workers, scientists, physicians, etc. In other words, objectively conditions exist which contribute to the creation of a kind

of "dual power" on the grass-roots level. In this case the AUCCTU and the scientists must voice their views. We must systematically sum up practical experience and formulate scientific recommendations governing relations between trade union committees and councils of labor collectives.

R. Livshits: Perestroyka is in its third year. Democratization is developing and many management functions have been decentralized and transferred to the local areas. To this day, however, we keep saying what we said 1 or 2 years ago or even earlier. Once again we have bureaucratic administration, coercive planning, scorn of the views of the labor collective and ignoring social self-management authorities, although we heap praises on them. Obviously, there must be some kind of internal, profound reasons which determine the illogical time-marking development of the process of democratization of public and socioeconomic life. The way to understanding a general phenomenon goes through the interpretation of particulars. For example, it is obvious that this practice of accelerated issuing of state orders is decisively clashing with the interests of labor collectives. Do they have real possibilities, through a variety of mechanisms for legal defense, to oppose such practices? They do, for such practices clearly affect the socioeconomic interests of enterprises and trade unions which essentially have in this case the right to a veto. Yes, the area of jurisdiction of this exceptional right is limited to the enterprise. As we know, however, the new Law on the State Enterprise actually lifts this restriction and establishes, on the governmental level, a principle of enterprise activities, the fact that it "independently drafts and approves its own plans" (section I, article 2.1). Naturally, enterprises must be "guided by the control figures" of those same state orders. However, the initial data applicable to the enterprises for such planning "must be strictly interconnected" (section II, article 9.1). In other words, we must take into consideration the capacity of the enterprise and ensure its procurements on the basis of cooperation, with balanced material and technical supplies, etc.

The widespread view is that a right, if it is a real one, is manifested above all in the fact that its potential is achieved through independent activity, as though automatically. However, appeals to the public, to the trade union workers and to the activists to be more persistent and purposeful, to make more daring use of the instruments of the law in defending the interests of the working people, sound and will sound for a long time to come quite relevant...

V. Provotorov: Our shortcoming is also that even as we solve the problems we do not extensively inform of this fact the members of the trade unions. The result is an incomplete idea of our activities, efforts and results. To a certain extent, this was manifested today as well. Let me back this thought with several examples.

The AUCCTU ascribes particular importance to participation in the implementation of an active social policy. For example, today we are extensively involved in drafting the USSR Law on Pensions and legal stipulations on paid leave and price-setting. This work is not reduced to "participation," for we argue, submit proof and, as a rule, have our ideas accepted.

A great deal has also been accomplished truly to upgrade the level of independence of primary trade union organizations: on AUCCTU initiative restrictions in the use of the funds at their disposal, as well as 265 regulatory documents, adopted at different times and restricting the right of primary trade union organizations, have been rescinded. In order to give them practical assistance, last year alone the central trade union authorities assigned more than 500 comprehensive brigades to the local areas. The practical work of trade union committees under the conditions of the new methods for economic management and self-government is being developed at 103 base enterprises. Let us consider one of its aspects, the creation and establishment of labor collective councils. By the start of 1988 such councils had been set up at nearly 84,000 enterprises, establishments and organizations. The basic principles of interaction between trade union committees and labor collective councils were formulated at the second AUCCTU plenum; suggestions were expressed on a dividing pension work between trade union central committees and councils.

Nonetheless, even at this roundtable meeting not everyone was aware of this fact. Actually, a great deal could be said about our accomplishments but that is not what matters the most. What matters is that restructuring demands a dissatisfaction with accomplishments and a constant quest for more energetic and efficient steps...

Sharing this conclusion, the participants in the discussion noted that this depends least of all on the subjective desires of the trade union aktiv and to a tremendous, a decisive extent on their cohesion, organization, militancy, efficient interaction among trade union groups, and the flexibility and dynamism of the organizational structure—all that merges within the concept of "trade union building."

The Trade Union Committee: Structure and Authority

"Communication with the masses... is the most important, most fundamental condition for the success of any would be activity of the trade unions" (V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 44, p 348)

It is thought that the exclusive centralization of management is advantageous primarily for the "top levels," be it an economic or a social system, allowing them to lead the lower levels in the most convenient, command-administrative style. However, after all, centralization had and has its own advantages for the "low levels" as well, freeing them of the need to think and enabling them to avoid responsibility in solving serious problems. Perhaps the psychological reason for stability lies not only in this, but

also in many other deformations of the principle of democratic centralism which underlies the organizational structure of the trade unions.

A. Arzhavkin: We are proud of the fact that trade unions are the greatest mass social organization of workers, and the dynamics and absolute growth of trade union ranks has never caused us particular concern. Today though, in re-examining the work of all groups in the trade union system in the course of restructuring, we are also considering the question: Is a membership card always a testimony to genuine membership in the organization? Judging by the official reports, everything here is normal—virtually one half of the trade union members are also members of our aktiv. However, is this type of activeness appropriate for us today?

The structure of trade union groups also contributes to creating an illusion of strengthening the pulse-beat of trade union life. Consider, for example, how many different types of commissions we have under the trade union committees! They were, as a rule, created according to instructions from above under the pretense of expanding democratic channels in trade union activities. The time has now come to think about the democratic basis of our organization and its independent nature.

Truly, we ask ourselves, when was the last time we held our trade union card in our hands? Alas, already it is not only no longer pinned on blouses (a detail, noted by a poet, which accurately attests to the former authority of trade unions), but ever since the personal payment of trade union dues was abolished, it can be located, whenever needed, but with difficulty. What precisely serves as a guarantee of the high activeness of a member of any association or organization? If we keep the main point in view—the manner in which they serve our interests—then they are professionals.

S. Shkurko: An orientation toward professional interest should become one of the high priority trends in the development of trade union activities. I am not speaking of the social significance of such an orientation (professional unity is a reliable prerequisite for cohesion and class solidarity), but in many ways this makes it possible to modify the practice of trade union work, to grant it the necessary diversity which, unquestionably, improves the attractiveness of trade unions. After all, to rephrase a famous expression, one could say that all organizations are good, except the useless ones...

V. Voronov, head, AUCCTU consolidated department on matters of social development:

I would like to dwell upon the information work of trade unions. Its importance is evident: as you know, the completeness and, in particular, reliability of information are the primary conditions for making optimal management decisions. To put it bluntly: the system for gathering and processing information, which traditionally occurs in the trade unions, is in no way satisfactory

today. The flow of information from local to central agencies is excessively large and unrepresentative, and in many cases is not characterized, to put it mildly, by the necessary truthfulness and accuracy.

We are trying to change this situation. In particular, the All-Union Center for the Study of Social Opinion on Socioeconomic Issues (VTsIOM), headed by Academician T.I. Zaslavskaya, was set up under the AUCCTU and USSR State Committee for Labor. Its basic purpose is to ensure the reliable reverse communications with the population, which is so necessary when making one or another decision that affects the interests of the people. It has proposed conducting 10-12 all-Union surveys annually, related to the development of decisions on matters such as changes in pensions and wages, perfecting the social infrastructure and the service area, various aspects of the activity of labor collective councils and their work under the conditions of state acceptance and cost-accounting, etc.

This list of questions is already an overview of the Center's work program, which consists of revealing the people's attitudes toward important management decisions, and this is why the AUCCTU is striving to become the VTsIOM's basic client.

Problems of perfecting the trade union structure trouble the trade union community and the AUCCTU. Even this high authority of the trade union system is itself being restructured today: some of its departments are being abolished and the number of apparatus personnel is being reduced. It is thought that the results will be positive, but in order for this to happen, the entire style of work should be changed, and interrelations with lower organizations reconsidered. As the roundtable participants noted, it is a shame that this activity basically only touches upon intercommunications and the redistribution of apparatus personnel in the higher-level agencies—trade union and trade union council central committees. But how do things stand with their functions? Here they have accumulated problems of their own.

N. Tsikorev: We recently met with all trade union obkom chairmen in order to consult on possibilities of perfecting the oblast system. Fourteen out of 16 were in favor of eliminating obkoms as an essentially superfluous intermediate link in the trade union structure.

In this connection, it would also be appropriate to consider the following, seemingly strange question: on what is each ruble of trade union dues spent? The primary organization retains 67.6 kopecks, while as of April 1987, by decree the AUCCTU itself has the right to dispose of the following funds: 8.9 kopecks are deducted for the funds of the AUCCTU and trade union central committees; and 23.5 go to trade union councils and committees. Kopecks add up into rubles, rubles into thousands: the trade union obkom apparatus in Orel Oblast "is worth" 560 thousand rubles annually...

In view of this statistic, it is easy to imagine what sort of reserves the reorganization of the trade union structure contains. It is not simply a matter of economizing on material means. How does the person—the trade union worker and activist—feel within this structure? What about the trade union committee on the primary level, of an enterprise, kolkhoz or institution? Today, in reproducing the activity of high-level committees, its efforts, so to speak, are being scattered in many directions. Formalism, which is inevitably generated whenever the organization of work is devoid of common sense, is the natural result.

The present situation of the trade union worker and activist on the primary level is not consistent with the tasks assigned to him by the restructuring which has been initiated in the trade unions. Such personnel are not ready for perestroika organizationally, morally-psychologically or in the sense of material and technical support of working conditions. Such was the general conclusion which was expressed on this matter by virtually all participants in the discussion. This is also confirmed by sociological studies conducted by the AUCCTU Scientific Center. According to the survey conducted among trade union personnel and activists, among those surveyed 0.8 percent agreed "very willingly" to become members of trade union bodies; 12.9 percent were "willing;" 51.8 percent were not all that willing and 25.8 percent firmly rejected such a possibility, whereas 8.7 percent failed to express an opinion.

Judging by the statements of the roundtable participants, what are the reasons for the problems experienced by a trade union leader, so sharply reflected in the statistical data we quoted?

The first is the excessive and frequently unjustified load, taking into consideration that the work of the trade union aktiv is primarily of a voluntary nature. Numerous statements were made on this subject, for which reason all that should be pointed out is the fact that with the creation of the STK it may perhaps be the first time in trade union practices that the real possibility appeared for relieving trade union committees from extraneous obligations. This becomes even more important today, with the drafting of the Law on Trade Union Rights.

The second reason is the consequence of the first and in itself is a problem familiar in trade union life as "unrelieved trade union aktiv." Since this reality of trade union life itself is not new, let us touch upon its sensitive spots only.

Strange though it might seem, the radical economic reform is lowering the level of the prestige of engaging in social trade union activities, due to the fact that, as forecast by V. Dybal, "under the conditions of cost-accounting the quality structure of the trade union aktiv will decline." There is an explanation for this as well: the cost of a work minute is rising and it is unlikely, as M. Pulina said, that someone would be willing now to work "for the boy who is at a session," particularly if he is a

regular production worker. The palliative, as suggested by S. Arzhavkin, is the following: "Based on an agreement with the administration, to pay trade union activists who hold full time jobs, for 2 to 3 hours of working time to meet their social obligations." Another idea was expressed on this account by R. Livshits: "Why should the labor collective which, under the new circumstances, is the main handler of the wage fund, not pay the salary of the trade union worker? Naturally, this would occur if that worker deserves it and, unquestionably, the labor collective would know who among the colleagues-comrades would be able worthily to earn his keep by defending the interests of the brigade or the shop in dealings with the administration." S. Shkurko reminded those present that similar experience has already been acquired by labor collectives of the Mosoblsestroy No. 18 Administration, where the question of the released trade union worker was solved precisely through that method. Finally, there is a third facet to this problem. It may seem that compared with the other public organizations, the trade unions, which rely essentially on the foundations of society as a whole, enjoy unquestionable advantages in solving personnel problems. However, under what circumstances can such foundations be used? They are largely determined by the social prestige of a profession. Some of the conditions for the organization of trade union activities were expressed earlier. But here is another important detail which was emphasized in the address by L. Bulygina: "The party authorities follow quite closely the growth of their cadres. Who controls this process in the trade unions? No one. The result is that the chairman of the trade union committee, who has held this job a number of years, clashes with the administration (which is inevitable if he is a good trade union chairman) after which, relieved from his social duties, he must await the decision concerning his career, coming from that same director. In this case, as the saying goes, variants are possible and, as a rule, they are not in favor of the trade union leader."

We can only agree with the general view expressed by the participants: given the existing circumstances, the trade union committees are not the only ones to be blamed. We should consider perhaps the following fact: according to existing regulations, the shop committee is allowed one full time official per no less than 1,000 working people. How can this enhance the prestige of trade union work? Alas, such prestige is low, as confirmed by statistical data. The study of the qualitative structure of trade union cadres, based on their length of work in trade unions and their age group, offers the following picture: among the personnel of central committees of trade unions who have held their social positions for more than 10 years, trade union cadres account for 43.1 percent of the total number. Chairmen and secretaries account for 67.2 percent. Naturally, experience is highly valued but we know what it could turn into: mental inertia and the habit of following procedures developed once and for all. In short, the problem of rejuvenating trade union cadres is quite pressing. For example, whereas in said category of trade union workers people under 40 accounted for 30.7 percent in

1982, they accounted for 30.4 percent in 1986. Meanwhile, people 51 years of age or older accounted, respectively, for 26.8 and 28.1 percent. This clearly indicates a process of aging among trade union cadres.

Therefore, all of this put together, allowed one of the participants in the discussion, N. Tsikorev, to draw a conclusion which may have been excessively categorical and polemically sharp but by no means groundless: "People assume trade union positions to 'mark time.' The basic principle in cadre policy which could be described as 'residual,' which developed in the trade unions during the period of stagnation, has largely been retained. Let us not ignore this."

Yes, we shall not ignore it and we shall say that among the problems of trade union life this one, like the others we named here, is one of the most pressing problems which requires a planned and innovative solution in the spirit of perestroika.

Many questions were raised at the roundtable. Many of them, however, were also set aside. That is why the editors believe that in addition to practical steps, new debates and creative and self-critical discussions and scientific developments are needed. They should help us to surmount difficulties and problems in the trade union movement and ensure a radical change in the role of the trade unions in social life.

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United Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow; Notes of a Political Journalist

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[Article by Igor Aleksandrovich Dedkov, KOMMUNIST political commentator]

[Text] We usually go back to Lenin when we come across the complex phenomena of reality. We do this today as well: What would he have said? How would he have acted? What advice would he have given us?

Let us remember that Lenin's last concerns and experiences, which preceded the drastic worsening of his health, were largely related to the national problem. Vladimir Ilich was indignant at Ordzhonikidze's coarseness and tactlessness in his dispute with the Georgian comrades; he was worried by "Stalin's haste and administrative zeal."

It may have seemed as though in his December 1922 notes "On the Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomy,'" Lenin had expressed all of his thought on the subject. In February 1923, however, shortly before the fatal attack of his illness, Ilich kept thinking about the national

problem, and his secretary recorded the following: "1. There should be no quarrels. 2. Concessions must be made. 3. One cannot compare a big state to a small one" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], v 45, p 607).

"There should be no quarrels." Did this exclusively pertain to the fact that Ordzhonikidze had "laid hands" on others? Or was it a firm condemnation of any such method of resolving a conflict? This method has always and everywhere been disgusting. However, it becomes even more unseemly, unforgivable and dangerous in a multinational environment, when something chauvinistic is added to it. "Generally speaking, animosity plays the worst possible role in politics." We have frequently had proof of the accuracy of these Leninist words: Animosity, collective animosity in particular, is a destructive element in social life; nothing good comes out of it.

"Concessions must be made." Does this apply exclusively to the inevitability of compromising and of concessions which a "big" state should grant to a "small" one? Or is this a clear and simple reminder that there is no other "nonconcessionary" way of solving problems among nationalities? The other method is a reciprocal national-egotistical arrogance and stubbornness, aggravation, exacerbation and worsening of conflicts, i.e., in simple terms, a **fight**, and this is unacceptable, inadmissible to any true communist, to any cultured and civilized person aware of his responsibilities.

Let us recall this Leninist concern.... At that time he did not think of himself but of the tremendous multinational country, of its future, of all of us....

For many years friendship among the peoples was considered in our country one of the successful areas of life. Its symbolic embodiment, its kind of "emblem," as it was described at a recent writers' plenum, appeared in the solemn conclusions of great holiday concerts, when hundreds of people wearing their national costumes formed a grandiose and picturesque composition, after which both the stage and the hall merged in lengthy reciprocal applause. This was beautiful and impressive as well as soothing: There were no problems, everything was splendid!

Actually, it is not the concerts that are to be blamed for our placidity.

It was as though the national problem was considered solved once and for all with the proclamation that a new historical community—the Soviet people—had appeared in the country. With the help of "deleting" or suppressing unpleasant information, the picture of an external well-being was firmly supported and no visible problems arose within the "community." Life, however, whether we wish it or not, takes its due and, sooner or later, we are forced to abandon our rose-hued illusions or self-deceit. Although squeezed in a far corner in order

not to spoil our moods, nonetheless reality makes its way and, let us admit it, encountering it is not always a joyful experience. Always, however, and this we must firmly point out, it benefits life and socialism.

In addition to everything else, perestroika means freeing all reality from departmental and other "padlocks," and glasnost and openness instead of concealment and suppression. It means working on the basis of reality and on the basis of reality alone.

We know now that friendship among the peoples exists not only in its exhibited, its conflict-free variant, but also in the real live, contradictory and complex variants of reality. Some of them trigger our legitimate pride while others cause common concern, forcing us to think of unsolved or neglected problems and unresolved contradictions. All of us have had the possibility to see that in the life of a large multinational country nothing becomes simpler with time; despite predictions and administrative zeal, national features are not absorbed within a single linguistic sea and the old tight historical knots which we inherited do not become unraveled by themselves. This proves yet once again that nothing in history vanishes without a trace. Nations forget neither good nor bad, and ignoring this fact or not noticing it is rash, tactless and dangerous. Furthermore, whether we like it or not, we must remember and know everything, not for the sake of persecution but for healing the old unhealed wounds, for living united and working on the basis of mutual trust, understanding and aid.

Were we not shaken up when we found out that our fellow citizens, brothers and sisters in a historical community, could suddenly forget this community and feelings of brotherhood, which had withstood so many severe trials?... However, by forgetting this, as though blinded and losing their memory, in the throes of sinister passions, they also forgot the simple and perhaps obvious international fact that regardless of who our mother was or where we were born, we are above all people and anyone who pits the national against the human, regardless of his subjective wishes, either commits or provokes the commission of crimes against humanity. At this point politics and culture collapse and pogroms and criminality begin....

The hour struck and long years of placidity were disrupted. This began in Alma-Ata and then spread elsewhere....

We must bitterly acknowledge that no other more sensible ways and means were found there to solve the old and new disputes, claims and counterclaims, other than insulting national feelings and intensifying the stifling and heated atmosphere of hostility and rigid confrontation.

When calls are heard to obey the voice of the "soil and the blood," we should listen to such calls more closely before we obey them slavishly. As we know, national

feelings may exist on the level of base instincts but also on the level of culture and socialist values. What is preferable? Should we try to clarify relations and determine "advantages" of one nation over another in the language of instincts? Or should we engage in a dialogue among equal neighbors who respect one another, using the language of culture, the language of perestroika? In other words, using the language of reason, dignity, democracy, humaneness and mutual concessions for the sake of saving the whole?

Is it possible that some knots turned out to be tighter because for many years at some levels, gradually a social injustice developed, harming democracy and the local "big" state neglected the interests and rights of citizens of a "small" state and its national autonomy?

One of the roots of the evil is that there are people, including some carrying party cards, who interpret and use their official position and advantages as national positions and advantages. The response, naturally, is the accumulation of insults, irritation and discontent which are also given a national coloring. Such a "translation" of social relations into the language of relations among nationalities is extremely dangerous. It could confuse, mislead and carry away many people but, as history has repeatedly confirmed, this way inevitably leads to an impasse. Luckless but also careful and refined "translators" inspire popular dramas and even tragedies. For a long time to follow the generations will recall such misfortunes and then there will be a new thoughtless "national patriot" who will once again dig into the old ashes to resurrect the fire of national dislike and enmity.

Unfortunately, it happens to this day that in everyday relations the ethnic origin of a person means more than it means in terms of ordinary life, and that Question No 5 in a survey or a note in a passport somehow push into the background primary human qualities, such as labor skills, knowledge, culture and moral qualities and even, as they used to say in the past, civic virtues.

Wherever it may be, and whatever the seemingly pretext for such an evaluation of a person and his possibilities, it inevitably influences the moral and psychological climate in the society and the entire area of human relations. Would it not be better to be interested in whether a person is a good worker, honest, conscientious, and initiative-minded, if he is concerned with the destiny of the country, perestroika and socialism? If we start by tracing the family and tribe of a person and the "purity" of his blood, it may fully turn out that we shall not be concerned with equality, perestroika or socialism.

Wherever the flammable material of unsettled national insults and quarrels accumulates, where social and economic relations assume a national coloring, and where zealous representatives of the "big" state neglect the language, culture, traditions and history of a "small" state, willy-nilly, an "explosive system" with a delayed fuse will develop. Unless noted and disarmed on time,

sooner or later it would explode. Yet detonations have their own laws. If there are other similar "systems," installed as a result of someone's thoughtlessness or political illiteracy or else open and challenging chauvinism, they will respond and also blow up. What happens then? What forces will then celebrate on the streets? Will they be humane, right and just? Will the street be one of equality, freedom and friendship among the peoples?

If that could only be! Let us honestly respond to ourselves that this would be, instead, the holiday of the forces of destruction of culture, a holiday of intolerance and enmity, a holiday for the opponents of perestroika and of the renovation of socialism!

To this day some people are willing to warm their hands at the fire of any popular trouble and to pass sentence as follows: All of this must be blamed on democracy, glasnost and reform; the people have been turned loose, the old order has been forgotten and so has the firm hand! And there are people who believe such lamentations!

Is this what we want, is this what is needed by a country which has returned to the path of Lenin's socialism?

A great many things have become inseparably linked and intertwined in the history of the Soviet peoples. This history contains heroic pages which have recorded the revolutionary liberation struggle against autocracy and national oppression. There is the unforgettable remembrance of the first years of the building of socialism and the cultural revolution. The Great Patriotic War became a truly fraternal mutual support among the peoples of our country.

However, our joint history also contains dark pages, and however much we may wish it, they cannot be deleted or rewritten. However, they were written not by the will of the Russian or any other people. The difficulties which were experienced, not only by the Russian people but also by the other nationalities and ethnic groups, during the period of Stalin's illegalities, were our common troubles, our common bitter memory and pain. The repressions of the 1930s carried out against ethnic party cadres and men of culture, accused of nationalism, can neither be forgotten nor forgiven.

The living today have the sacred duty of going back and clearing forgotten and insulted names and restoring justice once and for all.

Today interest in postrevolutionary history is unparalleled. Sometimes it is considered unhealthy, something which distracts us from pressing matters. However, it may be precisely this interest that indicates spiritual and moral health and the growth of people's self-awareness.

A great deal was being concealed from the Soviet people, whether it affected the country at large or any specific republic. The people, however, want to go through life

seeing, want to know the truth, want to reach the truth and they have the inalienable right to do so, for this is their country, their land and their destiny.

It is perhaps time to realize that truth, including historical truth, does not depend on our wishes and that historical facts cannot be shaken off like an annoying fever....

History united and tempered the peoples of our country through most severe trials: We jointly took part in a great revolution and a great war and in great constructive work. When we struggled and are still struggling against social injustice and against distortions of socialist means and objectives, the line of struggle has divided and is dividing the people not according to national features. This must be seen clearly. Perestroika can win only if we are together in this great historical act, if we care for the friendship among the peoples, remembering the courage and the efforts of the generations it took to put it together.

At its 27th congress the party pledged "to display particular responsiveness and caution in anything affecting the development of national relations, affecting the interests of each nation and ethnic group and the national feelings of the people, promptly to solve problems which arise in this area and to engage in a principled struggle against any manifestations of nationalism, chauvinism and parochialism."

Has all that was included in the congress's resolution been carried out in full? Could we honestly say that always and everywhere we were sensitive, cautious, principle-minded, that we joined in the struggle against chauvinistic and nationalistic moods, views and appeals, promptly and authoritatively?

More likely, this part of the resolution was accepted by many people on a formal, superficial basis: Some comrades lacked knowledge, convictions, the power of ideological arguments or the possibility of setting the moral example in this fine and even delicate area of national relations.

Unfortunately, the administrative, the command ardor and urge, mental dogmatism and a simplistic attitude toward problems of national culture, history and language are to this day hindering and harming ideological work in the republics. Obviously, we must firmly reject the sticky "legacy" of the past, including the imperial past, the mentality and behavioral stereotypes of which are difficult to surmount and sooner or later make themselves visible....

The headlong and impressive growth of national self-awareness is a real fact of tremendous importance in our Soviet reality. This growth became possible thanks to the socioeconomic and cultural upsurge of each individual nation which owes its successes not only to its own efforts but to the entire community of republics and to

the spiritual wealth of the country. The shaping of a developed national-historical self-awareness is not a regional phenomenon but a new stage of spiritual maturity of our common multinational society. It is a gain of socialism and not its error or blunder. Equalization, thoughtless "internationalization" and standardization may have been the greatest error and foolishness of socialism. However, it would also be proper to remember that the establishment and development of self-awareness, of a nation or an individual, is not insured against "growing pains," including some which are dangerous, such as excessive feeling of self-importance, claims to exclusivity, and refusal to engage in healthy and critical self-assessment. Ability to engage in national self-criticism is an indication not of weakness and disorganization but, conversely, of strength, of spiritual, moral and social health.

It is an extremely inconsiderate thing when people, who display daring and self-confidence because of a low level of competence, undertake, for example, to speak of the "lack of future" of any given language and the culture on which it is based. One should begin with the consideration of whether this language had not been harmed over long periods of time and used under unequal conditions alongside another dominant language and was the thought "incidentally" instilled that it was "second rate" and doomed?... We should also bear in mind that any language within the country is a natural phenomenon, the result of a long social development, a repository of unique popular experience, historical memory and mentality.... But then, some official would declare it "obsolete," and doomed, like some kind of village "without a future!" Is this not absurd?

We worry about protecting forests and waters. We learn how to care for any small living thing in nature. Meanwhile, we adopt a calm and indifferent attitude toward the possible disappearance of a language or even of a small ethnic group.

And why, after displaying such an indifference toward preserving the wealth of mankind are we amazed by sharp outbreaks of national feelings and various protests?

Yet there is nothing astounding in such cases: Outbreaks and protests are somehow "provoked" by incompetence, by the insufficient knowledge of some people, including local personnel, and their lack of habit to engage in an equal dialogue and to establish the fine points of a national situation.

The history of the Soviet state and its culture is the common history of the peoples of our country but also, inevitably, the history of each ethnic group within the Soviet Union, including its cultural and political establishment. The Russian people do not need the type of respect shown in history textbooks, which describe in more gentle and vague terms the great-power colonial policy of tsarism toward the national outlying areas and

its punitive actions. The science of history must give everyone his proper due: Coercion must not be described as being more attractive, more forgivable and "progressive," if it is "our" coercion and not "someone else's." If we were to adopt this point of view each nation would start to justify "its own" home-grown aggressors and successful conquerors, keep solemn track of victories over "unbelievers" and "foreigners," and so on. At that point there would be no end to bellicose altercations or praises on the subject of who is "above" or "stronger" than someone else. This, however, would hardly advance friendship and reciprocal trust among nations.

Naturally, the people would like to know the history of the founding of their nation and its struggle for independence and free development, the history of their culture and its creators and place on the cultural map of mankind. This is their inalienable right. To obstruct this aspiration means to nurture nationalistic moods and thoughts. Nonetheless, we are concerned when history is used not only in order to promote the national pride and feelings of national worth but also for purposes of boastfully pitting one nation against another and asserting national superiority in various areas.... Naturally, khans and princes, tsars and kings played a major role in the past. It is more important to us, however, to study and know something else: the way people cooperated and interacted among each other, toiled and built, i.e., the history of human labor and the acquisition of knowledge and culture and their development.

Obviously, the curricula in schools and VUZes are insufficiently oriented toward the study of the history and cultures of the peoples of our country. Does it suffice to be familiar with one another primarily through tourist trips, souvenirs and stores? In turn, the mass information media could promote and expand interest in the way of life, traditions and cultures of different nations and ethnic groups in the Soviet Union. Is the Baltic area famous only for its entertainment and movie stars? Why, for example, do we hear so rarely from the television screens views on national and Union problems voiced by Baltic writers, philosophers and historians? The same could be said of scientists and artists in the Transcaucasus, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia and Central Asia. Our country is rich in people with the highest possible labor skills and civic responsibility, people of great knowledge and culture, people of talent and mastery of their work. Their experience and thoughts could and should be made known to all. This is our international property, our common spiritual wealth. The rapprochement among nations, reciprocal enrichment of cultures, and joint accumulation of ethical and esthetic values are possible only with a real and not formal interest in one another, with a steady increase in our knowledge of others, and with creative and labor contacts free from any ostentation. A great deal remains to be done in this area! A great deal of thought, sensitivity and sincere fraternal interest are required!

This path is neither simple nor short.

To live in a multinational country means to think and be concerned not only with oneself or the members of one's tribe and area but also to learn and be able to think about others, to remember others, and to make one's decisions and actions consistent with the opinions, interests and traditions of others. In other words, we must never forget the interests of the entire Soviet community of nations with its related main objectives which bring us together—socialism, democracy and perestroyka.

In prerevolutionary times Lenin was concerned by the fact that national slogans could divide and lead the Russian proletariat away from revolutionary tasks and objectives. Today as well, under absolutely different historical circumstances, we can justifiably ask ourselves: What are the reasons for the revival of the national problem in one part of the country or another? To what extent does this unite or divide us, distract us from perestroyka or contribute to it?

When a national feeling has been insulted, and we remember Lenin's "nothing 'insults' ethnics worse than attacking a feeling of equality and disturbing this equality," as we now understand, this occurs most frequently wherever perestroyka is taking place slowly, where it gets stuck, where it is clearly obstructed. What makes national passions dangerous is that they are difficult to restrain within certain limits controlled by reason, for which reason one cannot say in the least that they help perestroyka. They clearly reveal difficulties in matters of perestroyka, also caused by our former placidity concerning the national problem. "Outbursts" of national feelings unquestionably distract us away from perestroyka and trigger gloating in its opponents although, on the other hand, they encourage the more daring and consistent implementation of perestroyka in all areas, clearing obstructions and removing the social grounds under nationalistic speculations.

We are particularly concerned when national problems become overinflated and catch some people unawares. In words such people frequently favor perestroyka and in their speeches mandatorily pay homage to it as though in bowing in front of an icon; in fact, however, whether they wish it or not, they help to divide the people and to extract out of any conflict situation—political, economic or any other—the "national root," so to say. They try to find in the various troubles, major and minor, such as destructions of monuments of architecture and hasty and poorly planned designs and projects, economic discoordinations, and so on, above all not social but national reasons and premises. Occasionally it suffices for them to identify a "foreign" name among true or imaginary culprits and consider that the question has been "solved." This is an old extremely simplistic method: to identify the culprits on the outside, not "among our people," but "among foreigners," and, as has frequently been the case, to look for the latest mythical "enemies."

This phenomenon, with its characteristic features of chauvinistic and nationalistic feelings, took root in the pre-crisis, the stagnation period in our development and bears its mark. Insofar as it is based on national spiritual values, although not all that discriminately, preferring to seek in them conservative elements, such a feeling could somehow be understood and even ascribed a certain instructive role. However, when efforts are made to instill in society that everything difficult in our history, with all of its dramatic turns, starting almost with the October Revolution, is the result of a treacherous conspiracy by the sinister forces of world "masonry," at that point we must firmly say that such rather secondhand evil-smelling "philosophy of history" is not for us, is not for the communists, and that such dirty myths directed at the basest sides of human nature have nothing in common with the ideology of socialism, the ideology of renovation.

The path of our revolution was incredibly complex and difficult and, at times, tragic. However, this was **our** revolution and **our** path. We chose it ourselves and all that it included that was great and bright, heroic and difficult, we also owe to ourselves and, naturally, to the historical circumstances which did not spare us. However, we entered this pioneering way as internationalists, and no trials made us change.

Internationalism has nothing in common with depersonalized national cultures, traditions and way of life. The term international is not a synonym of without nationality. Internationalism is based on common socialist values, on a social ideal which rallies people of different nationalities. Internationalism does not demand of anyone a rejection of his cultural originality or national features. This would be stupid and absurd. It would be equally stupid to pit national originality and exclusivity against the natural dynamics of life which inevitably brings the people closer to each other.

A discussion has been initiated among writers whether it is proper to describe the Russian people as the "elder brother" or not. Obviously, self-boasting and a desire for praise and glorification is not all that comfortable and seemly. But if at a difficult time in life one said "thank you, elder brother, for your help," it came from the heart. The point is not who is the elder, higher or "main." The point is our reciprocal responsibility, and it so happens that historically the Russian people have assumed more such responsibility. This is not an advantage but a tremendous liability which is historically explainable.

The Russian language and Russian culture act as intermediaries among the national languages and cultures in our country. Deservedly, the Russian language is described as the language of communications and kinship. We proceed from historically developed realities when we say that Russian-national bilingualism is becoming our standard of life. This does not mean in the least that the Russian language is better and richer than

others, for which precise reason everyone must learn it. The reality is that one cannot do without the Russian language if one wishes to become an active citizen, to participate in social life and to be exposed to the spiritual wealth of Russian culture and, through it, to that of many national cultures in the country and throughout the world.

One must be flexible, cautious and sensitive in the area of linguistic policy, taking into consideration the characteristics of each national area. In some areas, for example, we must support and strengthen the positions of the Russian language and explain why it must be studied. Elsewhere it is the national language that needs support and somewhere else again, both, which has also been the case. No single language should be denigrated or imposed and those languages which have been hastily declared as "having no future" should be helped.

Unfortunately, an ordinary display of culture and tactfulness is still lacking in our relations among nationalities. It also happens that an entire nation becomes judged on the basis of a few disreputable people. Such people, who have come to work and live in another republic, ignore the customs and characteristics of its nation and are not interested in its language and culture. Worse, they bring with them not the best of their own customs and display a lack of culture. There are still many insulting epithets and primitive narrow-minded concepts and all sorts of slanders of one nationality or another.... This is garbage but it is quite difficult to remove. The national dignity of a person may be insulted and such an insult leaves a deep and lasting wound. Improper behavior undermines friendship among the peoples in daily life.

Veterans of the Great Patriotic War say that at the front a person's nationality was neither noticed nor discussed. The only criterion was the behavior of the individual in combat, in difficult times. Those who went to school after the war will probably not recall anyone being excited by this problem in class. Something deeply alien to the spirit of a socialist society must have entered our way of life in official and other relations to make us all of a sudden start paying attention to the nationality of a person as though this is what determines his practical and moral qualities, intelligence, capability, etc. Therefore, while comprehensively developing national cultures and cheering the growth of national self-awareness, we must comprehensively contribute to the strengthening and development of the feelings of our social and international commonality and the unity of our basic interests and indivisibility of our historical destiny.

We are building a socialist, a democratic country. This is a difficult practical task but it is precisely this that can truly unite and rally us. This task cannot be implemented without the friendship among equal, highly developed and democratic peoples, and without an unbreakable union among republics.

Our party is international in terms of ideology, spirit, programmatic principles, and structure. The communists have no right to give preference to any specific national interest, even one which is personally close to them, compared to the interests of all other nations and the interests of society as a whole. It is their party and human duty to proceed from the interests of each nation and, at the same time, the interests of our entire Union of republics, of this unique multinational community the historical expediency of which was tested and not rejected by time.

We remember how complex and difficult it was not only voluntarily to put together a conglomerate of peoples, as we inherited it from the tsarist empire, and which was transformed by the October Revolution and the Bolshevik Party into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Even a small nation has its own history which goes deep into the centuries, and a territory on which that nation was formed and developed and which, for a variety of circumstances, has not always been kept by that nation or else preserved but not in its entirety. This may have happened a long time ago but it has also happened in our century as well. In this connection, one must point out that no nation should be held responsible for the criminal actions of some of its individual representatives. To claim the opposite means roughly to call for punishing not only the delinquent but his entire family, the old and the young. In terms of entire nations, such actions could be qualified as criminal.

What are we to do now, when we are asked upon to redraw national territories?

True, historical demands could confirm the substantiation of one or another suggestion or claim. True, the "land-use officials" of the past were not always impeccable or far-sighted. But let us be sensible: In such a matter no one knows the outcome of any such undertaking, particularly if passions become involved. And so people will start going to Moscow pulling for a lost "great reign!" No, we must choose: either perestroika, in the course of which gradually and democratically, taking all factors into consideration, without shouting and noise, any problem can be solved, or else obstructing it in all possible ways by erecting on its path a variety of obstacles such as "extraordinary" and "urgent" problems. We must all understand that such obstacles play in the hands of conservative forces which are nostalgic for the old brusque orders, when the destinies of peoples could be settled with an arbitrary signature. It is only in the course of perestroika, it is only within the framework of perestroika and trusting it that we shall be able to solve even the most complex and pressing problems which have arisen.

At one point someone joked that in recent decades we have become particularly successful in "internationalizing our toasts." We have become very successful in verbal internationalism. Our internationalism will become internationalism in fact when we see to it that

every individual in our country, wherever he may live and whatever his nationality or customs, will feel himself everywhere well, confident and free, as an equal citizen and full master of the socialist society.

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Toward Full Power of the Soviets

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[Article by Boris Pavlovich Kurashvili, doctor of juridical sciences, leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the State and Law]

[Text] Today everyone understands and acknowledges the key significance of the soviets in the system of governmental and, as a whole, social management. However, it is frequently assumed that there is no need for their in-depth reorganization, and that all that is necessary is to make them more efficient. However, we have frequently attempted to do so... and invariably failed. It makes no sense to continue in the same spirit. Obviously, the time has come to think of the profound reasons for the low efficiency of the soviets and of their radical reform, which could and should become the pivot of the democratization of the entire system of state governing and management authorities.

In 1917 the soviets represented a rejection of parliamentarianism, and the sharply negative attitude toward it on the part of leaders and masses at that time is understandable. Today, under entirely different historical circumstances, the following question arises: Was this rejection excessively comprehensive and unquestionable and were some elements of parliamentarianism, which would have been useful to the soviets, rejected as well? The question can now be answered in the affirmative.

In this connection, a creative approach must be adopted to a number of familiar statements made by V.I. Lenin, reflecting the features of the initial stage in the development of the soviets and of our statehood as a whole. Today, 7 decades later, in the course of the qualitative renovation of socialism and the restructuring of the political system, new solutions are becoming quite necessary. Let us recall that Lenin objected to those who exaggerated the truth of the "superiority of the Soviet system over bourgeois-democratic parliaments," making it "excessive" and, therefore, "to the point of absurdity" (see "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 46).

All of this, however, does not mean in the least that the ideas themselves have become obsolete. On the contrary, the most important among them, that the soviets are working corporations managed not by irresponsible

magniloquent politicians, but by men of the people, who were the most informed of the people's needs and expectations, must precisely be implemented.

The need for soviets which are like parliaments, functioning with a certain consistency, appeared from the very first months after the October Revolution, with the creation of a system of state administrative authorities. The VTsIK, which was elected at the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets, was equivalent in terms of number of representatives (more than 300) to a parliament. When it was disbanded in January 1918 by the Constituent Assembly (a representative authority of a parliamentary type), which abrogated the main decrees promulgated by the Soviet system, the VTsIK numbered more than 400 representatives.

By emphasizing the advantage of the Soviet form of popular representation compared to the parliamentary one, Lenin was concerned not simply with a change of form but, above all, of the purpose of this change, i.e., instilling a new content, a new principle in accordance with which "the people, rallied by the soviets, were to govern the state" (op. cit., v 31, p 188). The point was for the simple people themselves to make the basic decisions and for the elected representatives of the people not to be replaced by officials and technocrats in such a vitally important matter. Alas, with weakened control, the latter usually ascribed to the administration of the state a bureaucratic nature: officially everything seems to be done as it should but in essence we are facing the primary concern shown by bureaucratic elements for their own self-seeking interests, neglecting the basic interests of society and replacing them with departmental, parochial and corporate interests, which violate the rights of the working people.

Rejecting any useful democratic form of procedure whatsoever only on the grounds that it may remind us or may duplicate a parliament would be a display of blind dogmatism. According to Marxist-Leninist theory, socialism is not some kind of "upside-down society." It is a transitional society in its main and essential features but not absolutely and abstractly the precise opposite of capitalist society; meanwhile, it is not as yet communist in the full meaning of the term. It is a society based on public ownership and is free from the exploitation of man by man; it implements the principle of distribution according to labor. Let us add to this that it accepts and uses democratic forms of organization of social life whenever and wherever they were first applied, whether in a primitive system, whether one of slave-ownership, feudalism or capitalism, as long as all such democratic forms can properly serve the new superior social justice. Inheriting the elements of parliamentarianism is only a specific case of the use by socialism of anything valuable in the history of mankind. If "semiparliamentarianism" has indeed become timely, it would be unreasonable to reject it only because it could be considered by the "orthodox" dogmatists a distortion of the soviet form of

representation. It is not excluded that "Soviet parliamentarianism" will become a new stage in the development of both soviets and of parliamentarianism.

In order to understand the specific nature and historical fate of the soviets, it is exceptionally important to bear in mind that as a result of the sociopolitical creativity of the popular masses they appeared as the authorities of the political rule assumed by the working class and all working people. They were a form of initial organization of the new governmental system, resting on the ruins of the mechanism of the former bourgeois state. The specific features of the soviets, which developed previously in the course of solving specific historical problems, were consolidated and, with insignificant changes, converted into soviets as the representative authorities of the system, acting in an already established and stable system of governmental administration. It was at this point that it became clear that the efficient functioning of the soviets was obviously not being supported.

Without interrupting their main jobs, the deputies in the soviets perform deputy functions as a public obligation. This means that the deputies are not separated from the people but live among them and take to the soviets their immediate, their live views on the interests of the working people. At the same time, naturally, this means that the deputies can allocate for their work in the soviet relatively little time, which cannot fail to affect its results. Another feature of the soviets is of a production nature. The soviets meet in session (excluding extraordinary sessions which usually are held on the occasion of ceremonies) no more than a few times a year and their sessions last 1, 2 or sometimes several days. In the interval between sessions the functions and rights of the soviets, with greater or lesser limitations (i.e., excluding those which are officially assigned exclusively to the soviets in session) are performed by their presidiums (on the grass-root levels, by the executive committees which are also authorities engaged in performing administrative activities).

The features of the soviets naturally developed in the course of their founding. Soviet deputies did not have to be paid and relieved of their main job, attending sessions as representatives of the people for months on end. There were neither material nor financial possibilities of doing so. On a weekly or monthly basis, in the case of settlements, or at somewhat longer intervals of time, in the case of an uyezd, a guberniya or the entire country, they went to meetings to express the will of the working people who had sent them to the soviets, after which they returned to the voters with information on the decisions made and the power to organize their implementation. A small circle of deputies saw to the comprehensive implementation of such decisions and dealt with current problems. In Lenin's words, the soviets were "the only state apparatus" which ensured the "true participation in management by the entire mass of exploited people

which, even in the best educated and freest bourgeois democracy, had always remained actually 99 percent excluded from participation in management" (op. cit., v 41, p 187).

The practical solution of this problem was no simple matter. In his time Lenin noted that "... the low cultural standard leads to the fact that, being administrative authorities by virtue of their program, operating **through the working people**, in fact the soviets are administrative authorities **for the working people**, working through the progressive stratum of the proletariat but not through the toiling masses" (op. cit., v 38, p 170). By the 1930s the cultural standard of the Soviet people had risen sharply but the situation had remained unchanged with the difference that the "progressive stratum of the proletariat" was represented to a much greater extent in the soviets by members of the administrative apparatus.

How is this explained? Essentially it was the result of the extraordinary circumstances under which Soviet society was developing in the 1930s and 1940s. Violations of the law and cruelties, for which there is no justification, were committed during that time. However, it would be a misrepresentation of history to deny that the circumstances in which the new social system was defining its right to life made some restrictions on democracy obviously inevitable. This led to the creation of an extraordinary management system, characterized by the maximal concentration of power in the hands of the administrative apparatus. More precisely, it was in the hands of the superior party-political leadership and the executive machinery. In such an administrative system, the soviets actually performed the major role of an institution for approval and support of party policy. They became a form of "support democracy." Such was the real situation.

The extraordinary administrative system had to yield to a normal system in the 1950s. Because of historical inertia however and, to an even greater extent, the inability to make profound reforms, it was retained. It was essentially cleansed from illegalities but not restructured. Gradually losing its former power and efficiency, subject on different levels to substantial bureaucratic degeneracy, it was increasingly becoming the main obstacle on the way to economic and sociopolitical development. This organizational-political stagnation, which was inevitably paralleled by elements of a regressive development, lasted 3 decades. As a result, the situation of the soviets remained unchanged. Matters went so far that, as was noted at the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the elected authorities had lost their status and were subordinated to the administrative apparatus. This apparatus, with its bureaucratic distortions, had largely rejected its subordinate status to the political leadership and acted as a "second authority." "Dual power," not in terms of classes but organizations, became and remains one of the main elements of the "obstruction mechanism."

The task of "achieving the total subordination of the apparatus to politics," which Lenin formulated (op. cit., v 43, p 72) is quite pressing today. It would be difficult to solve it without the soviets. The most important step aimed at removing the obstruction mechanism is to convert the soviets from a form of "support democracy" into one of "participatory democracy." Their participation in the exercise of political power and in state administration, in accordance with their nature, should be autonomous, exigent and decisive. Without getting into a number of features of organization and work of the soviets, which confirmed their usefulness, let us try to consider some of the renovated foundations of their reorganization and functioning.

Let us start with the size of the soviets. From large fora, which are better suited for meetings, celebrations and approvals of predrafted decisions, the soviets on all levels could become large collegiums, although visible whether from the inside or the outside, adequate to ensure the comprehensive discussion of problems and make responsible decisions, taking into consideration the views of all or almost all deputies on all matters. There have been complaints in the press, voiced by deputies, that in the course of their participation in the work of the soviets they have not had a single opportunity to express their views and to take part in a practical discussion. We must agree that this is an abnormal situation, for such participation is the precise purpose of sending deputies to the soviets. Such an opportunity would become available to all by reducing the size of the soviets, for instance, by several hundred percent. This would apply also to the USSR Supreme Soviet, which currently consists of 1,500 deputies, as well as the supreme soviets of Union and autonomous republics and the local soviets.

The question of the qualitative structure of the deputies, their social position above all, is of exceptional importance. In violation of the initial concept, increasingly the soviets consist of state, trade-union or other officials. To them membership in the soviets has developed into some kind of honorary supplement to their positions. It is true that by this token they are under the direct control of the voters. In fact, however, this is only the appearance. By reducing the number of deputies, without changing their qualitative structure, the personnel of the administrative apparatus would assume even greater power in the soviets and would begin to apply even greater pressure on the "rank and file" deputies, using their position, power, contacts and ability to find their way in the administrative mechanism.

Here is another essentially important consideration: Who will argue that most of the administrative machinery and its managers perform necessary and useful functions and are worthy of respect. No administrative work would be possible without them. However, by virtue of their positions they are already part of the

power and administrative system, holding jobs in governmental agencies which are accountable to and controlled by the soviets. Is this not sufficient? Should they also hold deputy positions? Is the purpose of this not to report to themselves and to control themselves? The result is an unnatural diffusion within the state power system, an organizational amorphousness which in fact turns into the "undivided power" of the administrative apparatus.

Under the conditions of the one-party system which developed in the USSR, the pluralizing of social life, defining the course of development of the country, and solving differences and contradictions related to appointments and the choice of alternatives could take place entirely within the framework of a single ruling party, using a mechanism of internal party democracy which would be more developed than it is at present. The classical form of pluralism, known as the "separation of powers" (into legislative, executive and judicial) is a different matter.

"Separation of powers" does not mean the absence of unity of power, or the fact that each one of these authorities issues its regulations to society regardless of the others. In its relations with society, the governmental authority acts as a single entity. It is a single entity with its own internal structure, however. Within the framework of this structure and through the interaction among different and sometimes opposite subsystems, the administrative influence of the single power system on society takes shape. In this connection society, with its collective or individual members, could "send back" an administrative decision, considered illegal or inexpedient, to the power system and thus bring into action the mechanism of "separation of powers," interpreted as the mechanism for supplementing and balancing the rights of one governmental authority (which had made the decision) with the rights of another authority, thus leading to the adoption of a better substantiated decision or its elimination or amendment. The power mechanism thus acts on the basis of the principle that "one mind is good but two are better." By calling for the removal from the principle of "separation of powers" the mystical clothing in which bourgeois political philosophers garbed themselves, F. Engels clearly defined its true nature as the "practical division of labor as applicable to the state mechanism, with a view to simplification and control" (K. Marx and F. Engels "*Soch.*" [Works], v 5, p 203).

Let us cite as an illustration a situation according to which a possible constitutional court would judge illegal the plan for the country's economic and social development, approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet, in terms of the activities of a given ministry or department, with billions of rubles at its disposal, actions which the public has deemed inexpedient. Guided by the principle of "separation of powers," the Supreme Soviet should review this question. Should such a review involve the

participation, this time as deputies, of the leading personnel of the ministry or department which has submitted the project and has already expressed its views? Clearly, it should not. Would it not be better to involve in the consideration of this matter, as witnesses and experts, other independent witnesses and experts who may express a different view? Obviously, such should be the case. In the final account, after balancing and weighing the value of competing projects, the matter would be solved by the overall power system in the best possible way.

No radical change in the actual situation of the soviets and their actual transformation from a form of "support democracy" to a "participatory democracy" would be possible without the application of said principle, naturally taking into consideration the supremacy of the soviets (manifested in the fact that the final decisions on controversial administrative problems must be made by the soviets). "Power and administration must be in the hands... of the soviets, and not the officials" (V.I. Lenin, op. cit., v 32, p 47). This, however, does not deny the role of the administrative apparatus. "We cannot live without this apparatus..." (op. cit., v 38, p 169). This apparatus is necessary as long as it knows its place and plays its role. In turn, the soviets play or, rather, should play their special role in the state power system. However, they would be able to implement their functions only when they are free from administrative pressure operating from within and without.

Under normal not emergency conditions, when no extreme concentration of power is required, the fact that even a small number of administrative officials are members of soviets is incompatible with the democratization of the ruling and administrative systems. This requires the application of the following rule: soviet deputies on all levels must consist of citizens who do not hold any positions (managing or executive) in any given administrative apparatus above the enterprise level or the level of other organizations which are the basic units of societal economic and sociocultural systems.

Those elected to the soviets should be "simple" citizens enjoying a good reputation. They must be rank and file working people who can think like statesmen and have a broad outlook. They must be principle-minded and decisive people, who can formulate and defend and, if necessary, in the course of a clash of opinions, promote the interests of society, the state, social groups and strata and national and territorial communities. Such people must be ready to serve society and we have an abundant supply of such people.

Naturally, the revival of the authority of the soviets would require more than a proper "popular" structure. Tremendous practical activities, particularly during the active time of perestroika, will be needed as well. Currently the soviets and their rank and file deputies are

essentially "free" from practical governmental work by the administrative apparatus. In the future they will have to do this work themselves. What does this involve?

The soviets, from the rayon level on up, could function on a practically permanent basis. At that point the salaries of the deputies should be paid by the state: "deputy service" would become their main activity. In order not to be disqualified, whenever possible, the deputies would continue to hold their former jobs as well. Working time spent in "deputy service" should be divided approximately evenly between work in the soviet and meeting with the electorate.

Most of the work of the deputies should be in the permanent commissions. On the Union level there could be some 25 such commissions and fewer commissions would be necessary on the republic and local levels. Joint commissions could be set up dealing with related administrative areas. The soviet sessions should last not 1 or 2 days but as long as is necessary for the thorough discussion of the decisions to be made.

The soviets on all levels, we believe, should conduct their work as openly as possible, with free access to the public and radio and television coverage of debates of interest to the people. Deputies of lower soviets could, if necessary, participate in the work of superior soviets on a consultative basis. Deputies should be provided with greater opportunities to develop as competent state officials. Their intellectual standards and political beliefs, merits and errors should be widely known to the people and assessed strictly. Systematic meetings with the electorate would correct the work of deputies and soviets whenever necessary.

Naturally, legislation (particularly on the Union and republic levels), the consideration and approval of the plan and the budget, filling key state positions and controlling the activities of the administrative apparatus and of other authorities subordinate to and controlled by the soviets should remain their leading functions. The soviets would fulfill such functions not formally, according to superior instructions, but on the basis of their own investigations, assessments and projections.

The soviets and their permanent commissions must make use of the broadest possible rights which are naturally granted to any people's representative. In particular, they must have access to pertinent information on the question they are discussing, study public opinion, which requires a corresponding research institution or assignment, make surveys, set up temporary commissions of experts if necessary, question subordinate authorities and candidates for such positions, approve or reject their holding of a position or assignment, and so on.

Clearly, the presidiums of the soviets should be retained but not as permanent soviet authorities (for the soviets themselves would operate on a permanent basis) but so

that they could organize their activities and coordinate the work of the permanent commissions and represent the soviets in their relations with other authorities and administrations in implementing adopted resolutions.

In order to free the local soviets from petty supervision or orders issued by the administrative apparatus—the ispolkom—it has long been suggested for soviet presidiums to be created on the oblast and regional levels as well. This would not eliminate the need for executive committees which would continue to function as collective administrative authorities in charge of general affairs ("local governments") set up by the soviets and subordinate to their presidiums.

The soviet presidium chairman and his first (or only) deputy and the secretary, unlike the other members of the presidium, should be elected on all levels not among the deputies of a given soviet but directly by the population. These three positions, we believe, should be held by professional politicians with proper training and practical experience (naturally, they could also "develop" from "simple" deputies who assume, so to say, a different professional quality. In general, the soviets must become a reserve and a school for the training of political personnel holding democratic views).

Let us assume that the custom develops (with exceptions based on circumstances) of nominating as candidates for soviet presidium chairmen the first secretaries of the respective party committees. The party managers, who are actually the "first leaders" on any administrative level would, consequently, be given a proper mandate on the basis of a general democratic procedure, not only by the party and its organizations but by the population as well. If the candidacy of the leading party official does not meet with sufficient support and is not accepted, the party committee will decide either to replace this candidate and hold new elections or, for a while, would abandon the custom of combining these positions.

This point requires a clarification concerning the position held by the heads of the ruling party within the state mechanism. This question assumes key significance in connection with the fact that, as M.S. Gorbachev said in his talk with A. Natta, "the CPSU is fully resolved to fulfill its role as the political vanguard of society, letting the administrative functions to be performed by other authorities, the soviets above all." Once the party and state functions have been demarcated, the question will arise anew as to whether or not the party leaders, who have the confidence of the people or the population of a given area, should hold key positions in the state apparatus on all levels. This would be a general political practice which would enable the ruling party, without directly engaging in "party management," to carry out its responsibility to society.

The following question arises: What would be the most suitable positions within the state apparatus that the party leaders should hold? In practical terms, it is necessary to choose between the position of chairman of the presidium or head of the administrative authority in charge of general affairs (the government, the executive committee). The former would be preferable, for the functions of chairman of the presidium of the soviet is more similar to that of the head of the party committee (overall programming of development, political control). A party leader who holds this position would not be drowned by current administrative affairs but, through corresponding soviet resolutions, and acting within the framework of popular representation, would be able to direct and control such work. Incidentally, this is yet another argument in favor of setting up soviet presidiums on the oblast and rayon levels. This would ensure in practical terms a distinction between party and state functions and would make it possible to eliminate the duplication of sectorial units within the party and administrative apparatus (it would suffice to have a single administrative apparatus, and control functions could be performed with the help of the permanent commissions of the soviets).

In addition to this (approval of the party's choice by society) the suggested change is based on a serious governmental-legal foundation. The collective head of the territorial community would be appointed as democratically as possible: considering the importance of the position of chairman of the presidium of the soviet, the population, the voters themselves would fill this position, and not assign this function to their representatives. In this case the presidium would be a collective authority which would make decisions on the basis of majority vote; decisions could not be annulled by the chairman but his special mandate would give him the right to issue a suspensory veto which could be canceled by a soviet majority. The presidium as a whole could be given the right to issue a suspensory veto on resolutions passed by the soviet, thus making it necessary to override it by absolute majority, referendum or a new soviet convocation. Such democratic mechanisms are extensively used in different countries and have proved justified. I believe that they would be useful in our country as well.

The resolution which was adopted at the Eighth Party Congress stipulated the following on the matter of organization: "The party tries to **guide** the activities of soviets but not to substitute for them." Today, along with the word "guide" one could emphasize the word "tries." It would be expedient to stipulate that party members who are soviet deputies are guided by the CPSU program and by the general party line. However, in solving specific problems in the soviets, they act not as ordered by the presidium and its chairman but in accordance with the instructions of the voters and their "deputy conscience," on the basis of their own civic concepts. In this connection the status of the deputy would become similar to that of judges who, according to the USSR Constitution, are independent and must obey only the law.

In implementing their control functions, the soviets must work very closely with the people's control authorities. Such authorities could become part of the system of soviets, as their special instrument. I believe that it would be logical and useful for the Union People's Control Committee to be headed by the first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium while the republic and local committees to be headed by the deputy chairmen of the respective soviet presidiums.

A particularly sensitive question is that of the sovereignty of the local soviets. To be more precise, the question is that of their "normal sovereignty," the normal allocation of powers between the local soviets on the oblast level and the central departments, the sectorial departments above all. At the present time no such standards have been set. The majority of enterprises, including virtually all large ones, are not under the jurisdiction of the soviets, and the possibilities of the soviets to influence them are very limited. Problems of comprehensive territorial development are solved less by the soviets than the sectorial departments in the center, i.e., in frequent cases they simply remain unsolved. We believe that territorial management on the oblast level could be organized roughly as follows:

With extremely rare exceptions, the oblast would have no enterprise or any other organization independent of the oblast soviet. Virtually all such units would be under the jurisdiction of the respective subdivision of the oblast executive committee and, through it, of the superior department of the Union republic and of the USSR. The departments would essentially centralize scientific and technical and investment policy within the framework of national programs.

The administrative apparatus, which is set up by the soviet, to which it is accountable and by which it is controlled, would have a full set of subdivisions (main and other administrations) which, unlike the majority of today's ministries, would be broadly specialized and would ensure the comprehensive administration of the oblast. The heads of these subdivisions would be members of the soviet executive committee, like an "oblast government," under "dual jurisdiction:" the soviet, horizontally, and the central departments, vertically. Most of these subdivisions would be under not one but several central departments, for at the present time, particularly in the national economy, they are narrowly specialized (which is a natural result of the prevalence of an excessively centralized administrative management system). This will have to be tolerated as long as the number of central departments has not reached the stipulated figure. The executive committee subdivisions would act not only as a transmission link between central departments and enterprises and other organizations, but also as a barrier which would protect the latter from any excessively bureaucratic activity of the departments.

The enterprises and other organizations, which are not subordinate to the local soviets are even today managed, to the necessary extent, by the local authorities, which

are essentially those of the party. It is this that leads to the substitution of the state apparatus with the party organizations, something which we have tried to eliminate unsuccessfully for some time. The suggested changes, finally, would make it possible to shift the management of all economic and sociocultural activities within the territorial community from a primarily party to a primarily governmental basis.

The reform of the soviets of people's deputies could be topped by renaming them, as consistent with the spirit of the reform, and eliminating the stylistic error in the word combination of "deputy of the soviet of deputies." Their new name could be "People's Soviets." Such changes would presume amending the USSR Constitution. Today, however, we believe that this should not be considered an insurmountable obstacle.

In Lenin's view each stage in the development of society "should be accompanied by finishing and redoing our Soviet system" (op. cit., v 44, p 224). This is required today as well. The essence of the pressing reform of the soviets is that of restoring their sovereignty and converting them to a permanent operational system, as truly "working corporations," and as the true basic units of Soviet statehood on all levels.

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Democratization of the Party Means Democratization of Society

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[Text] Continued publication of letters on problems of party building and further democratization of the party and society (see *KOMMUNIST* No 18, 1987; Nos 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, 1988).

I. Moskalenko, professor, Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov, doctor of historical sciences:
Intraparty Control: Objectives and Means

It is neither suddenly nor accidentally that of late the party press has been mentioning the Central Control Commission, which functioned in our party in the 1920s and at the beginning of the 1930s. The idea is emphasized that the TsKK is needed today as well! What dictates this turn toward history and the experience of this party agency?

As we read with indignation and pain the published materials on abuses, violations of legality and crimes committed by senior officials in Uzbekistan, Bashkiriya, Moldavia, Turkmenia, Krasnodar Kray and Moscow (actually, this list could be extended), we ask ourselves: How could this happen? Why was it that violations and

gross distortions of the Leninist principles and standards of party life did not meet with the necessary opposition by the party authorities, the party control agencies above all?

The reason for the spreading of such phenomena, noted at the 27th Party Congress in the study of negative processes which took place in the past, included the absence of criticism and self-criticism, and the fact that individual republics, krays, oblasts and cities were put above criticism. The most important conclusion was drawn to the effect that there should be no party organization outside of control, closed to criticism, or else leaders protected from party responsibility. This also indicated the admission that the rights of control authorities in the recent past had been severely curtailed. The weakened role of control authorities was quite clearly mentioned at the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum: "They ignored many reports on abuses and violations in a number of areas and economic sectors and in oblast, kray and republic party committees."

Today all control authorities, from rayon to central, are facing the task of justifying their high purpose and setting the example of principle-mindedness and justice. However, to this day we come across cases in which party control commissions sometimes ignore suppressions of criticism, violations of socialist legality and the protection of party members in managerial positions from accountability to primary party organizations. We also remember that in some situations the party commission is helpless when it comes to solving problems within its range of competence if its position conflicts with that of the corresponding party committee.

Why is it that intraparty control turns out to be insufficiently effective in the struggle against negative phenomena? I believe that the root of the problem lies in the nature of relations between party committees and party commissions operating on the same level, and the principles governing the establishment of the latter. As a rule, today the chairmen of party commissions are members of party committees and many of them are members of party buros. Unquestionably, this enhances the authority of party commissions and strengthens reciprocal relations, harmony and level of information in the work of the party committee and the commissions. Nonetheless now, when party control must be strengthened and become truly universal and systematic, in our view such practices are not optimal.

In considering this problem, it would be pertinent to turn to Lenin's legacy, to the experience in organizing party control in the 1920s. Despite the obvious difference between historical periods, a certain similarity exists in terms of the problems which faced our party at the start of the 1920s and today, in the second half of the 1980s.

At that time the party faced the need to eliminate the estrangement within its ranks, which was sharply manifested in the problems of the "upper" and "lower" strata

in its organizations, radically to change its ways, means and style of work, and abolish the unjustified privileges enjoyed by some groups of working people. These and other difficult problems of intraparty relations were described in the RKP(b) Central Committee letter "To All Party Organizations and All Party Members," which came out at the beginning of September 1920. This became a topic of discussion at the Ninth All-Russian Party Conference, where G.Ye. Zinovyev submitted a report on the forthcoming tasks of party building.

An analysis of the situation which had developed in the party was provided in V.I. Lenin's speech at the conference. In order to strengthen and develop the party, he deemed necessary for steps to be taken to broaden the autonomy of party members; to set up printed organs for the more systematic and extensive criticism of errors and, in general, of criticism within the party; to eliminate inequality (in living conditions, wages, etc.) between the "specialists" and senior personnel, on the one hand, and the masses, on the other, "which is a violation of democracy and a source of corruption within the party and of loss of reputation of party members" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*) [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 293).

V.I. Lenin was concerned not only with formulating a proper trend for party restructuring but also with guaranteeing that the changes planned at the conference would be implemented. He saw as such guarantee the creation of a special party control authority—the Control Commission. No such commission had been set up in our party previously. Concerned with the reliable implementation of the course of development of intraparty democracy, on 26 October 1920 the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo considered the question of the mood within the party. V.I. Lenin drafted a resolution on the Control Commission. According to him, it was to be a real authority watching over the party and proletarian conscience (see *ibid.*, p 394). That is why he considered it important for F.E. Dzerzhinskiy and Ye.A. Preobrazhenskiy, who were made commission members, and who were noted and authoritative party members, to work no less than 3 hours daily in the commission (unfortunately, this was not achieved). This personal aspect was by no means of secondary importance in the implementation of the assignments set to this party control authority. "... We are looking for people," V.I. Lenin said at the Ninth Party Conference, "with a party membership of no less than 15 years (i.e., people who had received their training during the revolutionary struggle under conditions of clandestine work and exile—author) who enjoy the trust of the party and are noted for their impartiality...." (*ibid.*, p 289). The member of the Control Commission was to have the highest possible party training, practical experience, principledness and ability to provide strict party control.

By decision of the Ninth Party Conference a Control Commission was set up in the center (it soon took the name of Central Control Commission—TsKK), and

control commissions were set up under the party guberniya committees. The appeal of the Control Commission to all party members, published in PRAVDA on 28 October 1920, and the Regulation on Control Commissions, which was drafted by the RKP(b) Central Committee by the end of that year, reflected the understanding of the important role played by party control in ensuring the purity of party ranks, formulating party ethical standards and their observance by party members, and strengthening the party's authority among the masses. From the very start the principle of universality of control was proclaimed. The Control Commission called upon the party members to report to it all cases of crimes committed against the party, **"and not to be restrained even for a minute by the position held and role played by the accused individuals."**

The tasks of the control commissions, formulated in the resolution of the 10th RKP(b) Congress seem so relevant today that it would be appropriate to cite an excerpt from this document. It reads as follows: "With a view to strengthening party unity and authority, control commissions are being set up, the tasks of which include the fight against bureaucratism and careerism, which are sneaking into the party, abuses by party members of their party and soviet status, violations of comradely relations within the party, dissemination of baseless and unchecked rumors and insinuations which defame the party or individual party members, and other similar information which violates party unity and reputation."

At the time of its creation, how was the Control Commission interpreted in terms of its relations with the party membership? At the Ninth Party Conference G.Ye. Zinovyev spoke of the need for a party court which would be "feared by the people." He believed that the Control Commission should be the "court of communist honor." The idea that the control commissions were primarily punishment institutions had many supporters within the party.

This was the result of the situation and the tasks of waging a decisive battle against crimes committed by party members and violations of Soviet laws and ethical standards. In one of his letters, V.I. Lenin called for **going after** abuses through the TsKK, underlining these words (see *op. cit.*, v 44, p 82). Nonetheless, he repeatedly emphasized the role of this authority as a guarantor of the development of democracy, and a means of intensifying criticism, correcting errors and exerting a comradely influence on party members.

Formulating the type of organizational principles for the structure and activities of the control commissions, which would make it possible for them to implement their assignments, became a difficult problem in party building. This topic is related to one of the key Leninist considerations relative to intraparty control. At the Ninth Party Conference, V.I. Lenin suggested the creation of a Control Commission "alongside the Central Committee," elected by the party congress and operating

entirely independently in solving a specific set of problems. In terms of acting independently, V.I. Lenin noted, its members should be superior to the Organizational Buro (see op. cit., v 41, pp 290, 291, 293). It is of interest, in understanding the view Lenin held on this problem, to note his incidental remark that "the German Labor Party had a control commission in the past as well" (ibid., p 290). Lenin mentioned it as early as 1905, noting that there is within the German Social Democratic Party a "special control commission independent of the board (the leading authority—author)" (op. cit., v 9, p 309).

At the Ninth Party Conference, as we said, two members of the RKP(b) Central Committee—F.E. Dzerzhinskiy and Ye.A. Preobrazhenskiy—were appointed members of the Control Commission. In the ratification of the resolution adopted by the conference, at the 29 September 1920 Central Committee Plenum, V.I. Lenin expressed the view that, in general, it would be improper to include members of the RKP(b) Central Committee in the Control Commission. Subsequently, and until the 17th VKP(b) Congress, which undertook to reorganize the control authorities, no one could be both member of a party committee and a control commission. This stipulation reflected entirely clear principles of the universality and objective nature of control or, in more specific terms, it created prerequisites for their implementation. Party control was to be extended to all party authorities and all party members, including members of the Central Committee. Furthermore, reciprocal representation of party committees and control commissions at their meetings was not only not excluded but had become standard practice.

In his article "On 'Dual' Subordination and Legality," Lenin noted that the TsKK was an institution "responsible only to the party congress and so structured that not even the slightest combination of jobs by members of that TsKK or any people's commissariats or individual departments or soviet authorities could be possible" (op. cit., v 45, p 200). V.I. Lenin classified the TsKK, along with the Politburo and the Organizational Buro of the party's Central Committee as among the party institutions which provided maximal guarantees against parochial and personal influences.

Finally, in his last letters and articles, presenting his considerations on the future of socialism and the tasks related to building socialism in the Soviet Union and the development of the Communist Party, and worried by certain alarming features in the work of the leading party authorities, V.I. Lenin paid great attention to the TsKK. Without dealing with the broad problem of the reorganization of control authorities, which concerned V.I. Lenin, let us merely mention one of his suggestions: In considering problems related to the conditions and work style of the party's Central Committee, V.I. Lenin expressed the thought of the need for a certain number of TsKK members to be present at each Politburo meeting, and the fact that they should constitute a "cohesive

group which, 'regardless of personalities,' should see to it that no one's authority, neither that of the general secretary nor any other Central Committee member, would prevent them from submitting a query, checking documents and, in general, ensuring the strict availability of information and the strictest accuracy of procedures" (ibid., p 387).

Since we are addressing ourselves to historical experience, it would be natural to ask the following: Why did the existence of control commissions fail to protect the party from negative processes, violations of intraparty democracy and appearance of the cult of Stalin's personality? For the time being, it is difficult to answer this question exhaustively and convincingly for lack of adequate data. Writing the history of intraparty control in the transitional period, with its entire difficulty, is still in the future, for a very important part of TsKK documents remains inaccessible to researchers. It would be probably accurate to say, however, that this history cannot be separated from the complex sociopolitical processes which took place within the party and the country. Under the conditions of the establishment of an administrative-command mechanism in managing the national economy, increasingly the control authorities were assigned the task of tightening up party and state discipline. The function of supervision and control over the implementation of party directives, above all the resolutions of the VKP(b) Central Committee resolutions, became the main task of the TsKK and the local control commissions. Less and less attention was being paid to the other tasks assigned to the intraparty control authorities by V.I. Lenin and the 10th Party Congress. The logical end of this evolution was the reorganization of the TsKK into a Party Control Commission under the VKP(b) Central Committee, accomplished at the 17th Party Congress. Starting with the next party congress it was no longer elected at the highest party forum but set up by the Central Committee.

In this connection, a most important lesson can be drawn from past experience: The principle of electing party control authorities is effective not per se but only under the conditions of a democratic system for the establishment of party authorities, enabling the party masses to have a real influence on their membership. This general requirement also presumes that the party control commissions, from top to bottom, must be elected and not appointed. They must act alongside the party committees and not as part of them; they must report on their work to their respective party congresses and conferences. As to the main trend in the activities of party commissions, we believe that control must be instituted over the observance of the principles and standards of intraparty relations and the accuracy with which they are observed by the party organizations, the party apparatus and the leading personnel.

The proposal of creating within the CPSU a special commission on party ethics was suggested in KOMMUNIST ("The Moral Aspect of the Party Member,"

No 5, 1988). Although we share as a whole the view of the author on the need for a scientific study of the status and trends in the development of party mores and the attitude of the various social groups toward the party, we would like to ask the following: Could such a function not be performed by party control authorities? Practical steps to cleanse the party ranks and to shape a public opinion concerning the moral aspect of the party member could be effective only if they are closely related to research. It was this type of analytical work that the TsKK and the local control commissions were trying to carry out in the 1920s. Let us recall that, in suggesting a reform of control authorities in 1923, and in describing their future aspect, V.I. Lenin classified them as institutions of an academic type.

We believe that openness in the work of party commissions must be raised to an essentially higher level. For example, currently the activities of the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee are reported essentially in the published resolutions on individual investigations and personal cases. The press publishes very infrequently data on the work of the party commissions under the central committees of the communist parties of Union republics and party kraykoms and obkoms. Obviously, under present-day conditions, systematic information on the work of control authorities becomes necessary, as it was organized in the 1920s. It would be useful to turn to the experience acquired at that time also from the viewpoint of the ties between control commissions and party masses. I believe that today as well we could use forms of activities, such as open circuit sessions of party commissions held at primary party organizations and the submission of reports by commission members at party meetings.

Unquestionably, the staffing of control authorities is an extremely important matter. How to formulate an objective criterion for appointing as party control authorities the most experienced and principle-minded party members? To a certain extent, long party seniority could be one such criterion. We believe that such authorities must mandatorily include rank and file party members—workers, kolkhoz members and employees who enjoy a certain authority and trust among their labor collectives.

By submitting at the Ninth Party Conference the suggestion on the creation of a Control Commission, V.I. Lenin noted that the suggestion should not be rejected and, if not adopted immediately, in any case it should be considered. It is as though these Leninist words apply to the current practice of perestroika in party work.

V. Dyachenko, special correspondent, KOMMUNA newspaper, Voronezh Oblast: A Daring Solution?

Currently many readers write to Moscow: "Our oblast newspaper is as different from the central press as the sky is from the earth." It is not being restructured. The people who are sent to us from Moscow are equally amazed: Why are these local newspapers extremely timid

and obliging? The following conclusion may be heard as well: The reason for the obedience of the oblast press is the fact that some managers have become accustomed to seeing the mass information media as mouthpieces for praise.

I have worked for many years in an oblast newspaper and I am well familiar with the internal situation. I must submit that we, provincial newsmen, can be justly blamed from the viewpoint of party principle-mindedness. However, let us consider why the lack of such a most important quality has been "suddenly" detected not among some journalists but in the majority of editorial boards of newspapers, the radio and television in one local area or another?

Let us consider our oblast. I remember many "inflated" initiatives which collapsed quite rapidly but, nonetheless, were able to cause great harm to the economy. How did at that time the newspaper, radio and television behave? By no means heroically. The central press would criticize the people of Voronezh not for the mania to launch initiatives but for some specific features, such as violation of economic rules, formalism in the mastery of intensive technologies, etc. The local mass information media did not notice failures and breakdowns. Kettle drums were beaten, asking for "stricter accountability." Naturally, not all journalists thought or saw things the same way; there were also those who cared for things but... the newspapers and the radio and television did not express such care and principle-mindedness, for a general oblast "guideline" was being applied.

Actually, how was "local" party leadership of the press usually provided? A great variety of members of the party obkom, from the secretary to the instructor, could issue instructions to the editor and to department heads (and do so). Although such practices have been repeatedly condemned, they remain to this day. Petty control over newspaper activities is by no means only a "stylistic" fault in the work. It is a reliable channel for reproducing, for multiplying through the press a single and exclusive viewpoint on the main regional development problems.

Why and how did such type of management appear? The reason is understandable: The command-bureaucratic work methods require a 100-percent controllable press. Demand, as we know, leads to offer. In the "local areas," in addition to "toeing the line," exaggerations frequently gathered tremendous power and threats developed much faster than in Moscow. Although, let us admit, some opposition to arbitrary manifestations also existed.

This is confirmed in the collection of documents "On the Party and Soviet Press," including, for example, the Central Committee resolutions "On Comrade Zadov, Editor of the Newspaper ZA NOVYY SEVER" (25 July 1939), "On Cases of Suppression of Criticism in the Kromskiy Rayon Party Organization, Orel Oblast" (January 1954), and others. Such opposition was frequently

naive and, sometimes, grossly erroneous. That same Ya.G. Zadov, in a note on the decree of the obkom bureau, published in the newspaper he edited, started an argument against the obkom. Unquestionably, both then and now it has been inadmissible to use the party press as a weapon in the struggle against views codified in the resolution of the party committee which publishes said newspaper. Ya.G. Zadov was relieved from his editorial position by the Central Committee for committing such an action and was reprimanded. But here is what is worth noting: The Central Committee also considered guilty the Komi Obkom, noting that "it had acted improperly by failing to react to an editorial note on the obkom resolution and failing to discuss this problem by the obkom bureau or submitting it to the VKP(b) Central Committee." That same resolution merely mentioned the obkom.

The resolution "On Facts of Suppression of Criticism in the Kromskiy Rayon Party Organization, Orel Oblast," includes the following statement: "... Comrade Cheshenko, raykom first secretary, does not understand the importance of the press...." Thirty-four years have passed since this resolution was promulgated. I believe that during that entire time the number of people "who fail to understand the importance of the press" did not decline but, instead, increased, despite improvements in educational standards.

Occasionally (and essentially in the central press) materials on the latest suppressors of criticism, on people who persecute journalists they do not like, show up. Subsequently, as a rule, a report on the steps which were taken is published: "the question was heard," and "the culprit was reprimanded." This is followed by more and more similar cases. The effect that to recall at this point V.I. Lenin's words to the effect that "whoever takes up individual problems without having solved general problems previously, will inevitably, at each step, subconsciously 'stumble' against these general problems" (op. cit., v 15, p 386).

I believe that in order to promote the cause, the oblast newspaper not only could but should criticize the specific obkom official, above all the instructor, the deputy head or the head of department, the "sectorial" secretary or even the "first" (why not), if they so deserve. That is the way the newspapers act in the case of officials who have lost their positions. We describe them as the "former leadership" and criticize them indiscriminately. We thus not only "restore the truth" but... also display subservience to the current leadership: look at what a difficult legacy you inherited.... But if, while criticizing the "past," the newspapers would also objectively describe the work of the "present" leadership, everything would be much fairer. Frequently, however, the situation is reproduced in the old framework: The new oblast leader, as a rule, behaves toward the oblast newspaper as did his predecessor, expecting of it nothing but its absolute obedience.

Currently a great deal is being changed for the better in our own oblast, as everywhere else, in the course of perestroika. However, we are concerned by the fact that, as in the past, instructions "issued" from superiors (although today many opportunities to discuss them exist) are accepted by the rayons without any objection although, it appears, many such objections, substantiated at that, do exist.

Consider the situation with hay storage areas. Their construction in the oblast was undertaken comprehensively and simultaneously. Today they can be found (two or four) in any farm in Voronezh. It would be nice if we could say that now the hay will be protected from losses. Yet all cow barns at Kolodezyanskiy Sovkhoz, Kashirskiy Rayon, need repairs, and there is no workshop. Meanwhile, the central farmstead has two huge hay storage bins. One of them contains a few bales of hay and the other, in order not to leave it entirely empty, has a few rotting root crops. A similar situation prevails in the farms of Liskinskiy, Podgorenskiy, Bobrovskiy and Buturlinovskiy Rayons. Here there are no workshops or sheds for the repair of combines. There is a shortage of warehouses, cow barns and calf-raising sheds; meanwhile, there are semi-empty or totally empty hay storing areas (in many areas the custom is to stack the hay). I discussed the matter with farm and rayon managers.

"Yes," my interlocutors agree. "We carried this thing with hay storing areas too far."

"Did you express your viewpoint at the RAPO, the raykom, the oblast agroprom, or the party obkom?"

"To tell you honestly, I was afraid, I kept silent. The idea of hay storing areas was formulated by the 'first,' who is a firm proponent of it."

Who today in the oblast can criticize the first secretary of the party obkom? Is it the party newspaper, which should express the viewpoint of the oblast party committee, which is staffed by dozens of most experienced and honest people? No, the editors do not dare to take this step. Everyone is hoping that eventually Moscow will correct the situation. Meanwhile, who can make a remark to the party obkom secretary in charge of agriculture? Only the first secretary of the obkom (and, naturally, Moscow). Department heads, their deputies and instructors, whatever work they may be doing, can be criticized only by their superiors.

Before writing this I went through old copies of many oblast, rayon and local newspapers. I noticed many changes: Today the newspapers publish critical materials more frequently. Sharp letters to the editors are assigned much more space, and so on. However, I also noted that this report mania has once again appeared in the press. In noting the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, it was as though the mass information media had gotten rid of their ostentatious blabbering and that the tone of the materials, not only in the central but the local

press, was businesslike and self-critical. But then, once again now... The reasons, I believe, are simple: Corresponding explanations and recommendations were issued concerning the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution but, to the best of my knowledge, no instructions whatsoever had been issued in advance concerning the all-Union party conference. Nonetheless, the editors had tried to do something, for this was a tremendous event and a campaign was needed. But how to conduct it? They used the old rusty but tried weapon they had used for decades: reports and assurances. That is how the efficiency of the "specific" instruction was manifested: The newspapermen had abstained from engaging in excesses, but we had not dared to do something more. The local people had concluded that always and on all occasions they would be given instructions and that by themselves they had no decisions to make. In such a situation any instructions or lack of same paralyzes initiative. No, we must change not particulars but the main thing. What precisely?

The point is that the situation of the local press has not changed in the course of perestroika, if considered from the positions of the democratization of intraparty life. As in the past, examples of skillful guidance of the press by the party committees involve regular visits of editorial boards by party committee secretaries, approval of their plans and support of critical articles. However, all of this could take place but the editors can still be restrained, the specific nature of the work of journalists may be ignored and they may be encouraged to take not a single step without permission.

As in the past, the rights and obligations of the party committee concerning its press remain unclear other than, naturally, the application of the universally familiar principles governing the functioning of the party-soviet press. It is well-known, however, that frequently a law needs legal regulations which would make its general stipulations specific. The opposite affords extensive possibilities of arbitrary interpretations. If the party committee is headed by a sensitive person, the relationship with the editor and the newspaper will be smooth. If the "first" is stern and sharp (which is frequently the case), the newspaper either loses its militant quality or else conflicts break out, which usually end with replacing the editor and a "shake up" of the editorial collective. Naturally, this is done with a view to making the newspaper more obedient and loyal. Some newspapermen oppose such a style of relations, realizing that here it is a question not of personal ambitions but of loyalty to common party principles. The majority, however, for understandable reasons, are both unwilling and unable to become heroes. And if the editor and his associates are timid, a suitable attitude becomes possible. It is no accident that such journalists are classified as "promoters," "assistants" or "gophers."...

One of my colleagues was forbidden to attend conferences; another one was forbidden "to enter the territory." I personally have been subjected to a number of

indignities. Understood, this is in the past! But what about now, at the peak of glasnost, what is the "local" situation? Today "valuable instructions" are issued not directly but in a much more subtle manner. Let us say that the editor, a correspondent or the newspaper as a whole has done something displeasing. In the past this would immediately be followed by shouts, insults, etc. Today other means are used. For example, one could encourage the readers' displeasure with the newspaper. "Rebuttals" are being written "from below," and sent to the party committee. And, as we know, one must react to such signals. Such a case, for example, took place in Bobrovskiy Rayon: Yu.N. Khruslov, the editor of the local ZVEZDA newspaper has had many unpleasant experiences.

Naturally, some party committees capably manage the press. This, however, is more an exception than a pattern, for such a feature will become a natural part of our daily party work only after it has become impossible to manage the press exclusively with the help of "arbitrary" decisions made by a single individual. For the time being everyone is acting, as the saying goes, sensibly. The changes which are now noticeable in the local press are more of a quantitative nature. Will there be qualitative changes in the future? Unquestionably yes. However, this will happen only if the status of the journalists, and of editorial collectives has been clearly defined, and if guarantees are provided that it will be respected. We believe that all of this must be reflected in the Law on the Press, the promulgation of which is urgently indicated by social practice.

A. Krechetnikov, member of the USSR Union of Journalists, Kiev: Pressing Changes

In my view the time to make a number of substantial changes in our party and state life has come. What am I referring to? Above all, to the principle of electiveness. In my view, secretaries not only of primary party organizations but also of party gorkoms and raykoms should be elected by direct and secret vote, with the participation of all CPSU members and with the nomination of two or more candidates. In the more distant future, as the political standard of society rises, and as stable democratic traditions are created, this requirement could be extended to the higher levels.

It would be expedient to change the procedure governing the election of delegates to party congresses and conferences. Today the rank and file party members, after electing delegates to rayon conferences, no longer take any part in the further development of the process. The central committees of communist parties of Union republics, and party kraykoms and obkoms could set up delegations in advance and then send the lists of such delegates to all primary party organizations to be put to secret vote. This would immediately make the leadership

on the oblast level more answerable to the party members. A person who has failed in his assigned work and is indifferent to the needs of the people and has an arrogant attitude would not be elected by the people as congress delegate.

In my view, the democratization of society in our political system should begin with a review of a number of principles governing the structure and activities of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the supreme soviets of Union republics. Their deputies should be elected in multiple-mandate districts in which two or more candidates would run. It would be expedient to elect the highest leaders of the country or the republic not by districts but on the basis of a single state slate, as is done in Hungary, for example. The activities of such people affect, one way or another, the entire country. Therefore, not only the population of a specific district but the entire population should be given the opportunity to assess such activities in the course of the electoral campaign.

The sessions of the supreme soviets are too short for the deputies to be able to study in depth the complex problems with which they are frequently totally unfamiliar. Is this not the reason for which they are virtually always unanimous in their vote, relying on the resolutions drafted by the apparatus?

I believe that in order to enhance the progressive social forces and also in order to upgrade the role of the public organizations in the administration of the country, following the example of a number of socialist countries, we should create a Patriotic Front. It would include all organizations supporting the socialist platform and opposing violence, war and nationalism, and acknowledging the right of others to have and to express their own views. Perhaps the constitution should stipulate a range of problems which can be solved only with the agreement of the central council of this Patriotic Front, consisting of the elected leaders of all member-organizations.

As to the constitution, Article 39, which stipulates that the rights and freedoms of citizens must not be exercised to the detriment of society, should be expanded by adding to it that in each specific case any restriction of such rights could be imposed only in accordance with laws passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is only the supreme authority, elected by the entire nation, that should have the right to decide what is consistent with the interests of the country and socialism and what is not. The present loose formulation grants such rights to any individual holding administrative power.

Finally, why not organize a regular television program with the participation of the highest party and state leaders? I believe that such an intercourse would bring the leadership much closer to the rank and file working people and would enhance reciprocal trust and respect.

V. Prokopyev, head of the Department of the Theory and History of the State and Law, Kaliningrad State University: Democracy and Human Dignity

Less than 1 year after absolutism was overthrown and after an extremely short period of bourgeois statehood, as a result of the victory of the Great October Revolution, a conversion to a socialist type of state was undertaken in the country and to the creation of a new, a republican form of government under socialist conditions. Alas, neither the new state nor the new society had firm democratic traditions and, above all, the most important among them: respect for the personal freedom and dignity of the citizen. In subsequent years, in connection with the specific features of industrialization and collectivization, the ruling methods gradually lost their democratic nature and, by the end of the 1930s, the political system in the USSR had changed substantially. Within that time not only had the general democratic and humanitarian ideas, which had not become widespread, been rejected but so had the communist principles and the legal standards for the protection of the individual, which had been formulated as early as in the Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People, the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia and the first RSFSR Constitution of 1918. In my view, a negative role in this process was also played by the refusal to include the set of rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens in the 1924 USSR Constitution. Based on the existing concepts relative to the correlation between the state and the individual, the 1936 USSR Constitution as well was so structured that the state once again became absolutized. Among the 13 chapters in the constitution, which regulated the state structure and the organization of the superior and local authorities, the chapter on the rights and obligations of citizens was in 10th place. That constitution considered the all-round development of the individual not as the objective of building socialism but as a means of achieving the objective, which was building a specific model of socialism. This concept contributed to the creation of unconstitutional authorities which violated the principles and standards of socialist legality, which intensified even further the bureaucratic trends in the activities of the state apparatus.

The democratization of Soviet statehood, which was undertaken on the basis of the resolutions of the 20th CPSU Congress, encouraged the creation of a new, a democratic legislation which strengthened the legal status of the citizen and enhanced the authority of people's deputies and of the soviets themselves, as the people's authorities. However, the half-way nature, inconsistency and errors in the implementation of the party resolutions allowed the conservative forces once again to prevail. The inertia of political thinking annulled the positive results of the initiated process.

It is true that for the first time the 1977 USSR Constitution introduced a section entitled "The State and the Individual." However, the topic of the main rights and

freedoms of Soviet citizens was by no means first and the chapter dealing with them was in seventh place. It followed a detailed stipulation of the features of the political and economic system, regulations of social development and even the exercise of foreign policy. It was thus that, once again, the structure of the constitution clearly singled out the priority of the state, closely identifying it with the state apparatus and ensuring for the state organizations a clear superiority over the society which had created them. On this basis, in practical terms, the specific members of the state apparatus once again laid the claim (and were given the opportunity) to embody the state authority, which continued to have a negative influence on the exercise of power. The apparent eternal nature of the state contributed to preserving within the ideology and the social awareness the priority which the organization of the state had over society. All possible sectors in our sociopolitical science supported this authority, literally absolutizing the state. The powerful propaganda of its infallibility, which started in the schools, was organized in such a way that the state, in its legal, its juridical meaning, was directly identified with the concepts of fatherland and motherland. All of this led to the fact that our appeals to enhance the dignity of the citizen and to promote a feeling of ownership rarely attained their objectives. As we can see now, impressions and, to many people, bitter and most difficult memories, are so strong and the inertia of the theoretical legacy of the 1930s-1950s remains so great that to this day priority is clearly given to the state in the relationship between it and the citizen. However, to continue to follow this path today means to hinder the process of democratization and enhancement of the human factor.

Only an individual with a feeling of personal dignity, enjoying moral, material and legal support, could consider himself a full member of society and a citizen of the state, and the master of his land. The guarantees for all of this are included in the legal status of the Soviet citizen.

The concept of "citizen" clearly political. As was the case during the age of enlightenment, it remains based on a profound moral and, now, also legal grounds. The dignity of the citizen is based on the right of everyone to develop his unique individuality; civic honor is based on personal honor resting on our family and tribal (let us not fear this word) legends and ideals. Our dignity rests in our affiliation with a specific social environment and our profession. It is assessed according to the level of professionalism ("an empty bag cannot stand straight," the old saying went); loafers, demagogues, drunks and dilettantes do not help today's perestroika. National culture and traditions are among the most powerful components of citizenship. In a socialist federation it makes no sense to boast of one's nationality. However, each nation has the right to be proud of it; let us recall Lenin's beautiful words in his article "On the National Pride of the Great Russians:" "We have a strong feeling of national pride, for the Great Russian nation also created a revolutionary class and also proved that it can give mankind great examples of the struggle for freedom

and socialism...." (op. cit., v 26, pp 107-108). The citizen—the maker and the foundation of the state—is shaped not in the course of revering the state and not in the process of acquiring mindless "convictions" but by developing a feeling of personal dignity and an independent approach to solving all problems in life. The concept of "citizen" is superior to any position, to any title.

Today there should be nothing to hold back the developing and already natural process of perestroika. I assume, therefore, that one of the most vital tasks is a conversion from declarations on the role of the individual in our society to the clear description of this role in the law and, above all, in the constitution. The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference could adopt a resolution to this effect.

The citizen is the creator and the foundation of the Soviet socialist state. However, the very term "dignity," along with life and health and personal freedom and property are mentioned only once in Article 57 of the USSR Constitution. Whereas in the 1930s this concept was considered "bookish" even in the dictionary, the inertia of juridical thinking in the 1970s did not make it possible to turn to it in either the first articles or the preamble to the constitution. Yet the idea of the primacy of man as a social value must literally imbue our entire legislation (not to mention ideological and political documents).

Another formulation which must be refined is that of the objective of the state which, today, is described as "building a classless communist society in which social communist self-management will be developed." In my view, the supreme objective of the Soviet state should be exclusively that of providing all the necessary conditions for the full and comprehensive development of the personality, for this is the entire meaning of life not only of our but also of all previous and future generations! The building of a classless society as well as social self-government are merely prerequisites without which said age-old objective of mankind cannot be attained.

The authority of the citizen and the constitutional principles of respect for the individual and protection of human dignity must be codified and become basic in all legislative acts and documents (regulations, instructions, etc.) relative to the activities of all state and public agencies and organizations. Accordingly, the state-legal and administrative-legal standards must be such as to strengthen the fundamental dependence of all administrative-management systems on the will, interests, needs and requirements of the citizen and society. The shaping and activities of all power and administrative authorities must be based on legally codified extensive electiveness (several candidates who would submit programs, with public debates and discussions), and systematic public accountability and open control.

In civil law the principles of democracy and respect for the individual must be clearly formulated and implemented above all in the new legislation on cooperatives. In this connection, we must seriously redraft the respective sections in the constitution. In criminal (material and procedural) law we must firmly break with the legacy of the 1930s, when the honor and dignity of an individual who was being investigated, tried or sentenced were in some cases left totally defenseless. Finally, the authority of the citizen must become the decisive, the starting point in all areas of our social science, including the law.

Naturally, such steps are open to debate. I am deeply convinced, however, that the honor and dignity of every Soviet person must be comprehensively enhanced and, above all, truly guaranteed, for without this there can be no perestroika or democratization.

Excerpts From Letters

V. Gorovoy, USSR MID associate:

The forthcoming restructuring of our political system, the basic point of which will be a demarcation between the functions of party and state authorities, should, in my view, logically lead to the establishment of the type of order in which economic and administrative managers will not be members of party agencies. However unusual this system may seem, particularly in the light of current practices, it is necessary, above all in order to ensure the efficiency of party control over the state-administrative apparatus. As part of the overall system of decentralization of power, we should also include the concept that the heads of lower-ranking party committees must not be members of a superior party authority.

In connection with the need to revive the full power of the soviets in its Leninist understanding, we should also consider the following: The same person should not be a member of two different soviets at the same time such as, for example, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

A. Lazarev, party organization secretary, Tekhnolog Plant, Moscow:

Let us imagine the following: a party committee secretary, who is heading the organization as a result of direct and open vote taken at a general party meeting, could tell party committee members in the course of an argument: "I was elected by the meeting, and it is to the meeting that I report. You cannot order me!"

Is such a situation far-fetched? What can one say.... In any case, it should be contemplated and, for this reason, as we introduce various democratic procedures in internal party relations, we should soberly analyze whether they are truly contributing to the intensification of democracy in substance or is this merely a question of form.

A. Kotsubinskiy, party bureau deputy secretary, Ulyanovsk Oblast Production-Technical Communications Administration:

I do not agree with the fact that membership dues are taken away, to the last kopeck, from the primary party organizations. The result is the absurd situation which frequently arises: In order to purchase political publications, one must go begging to one's own trade-union committee. I believe that it would be right for a certain percentage of the membership fees to be kept by the primary organizations. It is also time to consider the increase of glasnost in the use of party funds. The accountability provided by the auditing commissions in this area are scant and infrequent and, above all, the party members are virtually deprived of the opportunity efficiently to intervene in the matter of financing the affairs of their organization.

A. Drobyshev, head of the Department of Scientific Communism and Political Economy, Omsk State Medical Institute imeni M.I. Kalinin:

The 10th Party Congress entered history as a congress which passed a resolution on the inadmissibility of syndicalist and anarchic deviations. This, however, did not reduce intraparty democracy. The full freedom of criticism within the party and debates on the most important problems of party and social life, before a general mandatory party decision had been promulgated, were contemplated. The possibility of the existence of different platforms was considered while, at the same time, the inadmissibility was emphasized of debating general party problems only within a circle of individuals or "a group constituted on the basis of any kind of 'platform'."

I believe that at the present stage of democratization of intraparty relations, we should take a close look at what we already have and cull from it that which could be useful.

A. Belichenko, deputy party committee secretary, Moscow NIOPIK Scientific-Production Association:

Any type of accountability, including accountability within the party, is a means of attaining the objective, and nothing more. Yet we know that a smooth report frequently becomes the aim. This is encouraged by the superior committees. Frequently the efficiency of a primary party organization is judged by the number of measures which were taken, as indicated in its report, the activities of participants and the various tons, rubles and percentages achieved "as a result." This is the worst possible substitution, when a piece of paper becomes the equivalent of an action.

What should be done above all? We should abandon the comprehensive approach. We should reduce to a minimum or, in general, eliminate the system of accountability of party committees for the state of affairs in all social

and economic subdivisions. The party organizations must not be responsible *urbi et orbi*. This would be a simplistic understanding of the party's leading role: We have a state, a soviet and an administrative apparatus where party members are at work. Why duplicate this work by having a paper flow run upwards and downwards?

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05003

Minutes of the Sixth (Prague) All-Russian RSDWP Conference

180200141 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian
No 8, May 88 (signed to press 17 May 88) pp 47-73

[Text] The Sixth (Prague) All-Russian RSDWP Conference, which was held on 5-17 (18-30) January 1912, is one of the outstanding events in our party's history (* *Istoriya VKP(b). Kratkiy Kurs* [History of the VKP(b). Short Course] provided a wrong assessment of the significance of the Prague Conference. It stated that it "laid the beginning of a party of a new type, a bolshevik party." Actually, bolshevism "has existed as a trend of political thought and political party since 1903" (V.I. Lenin, *Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 6), i.e., since the time of the Second RSDWP Congress).

Fourteen voting delegates and four delegates in an advisory capacity took part in the proceedings of the Sixth (Prague) Conference (* For information on the delegates and their aliases see Note 1). They represented the most important centers of the labor movement in Russia, central institutions and party organizations abroad.

There were 16 bolshevik and two menshevik delegates.

The conference held 23 sessions (two daily). The following items were included in the agenda: 1. Conference structure; 2. Reports (ROC, TsO, grass-roots, etc.); 3. The present and the party's tasks; 4. Elections for the Fourth State Duma; 5. The Duma faction; 6. Worker state insurance; 7. Strikes and trade unions; 8. "Petition campaign;" 9. On liquidationism; 10. Tasks of the social democrats in the struggle against hunger; 11. Party publications; 12. Organizational matters; 13. Party work abroad; 14. Elections; 15. Other.

The conference passed resolutions on all items, published in a separate pamphlet in March 1912 (* The texts of the resolutions were included in all editions of Lenin's collected works, starting with the very first, based on the fact Lenin had authored the drafts of several resolutions, while others had been written with his direct participation, contained his essential thoughts and were edited by him. The minutes enable us to determine the nature and extent of Lenin's participation in the drafting of the resolutions which were adopted at the conference. See

also *"Vladimir Ilich Lenin. Biograficheskaya Khronika. 1870-1924"* [Vladimir Ilich Lenin. Biographical Chronicle. 1870-1924]. Vol 2, 1905-1912. Moscow, 1971, pp 647 and following. Subsequently referred to as *"V.I. Lenin. Biokhronika"*).

The minutes clearly prove the outstanding role played by V.I. Lenin, the ideological inspirer and organizer of the Prague Conference. In addition to the recorded report submitted by V.I. Lenin on the activities of the International Socialist bureau and his speeches on the struggle with hunger and the organizational problem, published previously (see op. cit., p 54, pp 357-361) (* This publication provides some refinements to the text of these records), eight other Leninist statements have been included in an abridged form, adding to Lenin's familiar statements on a number of basic problems. The minutes also include more than 30 retorts made by Lenin when he chaired the sessions, and his remarks on the speeches of the delegates and the draft resolutions. The texts of the draft resolutions included in the minutes include Lenin's remarks, notes and corrections, which enable us to determine more accurately and specifically Vladimir Ilich's personal contribution to the drafting of the resolutions at the conference.

The minutes take the reader into the democratic and comradely atmosphere of the conference, proving the genuinely collective way in which all resolutions were drafted and the free and comprehensive discussion of problems. V.I. Lenin was responsible to the creation of such an atmosphere to a tremendous extent. Feeling himself surrounded by supporters, who were closely linked to the clandestine organizations in Russia, he felt inspired and energetic, instilling in everyone a passionate attitude toward the cause and a profound party-minded approach to the solution of problems.

The published minutes of the Sixth (Prague) Party Conference were recorded in three notebooks (2, 4 and 6). As notes in the text of the minutes indicate, no less than seven notebooks were filled. The first, fifth and seventh have not been preserved. The ends of minutes of the third to the sixth and the twelfth sessions have been lost, and so have the beginnings of sessions Nos 2, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 15. The proceedings of the 11th session were recorded in two separate notebooks, one of which has been lost. The only complete minutes are those of the 10th session.

The publication also includes summaries of V.I. Lenin's speeches and the results of the vote for RSDWP Central Committee members.

The texts of the minutes and other documents are printed in brevier and reprinted in full. Lenin's writings are given in bold print. Underlined passages are indicated by spacing. Deleted texts are in parentheses. Abbreviations are expanded only if unclear.

The texts of the draft resolutions (separate or in full) are also set in parentheses, for they have been incorporated in the text by the compilers. Words introduced in the text for purposes of establishing continuity are also in parentheses.

Headings of documents, as provided by the compilers, are set in italics. Remarks pertaining to the nature of the document and presentation of the text are preceded by an asterisk. Footnotes are listed at the end of the publication.

The notebooks containing the minutes of the conference are kept at the Central Party Archives of the CPSU Central Committee IML, Archive 37 (Sixth (Prague) All-Russian Conference), list 1, sheet 1050, original. The documents written by V.I. Lenin are kept in Archive 2.

The publication of these materials was prepared (* For a more detailed scientific and referential data on the minutes see VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS for 1988, starting with No 5) by Yu. N. Amiantov and Z.N. Tikhonova, senior scientific associates, CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee

First Session¹

(* The minutes of the first session have not been preserved. Included here are individual documents related to the first session.)

18(5) January 1912

Time Limits(* See "V.I. Lenin. Biokhronika" [V.I. Lenin. Biochronicle], vol 2, p 647. It is likely that the time limits were suggested by Lenin, who chaired the conference):

1. The conference will hold its sessions between 10 am and 1 pm and between 3 and 9 pm.
2. The speaker will be allowed 40 minutes to present his report and 20 minutes for his closing statement.
3. Speakers will be allowed 15 minutes the first time and 5 minutes the second and subsequent times.
4. Statements and rebuttals cannot exceed 3 minutes each.
5. Personal remarks and factual statements will be made exclusively at the end of the session.
6. A motion will be considered defeated in the case of a tied vote.
7. If no absolute majority of votes is obtained on a motion, a second round of balloting will be held and the decision will be based on simple majority vote.

8. a. Amendments to the resolution must be presented in writing. b. Paired for and against statements will be allocated 10 minutes each.

Draft resolution on the Russian Organization Commission and V.I. Lenin's remarks on the draft (* For Lenin's text see V.I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch" [Complete Collected works], vol 21, p 481. For the final draft of the resolution see "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh Syezdov, Konferentsiy in Plenumov TsK" [The CPSU v Rezolyutsiyakh and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums], 9th expanded and corrected edition. Vol 1, Moscow, 1983, p 385; subsequently "CPSU v Rezolyutsiyakh...").

Draft:

The conference expresses its gratitude to the Russian Organization Commission², which labored under exceptionally difficult working conditions and which carried out the party assignment of convening an all-party conference despite all obstacles.

(The conference resolved that the representative of the ROC will have a casting vote at the conference) (* Deleted by Lenin).

Zinoviev

This is irrespective of gratitude. It pertains to the mandate commission.

Instead of "gratitude" I suggest that we proclaim a (solemn) acknowledgment of the tremendous importance of the accomplishment and detail the difficulty of conditions.

Summary of V.I. Lenin's speech (* See PROLETARSKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA No 1, 1941, p 143. The speech was probably in answer to Savva's address opposing setting up of the conference as the party's supreme authority; items 2 and 4 of the summary are related to Savva's statements which Lenin intended to rebut in his speech).

Summary of the 18 January 1912 speech. On item 1 of the agenda:

1. Attitude toward nationals. What should they be? (Savva does not answer).

2. Attitude toward the GOLOS people³. (Basis of the alleged difference) between Lenin and the Poles). The wish is expressed to "chuck them out," to "throw them out" of the party...(Trotskyites and Rozhkovites^{4reset and perhaps throw Lenin out).}

3. I am in favor of a conference with the GOLOS people (not those of NASHAYA ZARYA) and the other groups abroad....

4. "Our conference is not an all-party conference:"

Not pres(ent): a. Nation(als); b. Caucas(ian) Obl(ast) C(ommittee)⁶; c. Tr(ends) abr(oad).

[Boxed] This is a conference of Russian organizations only.

Statement by Ya. D. Zevin

Statement

I motion that the following be added to the minutes of this session: Although voting for the overall agenda, I motion that we delete the item "On the Attitude Toward the Liquidationists" and rearrange somewhat the order of the items on the agenda.

Savva (Yekaterinoslav)

1912. First day of sessions.

Ya. D. Zevin's note with a remark by V.I. Lenin.

(If necessary) submit my (resolution (* Not preserved) on the constitution of the conference.

Savva

The secretariat must (mandatorily issue) an original copy.

Second Session

(* The minutes of the beginning of the second session, recorded in notebook No 1, have not been preserved).

18(5) January 1912

Summary of V.I. Lenin's speech on the structure of the conference.

1. Disintegration and absence of the Central Committee. (2. Initiative of local organizations to rebuild the party.) (Elections for the 4th Duma⁷) 3. Urgent practical tasks have especially aggravated the task of rebuilding the party.) 4. All have been invited and only those unwilling to help the party are absent. 5. All organizations functioning in Russia are represented. The Conference must be structured as the party's supreme authority which must create plenipotentiary central institutions and help the comprehensive restoration of party organizations and party work.

1. National organizations have been issued 3-4 invitations:

(1) It has been noted that the fault for separation from the Russian organizations is entirely that of the national organizations;

(2) Partial support of direct liquidationist (Bundt) expectations; helpless fluctuations on the question of whether there should be a party or not;

(3) It would be extremely abnormal for the Russian organizations, which have assumed the entire work in the most important centers of the movement to decline such work or the restoration of the party.

————— 4. (1) None occurred for 3 years;

(2) The need for this was acknowledged for 2 and one half years and preparations were made;

(3) All without exception were informed and invited and their participation was made possible;

(4) 20 Russian organizations rallied around the ROC (* See V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 21, pp 482-483. No records are kept of the minutes. The text of the minutes follows (Notebook No 2)).

Lenin. A resolution on the structuring of the conference is submitted for discussion (* Draft resolution. See V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 21, pp 123-124).

Point 1:

(Considering:

(1. That the extensive counterrevolutionary moods and desperate persecutions on the part of tsarism and the collapse and breakdown of the majority of party organizations and the long absence of a party center and a Central Committee have resulted in the exceptionally difficult situation facing the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party). (* Obviously, in the course of the discussions a motion was submitted to add at the end of the item "in the 1908-1911 period;" the amendment was included by Lenin in the draft resolution and in the adopted version. See "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....," vol 1 p 386).

Savva. Amendment. Refusal (to reject 1908-11). Another amendment (* The text of the second amendment was not recorded. The first amendment was defeated).

Five for, four against, two abstentions. The second amendment passes.

Zinovyev. As to the reason, the main one should be sought in the struggle waged by the liquidationists against the party. Amendment: include "and the struggle of the liquidationists against the party."

Savva. The liquidationists have never blocked the establishment of a center.

Zinovyev. What factionalist struggle? Struggle against liquidationism only.

Six votes for the Zinovyev amendment, one against, with three abstentions. The amendment passes.

Valentin. Amendment: "Factional struggle caused by the liquidationists."

Sergo. It no longer makes any sense. I had no (objections) before, but now I consider this unnecessary.

Savva. Let me say a few words: If there is any factional struggle, it is only against liquidationism.

Valentin's amendment: Four in favor, five against, one abstention.

Boris. Come to order. We are tired, and our resolution will be of tremendous importance. Both friends and enemies will base their arguments on it. I motion that we end this session.

For Boris' personal statement see note (* Statement not preserved).

Statement by Valentin and others:

At the evening session of the conference, responding to Comrade Sergo's view on the non-mandatory nature of conference resolutions to the nationals, Comrade Boris suggested that debates be held on the question raised ante (* before, Latin) Comrade Sergo. By majority vote the meeting decided not to hold such debates. We declare that we voted against the opening of debates, considering that this subject cannot be raised at the conference, which is the main authority of the entire RSDWP. It is clear to all of us that all conference resolutions are mandatory to all organizations, including the national groups.

Valentin, Yerema, Pavel, Foma, (St. Petersburg), Stepan, Matvey, G. Zinovyev.

The session was closed.

Third Session

19(6) January 1912

Third session, on the thirteenth (* Wrong date. The third session was held on 19 January).

Lenin. I hereby open this session. The discussion of yesterday's resolutions on the structuring of the conference will continue.

Boris. I submit a motion. Unsuitable amendments were proposed yesterday. I motion that we start once again with the first item.

The majority vote was in favor. There was no opposition. The motion passed.

Lenin. We begin work on the resolution from the start.

I read the first item:

(Considering:

(1. That the extensive counterrevolutionary moods and desperate persecutions on the part of tsarism and the collapse and breakdown of the majority of party organizations and the long absence of a party center and a Central Committee have resulted in the exceptionally difficult situation facing the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party in the period from 1908 to 1911).

Boris. I motion that this entire text be amended. Its style is obsolete. I submit another resolution. The thoughts are the same but expressed in a form easier to understand; matters must be presented more clearly to the Russian workers. I do not know to what extent I have succeeded. Here is the text of the draft resolution: The flood of counterrevolutionary moods and the desperately fierce persecution mounted by tsarism mainly against the working class and its party, as the main irreconcilable enemies of tsarism, having caused the collapse and breakdown of the majority of party organizations, and the long absence of a practical party center and a Central Committee put the party in a difficult situation during the 1908-1911 period, and faced the working class with the task of surmounting this disorder and breakdown. Only at the present time, in connection with the revival of the labor movement has there been an increased aspiration on the part of the progressive workers to rebuild the clandestine party organization and, on this basis, to convene an all-party conference. Based on the fact that after a more than a 3-year interruption... 2.(* Item 1 missing) That attending this conference are.... 3. That the task of the conference is to implement the aspirations, etc., the conference is structured....

Lenin. Comrade Boris does not make the text clearer but even introduces a certain confusion. The topic is broken down as follows: Point 1: counterrevolution; 2: the critical situation of the party; 3: set of practical steps; 4: participation of 20 cities; 5: all were invited and are represented; and 6: this applies even to the legalists⁹. The text is cumbersome. A great deal of what he suggests could and should be said (in the resolution) on the current situation. Each item in the old resolution has its specific meaning.

Savva. I too consider it somewhat confusing.

Lenin. I interrupt the speaker because according to the rules one speaker must be for something but the following speaker must offer a rebuttal. I spoke against it.

Boris. Essentially I do not oppose the old draft. I am simply trying to make it more understandable. I do not find it confusing at all (he rereads the resolution).

Savva. There are unclear concepts, such as "tsarism," "working class," "disintegration," "breakdown" and "surmounting," but in what sense? What matters here is that all resolutions state that the upsurge will mean the

revival, the restoration of the party. Why upsurge? We must always recreate and work in the party. My view is that the old draft of the resolution is more acceptable.

Boris' amendment was defeated. There was only one vote in favor.

Savva. I introduce an amendment: **to include after the words "long absence," for reasons of said circumstances and the factional struggle within the party.** (* The correction was drafted by Lenin.)

For: 4; against: 6. Defeated.

Viktor. Correction: "that triggered by the desperate persecution by tsarism, the wide flow of counterrevolutionary moods and the struggle among various groups within the party—breakdown and disintegration..." I did not vote for the Savva amendment because the factional struggle is one of the general reasons. I submit an amendment: the struggle is the reason not only for the absence of a center but also for the disintegration of our party.

Lenin. I have firmly nothing against the idea of condemning the factional struggle. But where to include it? It is now a question of the structuring of the conference, and a draft which would include a condemnation of the factional struggle would give the resolution some kind of a factional nature. Here, with this resolution we accuse no one but merely note a fact. I am more in favor of Savva's than Viktor's amendment. Savva is accusing us of making frequent use of the words of (party) rebuilding in connection with the upsurge, claiming that we must always be rebuilding it. However, we cannot close our eyes. The situation is critical, and that must be said. I do not fear a condemnation of factionalism, but believe that this does not pertain to the topic of the resolution. The local organizations were hindered by the factional struggle. Viktor proposes and amendment which would condemn the struggle among groups. The struggle among groups, however, should not be condemned. This is a feature of party life. Squabbles must be eliminated, and factionalism and mindless fighting as well, but to condemn the struggle among groups means to condemn our present and past struggle against liquidationism. You are confusing the workers' thinking during a period of struggle.

Viktor. Amendment to the amendment: substitute (the word) factions for "groups."

Three votes for and five against. Defeated.

The second item is then read:

(2. That at this time, in connection with the revival of the labor movement a general intensified aspiration may be noted on the part of the progressive workers to restore the

party's clandestine organizations and, on this basis, tremendous and successful initiative has been displayed by the majority of local RSDWP organizations in rebuilding the party and convening an all-party conference).

Savva. Amendment: delete the word "clandestine," and simply use the word "organizations." I say that we have a party, it is clandestine, no legal party is possible, for which reason I cannot howl and whine.

Sergo. I would not (object) to this at a different time. Now, however, when Trotskyites and others cannot be expelled we must emphasize this word. The liquidationists as well could claim that they have a party organization.

Lenin. I vote in favor of Savva's motion.

There were three votes for and five against.

Zinovyev. Amendment: add after the words "clandestine party organizations" "and the organization of systematic legal and clandestine social democratic work."

Lenin. his amendment does not fit the topic. The topic is how to structure the conference. Zinovyev has introduced Savva's resolution. We cannot burden the resolution in this manner, for it will go on swelling.

Zinovyev. The topics do not blend, but proceed on a parallel basis, supplementing (each other).

There were four votes in favor of the amendment and two against. It passed. Second balloting round: six votes for and five against.

The third item is read:

(3. That the most urgent practical tasks of the labor movement and the revolutionary struggle against tsarism (leadership of the economic struggle, political agitation and proletarian meetings, elections to the 4th Duma and others) make absolutely necessary the taking of immediate and most energetic measures to restore the legitimate party center, closely related to the local organizations).

Adopted.

Fourth item:

(4. That after a more than 3-year interval since the last RSDWP conference⁹, and more than 2 years of repeated attempts to convene a meeting of representatives of all party organizations, finally we have been able now to rally 20 Russian organizations (* Added to Lenin's draft resolution was Zinovyev's note calling for "adding a list of the 20 cities." Lenin remarked on the note "Yes, include them!" The word "cities" was changed to "organizations.") (1. St. Petersburg, committee; 2. Moscow, committee; 3. Saratov; 4. Kazan; 5. Samara; 6. Nizhnyy; 7. Sormovo; 8. Rostov; 9. Yekaterinoslav, committee;

10. Kiev all-city conference; 11. Nikolayev, committee; 12. Lugansk; 13. Baku, committee; 14. Tiflis group; 15. Vilno group; 16. Dvina group; 17. Yekaterinburg; 18. Ufa; 19. Tyumen; 20. Moscow okrug and oblast (organizations)), around the ROC which convened the conference. Several months ago the commission informed all social democrats about the conference and invited absolutely all of our party organizations without exception to attend it. All organizations were given the opportunity to participate in it.)

Viktor. Amendment: I motion that the words "and invited the overwhelming majority of party organizations to attend." We cannot guarantee that all of them were invited. Not even the ROC can guarantee this.

Lenin. Should we assume that someone may not know about it? It has been publicized for quite some time. Some uyezd center may not have heard about it. This is casuistry.

Viktor. It states that the ROC invited all of them, although it does not claim so itself. We have heard rumors that some organizations or groups were not invited for lack of communication.

Boris. Viktor's thought is clear. I wish we were living under different circumstances. The list of cities also indicates that information was sent to Kharkov and Odessa (* Clearly this was mentioned in the report on ROC activities, submitted by G.K. Ordzhonikidze), where no one could be located. We could be held accountable if we were to claim that we did not invite everyone, even if this was not done deliberately.

One vote for, and the majority against. Defeated.

The fifth item is read:

(5. That despite the delay in holding it and many severe failures, and with very few exceptions, all organizations active in Russia are represented at this conference).

(Adopted) without discussion.

The sixth item is read:

(6. That groups of leaders of social democratic groups of the legal workers' movement in a number of the largest cities in Russia (St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Caucasus) were invited to attend the conference and expressed their support. (* Item included in Zinovyev's draft)).

(Adopted) without discussion.

The seventh item is read:

(This conference is constituted to act as the all-party conference of the RSDWP, and is the supreme authority of the party (and must take steps for the restoration of the

party apparatus and for strengthening the combat capability of the RSDWP)(* The part of the text in parentheses was deleted by Lenin and was not included in the final draft of the resolution)).

(Adopted) without discussion.

Balloting for the resolution as a whole: 10 for and one against.

Lenin. Let us take up the next resolution. On the absence of nationals at the conference (* Draft resolution written by Zinovyev and edited by Lenin).

The first item is read:

(While strengthening the social democratic unity of the workers of all nationalities in Russia must be considered exceptionally important, and deeming absolutely necessary to achieve unity with the "nationals" in the local areas and the strengthening of relations between the national organizations and the all-Russian center, the conference nonetheless is forced to note the following:

(1. Throughout the entire counterrevolutionary period, while the all-Russian organization was experiencing a particularly difficult period, the centers of the national organizations did nothing to provide practical assistance to the Russian efforts and the strengthening of the RSDWP as a whole).

Savva. I motion to delete this resolution in its entirety. There is no question of amending it, for it is drafted in such a way that it must be defeated for the sake of unity with the nationals. What does this resolution say? It says that the nationals have done nothing for the party. I know, however, that the nationals did everything possible to strengthen the center. They do have their own work to do and their own organizations. It is not true that they did nothing. They are part of the party, and when they strengthen their own organizations they also strengthen the party. It is further stipulated that the Bundt is promoting discord. In my view, however, it is the Poles who encouraged division to a greater extent. At the decisive point, however, they rejected the destructive tactics. The Letts were with the Bundt¹⁰, but why is it that nothing is mentioned about them? The resolution speaks of the abnormal attitude toward the nationals. Generally speaking, however, there has been no specific social democratic work done. We show little interest in national problems, for instance (two words unintelligible) the Bundt. We must participate in its discussions. Our Central Committee must be represented in the Bundt's Central Committee. We must struggle against nationalistic aspirations. In many countries this problem has become very grave. We must become interested in the internal affairs of the nationals, such as relations between Polish populists and "the left"¹¹. It may be useful to support a bloc with the Polish "left" in the struggle against the populists. We know virtually nothing about it, yet we must. The nationals did not oppose the

conference. Furthermore, the resolution simply contains disorganizing trends, leading to an aggravation in relations between workers and leadership, as happened with the Letts. The resolution calls for fighting the liquidationists. The nationals, however, have always fought the liquidationists in accordance with their concept of that struggle. We cannot first insult and then speak of joint work. I withdraw my amendments and suggest that the resolution be rejected in its entirety; considering that as a whole it conflicts with the need for close unity with the national organizations which have been very useful to the RSDWP, I motion that this resolution be deleted.

Sergo. If a motion is made to delete, something or other must be changed. The matter, Savva says, is important, but he himself suggests that nothing be said about it. What can we tell the Russian workers about the absence of the nationals at our conference? Had Savva proposed a different resolution we could have chosen the better of the two. Item one deals with the workers in national organizations. Savva sees in it a hidden thought, although it is only workers who are social democrats. "The Bundt fought against the liquidationists," Savva says. Yes, but the last time this happened was in 1908¹², after which it has done nothing. Poles have never attended Central Committee sessions in Russia, although they were asked, they were begged to do so. The Lett spoiled things by failing to attend the meeting at which he could have cast his vote for Liber¹³. The first time the session was spoiled by Mikhail, Yuriy and Roman; in 1911 it was spoiled by the GOLOS and Bundt people¹⁴. I agree with Savka that we must organize things in such a way as to enable us to plunge deep into national life and influence its activities. (Savva) accuses us of wanting a division among the Letts. The Riga fact, however, indicates that among the Letts the center is one thing and the workers, something else¹⁵. The enemies of the RSDWP are also the enemies of the Russian working class. Whoever is against the RSDWP is also against the Russian working class.

One vote for, 10 against, with one abstention. Savva's motion is defeated.

Boris. I oppose the item. "Throughout the entire period of counterrevolution" is excessive. Occasionally we marched hand in hand with the nationals, and item one will leave us open to charges of improper actions and malice and would place us in an embarrassing position. (Motion): Delete item one on the resolution about nationals.

Six votes in favor, one against, two abstentions.

(Reading) items two (and three).

(2. In the past year, one of the national centers (the Bundt) openly cooperated with the liquidationists and tried to promote division within the RSDWP, while other (Letts and Poles) hesitated at the crucial moment in opposing the wreckers of the party—the liquidationists.

(Practical experience proved, once and for all, the inadmissibility of this state of affairs in the party, according to which "nationals," working entirely separately from the Russian organizations, promoting a federation of the worst possible type and, frequently despite their own wishes, put the most important Russian organizations in a situation in which they were totally prevented from participating in Russian work without the national centers, and the RSDWP was unable to implement even the most necessary and important party initiatives.

(3. The true party elements in the national organizations, the workers above all, to the extent to which they become informed about the life of the Russian organizations, unlike the centers of the "nationals," firmly speak out in favor of unity with the clandestine Russian social democratic organizations, support of the ROC and struggle against liquidationism).

Viktor. The polemical part in this item should be softened, for which reason I motion that this item be deleted. We are discussing structuring, for which reason (what have nationals to do with this?). I would understand it if we were discussing the matter of the nationals. At this point, however, this matter is out of place in terms of the structuring. Unnecessary polemics are harmful. Any mention of the conflict between workers and centers leads to depravity and is harmful.

Boris. Viktor asks what have the nationals to do with this? However, we are discussing the question of structuring the conference with the inclusion of the nationals and our attitude toward them....

Viktor's amendment was put to a vote.

Zinovyev. Point of order. We must distinguish here among several Poles and the Letts. We must vote separately on the matters of the Bundt, the Letts and the Poles.

Boris (chair). I mistakenly gave the floor to Comrade Zinovyev. If Viktor's amendment is adopted, voting separately would become unnecessary. I put the matter to a vote.

There were two votes for Viktor's amendment and six against.

Zinovyev. I submit another formulation: Soften the reference to Letts and Poles. Replace the word "hesitated" with the word "avoided." "At the decisive moment they avoided to engage in the struggle against the destroyers of the party—the liquidationists."

Eight votes for and none against.

The second item was put to a vote. It passed by majority vote, with one abstention.

Zinovyev. I call for a switch in items (* Subsequent to the switch, the second item with the words "Practical experience has proved once and for all" became the first item of the resolution).

The motion passed unopposed.

Viktor. Amendment: I motion that the words "contrary to the centers of the 'nationals'" in item 3 be deleted. They could lead to confusions and misinterpretation.

There were three votes for and four votes against. Reballoting: three for and four against. Defeated.

(Items four and five are read (* The draft resolution includes items 1 to 4. The final paragraphs were divided into items by the compilers in accordance with the proceedings. In its final draft the resolution contains four items):

(4. The central committees of all three national organizations (* The Bundt Central Committee, the Main Board of the SDKPiL and the SDLK Central Committee) were invited to attend the party conference on three separate occasions (OCA¹⁶, ROC and conference delegates¹⁷) and given full opportunity to send their delegates.

(5. Taking all of this into consideration and finding it impossible to delay the work of the RSDWP because of the unwillingness of the national centers to send their delegates to the all-party conference, the conference assigns full responsibility for the non-appearance of the "nationals" to their centers and so instructs the RSDWP Central Committee).

Items four and five are adopted without debates.

Pavel: Amendment: I motion that the words "unwillingness to appear" be replaced by "because of non-appearance."

Boris. We must take the facts into consideration and not wishes, like it or not.

Matvey. They did not wish and issued a number of ultimata.

The vote was three for and three against. Defeated.

(Reading) of the sixth item:

(Do everything possible to inform as fully as possible the members of the national organizations of the true state of affairs of the RSDWP and tirelessly promote unity and establish normal relations with the national organizations within the RSDWP).

Viktor. Amendment (* Unavailable).

The end of the resolution is read:

(The conference expresses its confidence that despite all obstacles, the social democratic workers of all nationalities in Russia will struggle jointly and hand in hand for the proletarian cause and against all enemies of the working class).

Sergo. This becomes belles lettres.

Lenin. No, it is not.

Zinovyev. (Reads) (Viktor's) amendment to the third item (* Apparently a second vote was requested on Viktor's previous motion to delete from the text of the resolution the words "in opposition to the centers of the 'nationals'," which were not entered in the final draft of the resolution). There were seven votes for and none against.

The resolution was put to a vote in its entirety.

There were 10 votes for and one against (* There is a note by Lenin on the resolution: "Passed as a whole with 10 votes to one (Savva)." For the final text of the resolution see "KPSS in Resolutions...", vol 1, p 387).

Lenin. I motion that we proceed to the second item on the agenda. Reports from the local areas.

Viktor. Point of order. Considering the news that three comrades will be arriving I motion that the conference be postponed for two days.

Sergo. The news is very vague (reads the letter) (* Not preserved). Since reports from the local areas will be submitted, they could study the reports from the minutes.

Stepan. I second Sergo.

Lenin. We cannot delay the conference after taking one and a half days out of 15 on a single item of the agenda. I motion, therefore, that reports from the local areas begin. Who is readiest?

All are silent.

Savva. Let the reports be presented in order.

Lenin. Petersburg is first. I motion that Foma present his report.

Foma. The Petersburg organization consists of five rayons: Vasileostrovskiy, 37 members; Vyborgskiy, 22; Nevskiy, 12-15; Narvskiy, 13; and Gorodskoy, 22. These rayons never ceased existing. Sometimes they did nothing, but they always stayed alive. On rare occasions they distributed leaflets on topical subjects. Thus, leaflets were distributed at the Pechatkin factory on the occasion of the strike, signed by organized social democratic workers; on toy soldiers, signed by a group of social democrats; Nevskiy Rayon distributed leaflets on the

occasion of Leo Tolstoy's death, etc. At one point, in August, leaflets were distributed in almost all rayons, appealing to the people to organize. I am familiar with two of them: a printed one to shop assistants, signed by a group of organized shop assistants, social democrats, and another, also calling for getting organized, issued by Gorodskoy Rayon. All leaflets had the RSDWP letterhead and were of a strictly party-style. Hectographed leaflets were also distributed, dealing with the current situation. However, the rayons were not coordinated and in frequent cases their work was amateurish. The rayon members would meet to discuss various problems, such as the Duma, the revival (jobs) and, in general, various topics. However, they were unable to establish relations among themselves until the ROC was established. Naturally, they were hindered by police circumstances, the factional struggle abroad and the lack of initiative on the part of the local workers. It was the ROC which did the entire work related to establishing contacts and rayon organizations. It not only organized elections for the conference but also directed the efforts of the newly-formed Petersburg Committee. The establishment of the ROC was sympathetically (received) by all workers. The workers interpreted the formation of the ROC as marking the end of the disintegration, the breakdown of the party and the termination of the factional struggle. Resolutions on the need to participate in the work of the ROC and in conferences were passed at all rayon meetings. Vasileostrovskiy Rayon, which is considered front-ranking, was in favor (of a conference) and actively participated in the work on convening the conference. It is being said that it includes many progressive workers. I do not know whether this is true, for they show nothing to prove that quality, but rather survive simply as conciliationists and simply say that quarrels abroad are harmful, that Plekhanov is of tremendous importance to work being done in Russia, etc. These are the so-called loyal conciliationists. However, the ROC was unable to establish contacts with all Peter groups, and there still remain small groups working quietly. Thus, shortly before the conference I met a comrade from one of the groups, (who) asked to be connected with the PK. I have no idea as to how many workers in that group remain unconnected. The cam(pain) for the second Duma has met with a response on the part of the worker masses. Meetings were held in many plants, addressed by PK speakers and it was the PK which organized the meetings¹⁸.

Liquidationists as well have gone around plants with the suggestion of mounting a "petitions campaign"¹⁹. The workers, however, stated that more radical measures were needed, and (the liquidationists) were unsuccessful. The work of the ROC was greatly hindered by the mistrust with which every new person was received. The Peter workers had gained experience in the Okhranka methods.

The party members are working in the unions as well. Thus, the union of metal workers includes bolsheviks, mensheviks and liquidationists. The percentage of party

members among printing workers is high. I attended two meetings. The board consists of party members and liquidationists. The liquidationists behave quite inimically toward the party members, saying that if the party members were to do anything they would make mistakes and may even bring in the police. I am not well familiar with (the situation) among textile workers. They too have liquidationists among them, I do not know how many. I attended only one of their meetings. Work is also being done by the cultural and educational societies. I am familiar with two of them: The Sampsoniyevskoye Society, on the Vyborg side, and the Prosveshcheniye Society in Gorodskoy Rayon. Most of the participants are party members. Members of these societies are young people with good aspirations and the wish to study Marxism. They are good material for the recruitment of party members.

Viktor. First question: How is the PK organized? Second: How are r(ayon) and p(lant) c(ommittees) structured, and what kind of relations exist between them? Third question: Are there groups of par(ty) leg(al) activists and liquidationist groups?

Stepan. Let us hear the second Petersburg delegate.

Six votes for and none against.

Stepan (report of the second Petersburg delegate). Comrade Foma has already submitted quite a detailed report on Peter, but it is unclear whether the report starts with 1905 or 1910.

Lenin. Recent activities only.

(Stepan). Starting with 1905 and until the half of 1910 our organizations have been gradually destroyed. Organizations break down, ties are cut off, the work is amateurish. The cells are continuing their work, continuing to try to establish contacts with other rayons, but then a failure would occur, and the old situation would prevail. Cells-circles, despite their isolation, tried to provide answers to questions related to the life of workers. Thus, Nevskiy rayon issued leaflets on the current situation, distributed in Moskovskiy and Nevskiy rayons. On the occasion of Mayday leaflets were distributed calling, wherever possible, for strikes or holding meetings and short gatherings. Meanwhile, detentions never stopped.

Work is being done in education societies as well. Thus, in 1910 the "Knowledge is Light" Society was set up in Nevskiy Rayon. Its board consists exclusively of social democrats, and so does its editing commission. Reports are being sponsored. The lecturers' commission as well consists of social democrats.

There were mass lay-offs at Lesner's, and the best workers-comrades left the Obukhov Plant, and once again many relations were broken. Overtime is the main obstacle to organization. And if the worker,,(* This is

followed by the following note: "Continued in (notebook) III." This notebook has not been preserved. The speech by the second Petersburg representative may be found in Lenin's records (see PROLETARSKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA No 1, 1941, pp 147-148). Apparently the third notebook included records of other grass-root reports, in particular some on the situation in the Yekaterinoslav RSDWP organization, the content of which was also partially recorded by Lenin (see *ibid.*, pp 146-147).)

Fourth Session

19(6) January 1912

Statement by Ya.D. Zevin

I motion that we make public and add Statement No 1 to the minutes: Yesterday I voted against the question of the subordination of the national organizations as motioned by Comrade B(oris) I(vanovich), considering that subordination not to an all-party conference was not possible.

Savva

P.S. Yesterday I submitted a statement (* not preserved), which was not made public. If it is added to the minutes I will not insist on its publication. Savva.

Statement by G.K. Ordzhonikidze and D.2. Shvartsman
(* A note by Lenin on the back of the statement reads: "Submitted on 19 January 1912 at the fourth session." (see "V.I. Lenin. Biokhronika," vol 2, p 648).)

Statement

On the statement by Comrade Savva that the Yekaterinoslav group was separated from the ROC, I deem the following statement necessary: 1. In the first half of August, Comrade Viktor (member of the Kiev committee) went to Yekaterinoslav as instructed by the representative of the Organization Commission Abroad [OCA]. The result of his visit was a resolution which approved the practical steps taken by the Conference of Central Committee members on convening a conference. 2. At that time the Yekaterinoslav group authorized the representative of the Kiev committee to represent the Yekaterinoslav group to the ROC. 3. The representative of the Kiev committee (who also represented the Yekaterinoslav group) attended all the meetings of the ROC²⁰. 4. Immediately after the first ROC session (5-10 November (* No such event occurring on 5-10 November has been established. The ROC held its first session in Baku on 29 November 1911, old style)) a Kiev comrade was sent to Yekaterinoslav, a ROC notice was sent and correspondence followed. Sergo, Viktor.

Fifth Session

20(7) January 1912

Continuation of the fifth session.

Supplements to Zinovyev's report were introduced²¹ by Lenin: I then met and talked with Plekhanov in Zurich.

He said that he will maintain friendly neutrality. I state that not a single line or remark have tended to favor Plekhanov. We are being accused of factionalism. However, Martov acknowledged in writing the accuracy of my article, something I cannot say about his (article)²². There has been only one year without a conflict or written declaration. That was when we were in the majority. Martov wrote unsigned editorials and everybody recognized it (SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT) as the party organ²³.

Matvey. Question: When did the GOLOS people leave, and have they left before?

Albert. Could the Russian comrades (tell us) how the Russian workers understand and look at the TsO?

Lenin. This is literature.

The report of the International Socialist buro followed²⁴.

Lenin (reporter on the ISB). The work of the ISB can be divided into two parts. The first is ordinary: correspondence, membership assignments and issuing...(* word unintelligible), etc. The second deals with congresses: those in Copenhagen and Zurich²⁵. There was one (representative) of the Russian social democrats at the London (ISB) Congress. The plenum also nominated Plekhanov, who refused, saying that one person was sufficient. A rapprochement between him and us took place at the Copenhagen Congress, we held a discussion. I can no longer talk to the GOLOS people and the attitude toward Trotsky was one of disapproval, particularly on the matter of the letter²⁶. By the end of the session Plekhanov agreed with the suggestion of the plenum. He and we speak with a single voice. There have been no conflicts between us until recently. In Copenhagen (I) participated in the work of the cooperative commission. What is of the greatest interest is the extreme tension in relations among the German social democrats; there is unity on the surface and two sharply different currents internally. Among the German social democrats membership (in the ISB) is split: one half come from the party and the other from the trade unions. It has been noted that the larger the German delegation becomes, the more the hegemony of the German social democrats declines. At the Stuttgart (congress) they covered themselves with shame by voting in favor of the colonial resolution²⁷. For example, one of their representatives (Volmar) said that the expropriation of the capitalists is impossible²⁸. It turned out that the word expropriation could not be found in their program dealing with this subject. He is, actually, not following the line of the social democrats. In this case no illusions should be allowed to exist, for the struggle will become ever sharper as time goes on. Naturally the proletarian

mass will not hesitate. It attended the Magdeburg congress²⁹, but it is not this that would frighten the social democrats.

There is a division among the Czechs. We are against it, having determined that the social democrats should not yield to any kind of chauvinistic and nation(alistic) agitation³⁰. A mass of scandals have erupted in Austria on the subject of the language in which the papers were to be drafted, etc. Plekhanov was the keynote speaker on the subject of this split and his resolution passed with a huge majority vote. Trotsky immediately tried to promote conciliation by saying that Adler³¹, the most "peaceful" and opportunistic social democrat, was to be blamed.

Unquestionably, the German social democratic movement is entering a new age, the age of the soc(ialist) revolution; the economic and military crises and global complications are all indications that this age is approaching. So far this has been a period of preparations. The time has now come to give battle to the bourgeoisie. Here as well the difference between opportunists and revolutionary social democrats shows up.

A (meeting of the ISB) was convened in Zurich on the subject of Morocco. An incident took place here. Molkeburg wrote a letter of intention, which Rosa Luxemburg published, and that was the spark which started the fire. Bebel said that he intends to hold R. Luxemburg accountable³².

The French tried to include in the resolution the concept of strikes as a weapon in the struggle against wars. This was opposed by all social democrats, who pointed out that one should not inform the government as to the weapons we may use, based on the circumstances. The motion was voted down³³. Bebel raised the question of the non-publication of documents, hinting at R. Luxemburg, and asked for a resolution. I defended Rosa Luxemburg. To Bebel's great indignation, I quoted Quelch³⁴. On this occasion Bebel was the conciliator. The document published by R. Luxemburg has nothing to do with the documents (* As recorded). The most important thing was for her to be judged by the party, which was done. Submitting the case to the ISB was unfair. Vaillant suggested that insulting Rosa Luxemburg should be avoided "in the future," and that the resolution should be published by the editors (* As recorded). This event reflects the relationship between ref(ormists) and revolutionary social democrats. Various trends have developed within the German social democratic movement, and are being spread outside it. (This) is an indication of the ferment within the party. Decisive actions lie ahead. The clash between reformists and revolutionary social democrats is inevitable (* See V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 54, pp 357-358).

Boris (chair). Are there any questions? I have one. How are revolutions in the East affecting international relations?

Albert. Could we find out whether the German and French governments in fact suggested to the ISB to agitate in favor of peace? This was reported by some social democratic newspapers. The bourgeois press should have been suitably informed.

Lenin. Boris' question has little to do with my report, but more with the current situation. A democratic revolution has been started in Asia, a revolution which is drawing to an end in Europe, where a soc(ialist) revolution should have started.

To answer Albert's question, the matter was as follows: In Holland, one Trulstra³⁵, a social democrat, said in parliament that whenever the bourgeoisie wants to live in peace it turns to the ISB. There are no more facts. It was Vanderwelde who then said that some "circles" had turned to him saying that war would be undesirable and that it would be a good thing if the ISB would start to agitate against war. This, however, should be ignored. Vanderwelde, who wants to be a member of the cabinet, is circulating in those "circles." Trulstra acted as an opportunist, boasting of his power. Seeing the drop in the stock market, and having 4 million social democrats at home....the German government has also Sedan to deal with³⁶. These are simply intrigues caused by the close contacts between reformists and those "circles."

Zinovyev. Point of order. I motion that the minutes include information on cities not represented here.

Lenin. It would be better now for (those) who have first hand knowledge or factual information to present their reports.

Valentin. A representative of the ROC (* G.K. Ordzhonikidze) went to Odessa but was unable to locate anyone.

Viktor. A member of the ROC from Kiev (* Ya. Sokolin, see note 30) went to Kharkov. He too was unable to locate anyone.

Yerema. Lugansk. I can report the following (not printed). Nothing happened there in 1910-1911. There was only a group of social democrats maintaining personal relations. They were not officially organized and were doing nothing. However, they had set up a cooperative, organized the publication of a legal newspaper and worked with the savings bank which numbers about 2,000 members. There is a metal workers union with some 200 members, which is idle. They took a subscription to ZVEZDA³⁷. Soon afterwards an agent of the ROC went to see them and delivered a report. They welcomed the idea of the conference and decided to elect (a delegate). However, they had no one and were unwilling to (trust) an outsider. They receive no publications and issue no leaflets. The circles read ZVEZDA, prepare

for the elections and are considering to send their del(egates) and a party candidate to the Duma. Their forces are small and they are working at increasing them.

Samara. Nothing happened during the month of May. But then, returning from exile, they began to talk about setting up an organization. As a first step, they started a cooperative with 100 members. They attend study circles and work in the cooperative. In August they formally organized a social democratic initiative group. I visited them on my way to the conference, and presented a report. They send you their greetings and instructed me to say that a person from Saratov could represent Samara as well³⁹. Liquidationists, bolsheviks, mensheviks and VPERED people are working together.

Orenburg. I was there in May. The group of railroad workers is officially known as the "initiative group." They are quite active and are working at the cooperative. They wanted to organize a union but were bumped off. They then set up a mutual aid bank for railroad workers. They receive 30-40 copies of PRAVDA³⁹, subscribe to ZVEZDA (and) distribute both. The group consist of 17 people, five of whom are intellectuals.

Tula. Here there is a group of bored people, who seek and hope. Their entire activities consist of spreading ZVEZDA. They read all journals. They tried to establish ties with the union but failed. They are trying to establish contacts with abroad, for the sake of distributing clandestine publications.

Foma. Ural. Reporting for the delegate and member of the ROC, now detained⁴⁰. The Zlatoust group has existed a long time. It has 30-35 members and receives publications. There also is a group in Ufa.

Boris. I spoke with a comrade working in the Urals. Apparently, he has already been detained. He told me that the entire Ural area participated in the elections for the conference: Yekaterinburg, Ufa and the oblast. Three delegates were elected, from Yekaterinburg, Ufa and the oblast⁴¹. No elections were held in Perm because of two unreliable people.

Savva. Point of order. I motion that the regulation be amended and made public.

Boris. I oppose any changes in the regulations. Everyone considers his own statement important and that the regulations should be drafted for his benefit.... The work of the conference must not be obstructed. It is furthermore clear that this statement is not based on the debates, for no such debates have as yet taken place.

There were three votes for and the majority was against.

Lenin. The debates will continue. Sergo has the floor.

Sergo. Ural. From the very beginning was sent... A delegate from Yekaterinburg (* I.I. Shvarts; see note 40) attended the first meeting of the ROC and did preparatory work. Small groups have been set up in all cities. The largest is the one in Ufa (13 intellectuals, including five mensheviks and seven bolsheviks). The group is preparing for the elections to the 4th Duma. They even wanted to publish a newspaper and have an old printing press. Two delegates attended, another failed to show up for reasons of principle. There is a 10-member group in Kasli (* Kasli plant, Yekaterinburg Uyezd, Perm Guberniya) (not printed). The Yekaterinburg group worked for the elections for the 4th Duma. Representative Yegorov⁴² made speeches in all plants. Few publications are available: RABOCHAYA GAZETA⁴³, SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT, ZVEZDA and MYSL⁴⁴. There are no liquidationists and few mensheviks. They work jointly. One delegate was detained but another was chosen to take his place.

Kolpino. As early as August (1911), Comrade Boris⁴⁵, the ROC representative, held a meeting attended by 15 bolsheviks (and) mensheviks. He presented a report on the conference and a resolution was adopted. Comrade Boris did not attend the ROC session, having been sent to Moscow, where he failed.

Rostov-na-Donu. See the report of ROC representative Sergo (* A short note drafted by Lenin on the report has been preserved; see PROLETARSKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA, No 1, 1941, p 151).

Lenin. All reports have been submitted. A resolution has been presented to the buro (he reads it) (* The draft resolution has not been preserved. For the final text of the resolution "On Reports From the Local Areas" see "KPSS in resolutions...", vol 1, p 388). Can we open a general discussion on the reports?

Albert. It seems to me that we should adopt a resolution only relative to the local reports and discuss the matter of the TsO and ISB separately.

Sergo. I motion that we undertake to analyze the resolution on the local reports.

Vote: The majority (is in favor).

On the first point of the resolution.

Albert. We must make a distinction between the areas represented by delegates and where (work) is being done, while in other (places) efforts are being made.

Lenin. Consolidation work is taking place everywhere, and there is no need for distinction. What we must note here is that "consolidation" covers both those already at work and those who are only resuming activities.

Sergo. The word initiative-minded" should not be included in order to prevent confusion, for both Trotsky and the GOLOS people are interpreting initiative in terms of abolishing the party.

Boris. Does the resolution further include a description of the aspiration of workers to achieve centralization and to have a party? If not, this should be included here.

Zinovyev. This is already included in the (resolution on) the structure of the conference, for which reason in this case this would be simply a repetition.

Boris. Amendment: I motion that we add "and for the unification of local work through a single central party institution."

There were two votes in favor and two against. Defeated.

Second item.

Boris. To delete the word "insufficient."

Sergo. On the contrary, we must emphasize it.

Matvey. Sergo is right. (That) which we have done in this respect is insufficient, particularly in the case of the social democratic faction in the Duma. Everything possible was done concerning the unions and educational societies.

Boris. If they disagree with me, I disagree with them. This is an accusation directed at the clandestine party. We have done enough for Petersburg to support the faction. I have worked in two centers only....

Sergo (interrupts). Sufficient?

(Boris)... and let me say that if the masses showed any interest, it was in the clandestine party exclusively. Considering our strength, we must acknowledge that more could not be done. We tried, but lacked strength. It was the clandestine party alone which worked and is working within the unions. One could say that we accomplished little, but I motion that the word "insufficient" be deleted. I motion that the word "insufficient" be deleted and the word "intensify" included.

There were two votes in favor and two abstentions. Defeated by majority vote (six against).

Lenin. (I declare) the session ended. He reads Savva's statement: "I request, if possible, that the following statement drafted by me be made public for information purposes: Yesterday, after my "local report" (* The minutes of Zevin's report have not been preserved. See the note on the report drafted by Lenin, PROLETARSKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA, No 1, 1941, p 152), in which I described the resolution drafted by the Yekaterinoslav city organization on the subject of the all-party conference convened by the ROC, to which it sent a delegate, I

noted the misunderstanding on the matter of my participation in this conference. In order to avoid any further misunderstanding, I state the following: On the basis of said resolutions passed by the organization which delegated me, as a participant in this conference I consider myself not responsible for its actions and decisions, for the reason that this is not an all-party conference but represents only a segment of the party and that, with its structure resolutions, it has indicated its unwillingness to work for the real unification of all RSDWP forces which deem its existence and strengthening necessary today, which means that the unity of RSDWP organizations is necessary⁴⁶.

Savva (* On the reverse of the declaration, Lenin wrote: "Submitted at the fifth session on the morning of 20 January 1912"; see "V.I. Lenin. Biokhronika," vol 2, p 649).

Sixth Session

20(7) January 1912

Seven January. Evening session.

Second point of the resolution on reports from the local areas.

Adopted without debate.

Third point.

Sergo. The matter of the VPERED people remains unclear. I suggest an amendment to read "as well as the VPERED people."

Zinovyev. I oppose the amendment. The VPERED people are not always helpful. The main thing we wish to point out is that in the local areas all sorts of people work side by side.

Sergo. In Petersburg the VPERED people engaged in antiliquidationist work and, in general, were helpful. VPERED people may be found in other cities as well. They are entirely different from the VPERED people abroad, with whom we are not concerned.

Zinovyev. I motion that this point be somewhat rewritten, such as to include the following: "Wherever VPERED people and other social democrats may be found" (* The subsequent text of the minutes is unavailable. There are seven missing pages, and the eighth page contains Lenin's speech on the report relative to the TsO).

Lenin.... We have argued and exposed the conciliationists. They have described my article about them as a model for squabbling articles⁴⁷. Fine. But allow me to ask you, my strict critical comrades, the following question: What kind of person is Trotsky, the head of the conciliationists? He has been promoting liquidationism

among the Russian workers under the party's banner, under the guise of clandestine party publications, on the sly, like a smuggler. This had to be exposed. It was also necessary to mention those who, consciously or subconsciously, are playing into Trotsky's hands. My article on the subject of Rozhkov was mentioned⁴⁸. That was an area in which there neither was nor could there (be) any squabbling abroad. Our differences with Rozhkov dealt with principles. They were preceded by extensive correspondence. You are saying clannishness, clannish squabbles. Yes, clannishness against which we must fight and not merely retreat. We are currently engaged in a struggle to death and there is no place for whining and complaining. I repeat, complaints about quarrels and polemical squabbles are understandable and pertinent only as feelings and moods expressed by the socialists. It is a fact that we have two parties, due to the nature of Russian reality. In some areas in Russia grounds for differences and division are created. The split in Yekaterinoslav between party members and liquidationists, their separate existence in Kiev and Baku, nothing can be done...(* The record ends at this point and the ninth sheet of the minutes is lacking).

Stepan. Comrades, I must point out that the TsO is quite unpopular, and one thing is understandable: They use very bad language. I support Albert's motion and say that if the TsO is written for the benefit of the intelligentsia alone, the only result is that only the Cadets read it for information purposes. Today the movement consists exclusively of workers who, in order to understand the article must spend half a day reading it. I suggest that the writing be done in a more popular style.

Foma. Let me answer Comrade Pavel. He may call himself a pure worker, to the best of my knowledge he spent a great deal of time away from the worker masses and is unfamiliar with them. My colleague from Peter has also forgotten that the workers have progressed and, to the best of my understanding, the social democratic workers understand the TsO.

Albert. I do not insist on my plan. All I want to mention is the inconveniences we are experiencing with the newspaper. The paper is read unwillingly if it is an old issue. A book, however, is read and preserved regardless of age. Pamphlets are kept and newspapers are destroyed. We can always pass on RABOCHAYA GAZETA, and in the case of the more conscientious workers there should be one booklet every two months, like the Germans do. Passing it along would be no more expensive.

Boris. I oppose Albert's idea. His plan would cause a great deal of inconvenience. I base this on personal experience. Meanwhile you, sitting in Leipzig, keep talking. The reaction in Russia to Aleksandrov's pamphlet has had a bad review⁴⁹. A variety of information should be exchanged between you and us. He (Albert) is saying that they (the pamphlets) will be preserved⁵⁰, although mass searches are conducted! Leaflets could be

hidden but not pamphlets. I am not defending the TsO in the sense that its style is good. However, there are attacks and attacks, and nor should we ignore the positive side of the TsO. Not a single article (difficult to understand) has been named here; the critic from Vilno (* M.S. Gurovich) was the only one to mention one such, but then all others said that this was a splendid article. I agree that we must become used to higher standards in waging the struggle. However, one cannot wage the fight without talking about it. This would be like acting surreptitiously. It is true that the taint must be removed. Nonetheless, we must follow the sustained and proper path as in the past.

(Intermission)

Viktor (reporting for the Mandate Commission). Having considered the mandates and heard the explanations of the Saratov delegate, supported by a certificate issued by Yerema, member of the Mandate Commission, the Commission suggests that the conference approve Comrade Valentin from Saratov and from Yekaterinoslav as well, on the basis of a certificate issued by Viktor as member of the Mandate Commission.

The matter was put to a vote. Adopted by majority vote with one abstention.

Lenin. I open the debates on the ISB report.

Sergo. Little information is provided in the press on ISB activities, and nothing is known other than its resolutions. There are only rumors about its activities. I suggest that the workers should be better informed on the ISB. Comrade Lenin published a report on the Second Duma social democratic deputies, in three languages⁵¹. The Russian workers are given no information.

Viktor. At some point we read in the press that some Turkish representative had submitted a statement in connection with the Italian war. Is that true?

Pavel. How are chairmen of the ISB appointed, and what is the duration of their term?

Boris (point of order). I motion that this be determined privately. Lenin. Why privately? Every (party) member has the right to know electoral procedures. A representative of the Central Committee is appointed and remains such until he resigns or someone else is chosen. With the old ISKRA it was Plekhanov. Plekhanov resigned at the London Congress, and I was elected. Then again the plenum nominated Plekhanov and now it is both of us.

As to Viktor's second question, I do not know of any such case.

Then, the ISB consists of representatives of all parties. Its meetings are quite cumbersome. The delegates meet once or twice annually. The rest of the time the work is handled by the Executive Committee which works independently.

On the matter of the poor level of information of the Russian workers: Anything we could we published: on the increased cost of living, on Morocco, etc.

My report simply consisted of newspaper excerpts on the Second Duma case and faction questions asked at the Third Duma⁵². This was printed in the legal press.

Sergo. I read somewhere that Lenin had voted against and independent English Labor Party.

Lenin. This was in 1907 (* Error in the record. The correct year was 1908). I voted only against Kautsky's formula. A report on this matter was submitted at that time⁵³.

A resolution was received by the buro on the TsO report: "Having heard and discussed the report of the TsO representative, and approving the principle-minded political line followed by the TsO, the conference expresses the wish that the TsO pay greater attention to propaganda articles and that the articles be written in a more popular style understood by the workers.

"Valentin, Yerema, Matvey."

Boris. I motion that no resolution be adopted, for this resolution does not refer to what we should be saying. The TsO will be discussed in the point on literature.

Matvey. Boris is wrong. A resolution is necessary. The TsO pursued a specific line which we must assess. The resolution does not say whether we approve or disapprove it.

Boris (interrupts). It bears your signature.

(Matvey). I signed without reading it, simply because a signature was required.

Sergo. It seems to be that a resolution must be passed. If he hear a report we must report our conclusion. Boris says that it does not cover all activities of the TsO. I do not know if a resolution should mention the various periods, and so on. Literature is one thing and the TsO another.

Boris. If it is a question for the resolution to express your wishes, then this resolution does not mention them at all. As a matter of principle I would sign it, but it would be more expedient to classify it as literature.

Yerema. I repeat: Literature is one thing and the TsO another. This resolution indicates our attitude toward the report in short and clear terms.

A vote is taken on whether to put the resolution to a vote.

One vote is against. Boris' motion is defeated.

First point:

(Having heard and discussed the report submitted by the representative of the TsO, and approving the principle-minded line of the TsO, the conference....)

Valentin. Amendment: add "and tactical."

Seven votes for, no vote against, with three abstentions.

Second point:

(...expresses the wish that the TsO pay greater attention to propaganda articles and that articles be written in a more popular style understood by the workers.)

Pavel. Amendment: I motion that the second point of the resolution be deleted.

(Three votes in favor and four against. Defeated).

Overall vote. (Five votes in favor, one against, and four abstentions).

Boris. Point of order. I suggested earlier that we vote by individual point. The chairman paid no attention. I resubmit the motion that we vote by individual point (* No further record available. For the final text of the resolution see "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh..." vol 1, p 401).

Seventh Session

21 (8) January 1912

Continuation of the seventh session⁵⁴. (See Notebook No 5) (* Notebook No 5 has not been preserved. It included the minutes of the end of the sixth and beginning of the seventh sessions and which current problems were discussed).

Savva has the floor. Rozhkov is also right from the viewpoint of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, although he speak of the hegemony of the proletariat. He speaks of the impossibility of engaging in revolutionary actions and, on this basis, (considers) that the peasantry was satisfied with the 9 November law⁵⁵. The thoughts expressed in the 1908 resolution were incorrect. For example, what do we mean by "pseudo-constitutional forms"⁵⁶? No such forms exist. Our Duma is real. The reactionaries opposed the 9 November law, for which reason one cannot say that the government is relying on Black Hundred landowners. They also disagreed on the question of the small unit. The government is trying to rely on (people) of a nationalist type and does not agree with Purishkevich⁵⁷. Martov is right by saying that the government took a step back. The law of 3 June⁵⁸ is a step back and the general policy (is not

consistent) with the interests of the coun(try's) bourgeois development, which it hinders. Larin and Rozhkov are wrong, for the law of 9 November does not basically agree with the interests of bourgeois development⁵⁹. It does not please the peasant masses and leads to an even greater revolutionary crisis. But who will solve the crisis? Present policy is unsatisfactory. The bourgeoisie is dissatisfied, and this is true. It mentions both old and new developments. If there is anything in common between us it is in the sense of preparations for a revolution. How? With the old or the new method? On the subject of coalition, however, we disagree. Apply the old slogans to the new nature of the cause (?). We cannot go on as in the past: attend a circle and deliver a lecture. We must adapt to the broad masses and the masses must understand the slogans. I hope that you will do what you said. Old content applied to the new times (?). We must not confuse party with class. The Cadets are liberal and represent the petite bourgeoisie, and since its problems have not been solved I cannot say that they will adopt the viewpoint of the big bourgeoisie. Martov is wrong because one could give this any kind of meaning one wants. What do absolutism and contradiction mean? Any Cadet would tell you that it means the contradiction between our government and the country's bourgeois development. Unquestionably, this contradiction will be resolved through a crisis, but not (in) the sense of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Aleksandrov is right by saying that there is no autocracy⁶⁰. He is right for there already exist representative institutions on which autocracy relies. We must intensify our agitation in favor of a republic, the draft resolution reads, but should we not do this at all times? We must intensify it, but how? By adapting to the situation and with the support of the masses? Yes, this is the direct task of the social democrats, to be in the lead, to head and to urge on, and there is no point for the resolution to mention (this). Larin and Rozhkov are wrong, but it is also wrong to say that some kind of nonrevolutionary coalition exists. No such coalition exists. The freedom of coalition is itself a revolution. Can we speak of a nonrevolutionary insurance? Lassalle⁶¹ said that universal suffrage is a revolution. Our entire social democratic movement has the right to be legal. The content matters. A legal existence may be impossible but everything possible must be done. The electoral campaign could accomplish a great deal in the sense of strengthening (the party) and ensuring worker support. As to the "petition," we have no quarrel with you. I believe that at this point it is possible, but that in general it would fail⁶². It could be successful only if extensive agitation becomes possible. However, we could try. As to the December resolution, I could vote for it up to the point where the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry is mentioned (* A reference to the first point of the mandatory part of the resolution passed at the Fifth All-Russian RSDWP Conference; see "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....," vol 1, p 314).

Boris (chair). I warn you that we displayed forbearance for the preceding speaker. The next speaker, however, should not abuse this privilege.

Sergo. I object. If the assembly has given the floor to a speaker, you have no right (to limit it).

Valentin. I also object.

Lenin. There should never be even a question of abuse.

Sergo. Let me start with Savva's first statement. I was happy to hear that now there (are no) serious disagreements between us and that the question of the revolution has brought bolsheviks and mensheviks closer together. I increasingly realize that we have grounds for joint work, had there not been those "damn foreign countries" with leaders in Paris, San Remo (* Places where groups of mensheviks-Plekhanovites lived), etc. who, understanding nothing, issue directives and promote discord. This is not Savva's fault but the fault of the leaders who keep issuing circulars. Savva then says that no resolution should be drafted because we could not include (in it) all that is happening now. The question of what is happening now in our country is entirely different from what is happening in Western Europe. Savva must agree that our circumstances are different. He says that the liquidationists reject the revolution which, in his opinion, is both necessary and inevitable. Savva blamed Lenin for his optimism, saying that Volskiy⁶³ would have been pleased. However, had Savva been listening closely he would have noted that Lenin said that the revolutionary crisis is growing. Savva says that the German social democrats have always been engaged in a revolutionary struggle. However, ever since the Russian revolution of 1905, the Germans have changed their tactics significantly. The German proletariat is waging the struggle within the law, but its latest actions in connection with the hunger indicate that it too is going beyond the law. Savva disagrees with Dan⁶⁴ if he rejects the revolution but agrees with him in terms of abandoning the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. I personally believe that if it is to win, the Russian revolution will win together with the peasantry. The liberals will not fight for the revolution, as confirmed by practical experience. The peasants may not want a republic but demand land, which leads them to fight the autocracy and for the confiscation of the landed estates. The peasantry will be the proletariat's most reliable ally. In this respect the mensheviks failed. Kostrov⁶⁵ said that the peasantry has no past, present or future. Your hopes concerning the Duma were not justified, and nor were Lenin's three- and five-men groups⁶⁶ or the hopes for an armed uprising. Savva seems to be agreeing with Martov. This, however, is not an answer but fear and avoiding to answer. Savva says that there is no autocracy in our country but representative institutions. It seems to me that he is exaggerating. Autocracy has been preserved by the ruler in its essential aspects, but it is trying to adapt and to exploit other classes to its advantage. Agitation in favor of a republic has been and is being carried out, and

there is no need to include any of this in the resolution. In my view, however, this must be said, for there are some social democrats who are not engaged in such agitation and are fighting for coalition. This must be emphasized at this time.

Boris (chair). Your time has expired. Will this assembly grant him additional time?

Put to a vote: Five are for and two against.

(Boris). You may continue.

Sergo (continuing). Whether there is a revolutionary coalition or not, Lenin said that the Cadets fought for and achieved the right to legal existence and that such an accomplishment does not mean a revolutionary coalition. But if this question is formulated in connection with the overall requirements, this will represent a revolutionary coalition. Savva keeps fearing that we may sneak something by him. As to the "petition," he said both yes and no. This is dialectics, and it has been put to good use by Plekhanov. As to the petition campaign, we should clearly say a yes or a no. I shall sign it when someone can prove to me that it can be carried out, like that of the English Chartists⁶⁷. In principle I have nothing (against) it.

Boris (chair). The motion has been made to extend our session by three quarters of an hour.

There were five votes in favor and five against. Defeated. The session was closed (* Judging from Lenin's note on the back of the resolution "On the Present Moment and the Party's Tasks," the discussion of this question was continued at the 15th session as well: 25 January. Fifteenth Session.)

Eighth Session

(* No record has been kept on the beginning of the session at which the question of the hungry was discussed.)

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—money in social organizations and not the Red Cross. Here and there money is being collected, such as among r(evolutionary) workers in the mill, many of whom contributed a ruble. The difficulty of this project can be seen by the fact alone (that) when the collection was to begin at a plant the mining engineer started shouting that the workers wanted once again to start a revolution.

Boris Ivanovich. The question of aid to the hungry was of great interest to the Moscow workers. In Moscow, money was collected in all plants and factories and sent to the newspapers. Usually such collections began spontaneously, and on payday. After the collection, however, many of the people started thinking and asking whether this was some sort of tipping. Thanks to the agitation

work conducted by the social democrats, the question was formulated in broader and different terms. We described the general conditions in our reality. The cells passed resolutions. Our resolution on the subject of financial aid was the following: To help but not give the money to the government but to the public organizations. I believe that the conference should answer the question of what should a revolutionary do when there is hunger?

Matvey. Is aid to the hungry philanthropy? It is not. Aid is sometimes given also in times of worker unemployment, and is not considered philanthropy. In Vilno the group was in favor of giving aid.

Zinovyev. We must point out and note the connection between hunger and the developing unemployment. Our economists are already noting serious symptoms of forthcoming unemployment. The question was asked here of what should a revolutionary do during times of hunger. The task is clear: systematic agitation and organization of the masses. Let me say a few words on the nature of our agitation. On the occasion of the hunger in 1891 Plekhanov appealed to r(evolutionary) Russia to split into two groups: those favoring the autocracy of serfdom and those who are against it⁶⁸. This does not apply today. Kutler⁶⁹, the delegate of the Cadet Party, is with the government. The liberal bourgeoisie is taking no active steps in the struggle against hunger or engaging in any whatsoever principled agitation against autocracy. Without assuming the initiative, we must participate most energetically in the collection of funds and use this time in promoting revolutionary agitation.

Pavel. There is nothing useful that this conference could say about the hunger. We must not appeal for support of the hungry and do nothing about it. Any type of situation imposes an obligation. Naturally we must engage in agitation. It is being said that the workers are helping energetically. This is incorrect. I represent the hungry guberniya (* Kazan); here the workers are indifferent toward the hungry and no collections are taking place.

Savva. I believe that a resolution must be passed. The question is being raised in the local areas, and the mood of the workers has been enhanced on the issue of hunger. I suggest that a joint leaflet be addressed to Russian society explaining the reasons for the hunger and indicating the need for revolutionary struggle. All of this must be mentioned in connection with the forthcoming elections for the 4th Duma, in the sense that the social democrats are the only ones engaged in fighting tsarism systematically and to the end. As to the committees: Wherever possible, nonparty committees should be organized, in which the social democratic workers would rally around them the best elements in factories and plants.

Lenin. The party must actively interfere and a resolution must be issued. From an exchange of views we have become convinced that the workers are paying great

attention to the hunger. They are actively intervening and helping the hungry. Aid to the hungry is no philanthropy. Aid turns into philanthropy only in the bourgeois interpretation of the matter. Furthermore, the Cadets have truly adopted the viewpoint of ministry officials. We must participate in the committees which are being organized for the struggle against hunger. I am referring to the nonparty worker committees. We must not call for their creation but must participate in them. It would be best to send the money to the social democratic faction, worker associations, clubs and other societies. Markov's speech at the Second Duma⁷⁰, in which he called the hungry peasants loafers, should be disseminated. This is a splendid speech, may it be read (* See V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 54, p 359).

Foma. In Petersburg I did not notice any particularly active response and interest in the hungry on the part of the workers, although they talked about it some and frequently asked questions of the social democrats. This was mainly among workers who had still not broken their ties with the countryside. As to the pres(ent) time on using the (elections to the 4th Duma, we must include anything which is of interest to the people's masses.

Viktor. The hunger is triggering among the workers a widespread desire to help. The death of a worker in putting up a house triggers compassion and hunger does the same, naturally throughout the country... This should be used but not, naturally, for collecting gold. The masses must be excited somehow, instead of simply saying that we need a revolution. The initiative of the committees must naturally be supported. However, at the (same time) we must identify the root of the evil and describe the conditions under which there would be no hunger. We must make use of the hu(mane) experience and feelings. The Kiev committee printed a leaflet but showed no initiative in the matter of collecting funds.

Savva. On the subject of the leaflet. I do not wish to...engage in an argument about principles; the hunger, however, affects not only the peasants. It must be linked to the electoral campaign and the confiscation of land. Should we suggest the setting up of committees? But they are not asking you. They are acting. Should we call for the creation of clandestine committees? We must point out, however... that a leaflet would be possible (in connection) with the appar(ent) crisis.

Boris Ivanovich. I oppose a leaflet. This is ridiculous. The con(ference) is recommending to the bourgeoisie to (organize) clandestine societies. I did not say this, the bourgeoisie should....

Valentin. I oppose the leaflet. To turn to society with a leaflet in connection with the elections means to address ourselves to the reac(tionaries) and the Cadets. To call upon them to vote for us is senseless. We know them well. We need a leaflet addressed at the democratic strata of the population, the peasants and the workers. Turning to society at large is meaningless.

Savva defends the idea of a leaflet addressed at society.

Foma. We are arguing senselessly. It is clear that mass leaflets are needed. The heading is unimportant and, naturally, we address ourselves to peasants and workers.

The draft resolution is read (* The draft was written by Lenin; see op. cit., vol 21, pp 128-129).

(Eighth evening session chaired by Boris Ivanovich. Resolution on the hunger.)

First point:

(Taking into consideration:

(1. That the hunger of 20 million Russian peasants proves one more time the entirely unbearable suppressed status of the peasant masses, inconceivable in any civilized country in the world, masses oppressed by tsarism and the class of landed serf owners.)

Savva. Delete the words "civilized country."

Boris Ivanovich. Amendment: (add) "based on lack of land and the backwardness of agriculture."

Zinovyev. I am against. This is not merely a question of lack of land but of the entire system. Even the liberals would agree that there is lack of land.

Boris Ivanovich. I am for. The entire revolution appeared on the grounds of the agrarian problem, the most important part of which is lack of land.

(Put to a vote). One vote for, the majority against.

Zinovyev's stylistic amendment is introduced.

Point one is adopted unanimously.

Point two:

(2. That the present hunger proves once again the failure of the government's agrarian policy and the impossibility of ensuring any whatsoever normal bourgeois development of Russia while its policy in general and its land policy in particular is directed by the class of serf and landed-state owners, who rule through their right-wing parties in the Third Duma, the State Council and the court of Nicholas II).

Viktor. Amendment: "as represented by the right-wing parties."

Adopted.

Point two is adopted.

Point three:

(3. That with their statements in the Duma and by holding the "peasant-loafers" responsible, the Black Hundred

parties (with Messrs. Markov and others at their head) have brought the shamelessness of the tsarist-land-owning gang which is plundering Russia to such a degree that the eyes of even the most ignorant open and even the most indifferent are touched).

Stepan. Delete the word "ignorant."

Boris Ivanovich. I am against.

Savva. I am for. The word is apt.

(One vote for and the majority against). The amendment is defeated.

Point four:

(4. That government obstruction to aid to the hungry, police fault-finding in the zemstvos, and of committees which collect funds and set up stands, etc., is triggering the greatest possible discontent even among the bourgeoisie and protests even in the backward and counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie, such as the 17 October Alliance⁷¹).

Boris Ivanovich. Question: What are the facts concerning the 17 October Alliance and its opposition? I motion that the words "17 October Alliance" be deleted.

Lenin. The zemstvos are with the 17 October Alliance, and they are part of the opposition.

Zinovyev. The 17 October Alliance supported the government in the matter of the hunger.

Savva. (I favor the old text). The Zemstvos were indeed part of the opposition.

The term "17 October Alliance" is deleted.

Zinovyev. Amendment: replace "17 October Alliance" with "among the zemstvos and the urban bourgeoisie."

Boris Ivanovich. I am against. Why should we single out the zemstvos from the rest of the bourgeoisie?

Zinovyev. The zemstvos' protest is a new fact. In a counterrevolutionary period it is the first fact. This should be noted.

The amendment passes.

Savva. Add "counterrevolutionary" to the word "zemstvos."

Zinovyev. Not only the zemstvos but the urban bourgeoisie as well is counterrevolutionary.

There were two votes in favor and six against. Defeated.

(Boris Ivanovich). Delete the words starting with "and protests..."

(Six votes for and one against).

Point five:

(5. That the liberal-monarchic bourgeoisie, whose press is helping to inform society about the hunger and the behavior of the government has, on the other hand, as represented by Cadet Kutler in the Third Duma, adopted the type of moderate-opposition stand which in no case can satisfy democracy. Nor can we tolerate the philanthropic formulation of the question of aid to the hungry shared by the majority of liberals).

Stylistic corrections.

Point six, second part of the resolution:

(That among the working class, entirely aside from the worsening of its economic status, due to the increased number of hungry and unemployed people, a spontaneous aspiration toward making collections for the hungry and providing other aid may be noted, and that this aspiration, which is natural to any democrat, not to mention the socialists, must be supported and guided in the spirit of the class struggle waged by all social democrats;

(It is decreed by the conference that:

(a. It is necessary to invest all available forces in intensifying propaganda and agitation among the broad population masses, the peasantry in particular and to explain the connection between hunger and tsarism and its entire policy, spreading in the countryside for purposes of agitation Duma speeches, not only those of social democrats and Trudoviki⁷³, but also those of friends of the Tsar, such as Markov II, and spreading the political demands of the social democrats, above all the overthrow of tsarist monarchy and the institution of a democratic republic, followed by the confiscation of landed estates;

(b. It is necessary to support the aspiration of the workers to help the hungry to the extent of their possibilities, advising them to send their donations to the social democratic faction in the Duma, the worker press or worker cultural and educational and other societies, etc., and to set up separate cells of social democrats and other democrats in joining the groups, commissions or groups for aid to the hungry;

(c. It is necessary to direct the democratic stir on the subject of hunger toward demonstrations, meetings, mass gatherings and other forms of starting a revolutionary struggle waged by the masses against tsarism.)

Savva. Amendment: delete the words "above all."

Adopted.

Yerema. Delete anything relative to disseminating Markov's speeches.

Zinov'ev. Yerema, are you afraid of Markov II?

Matvey. I second Yerema. We are unable to distribute even our own publications.

Boris Ivanovich. I am in favor. These are new methods of struggle. The Germans have resorted to this method.

(There were three votes in favor and seven against). Yerema's amendment was defeated.

Foma. Delete the word "those" but keep "friends of the Tsar, such as Markov."

Viktor. Seconded.

Savva. Seconded.

Lenin. In defense of the word "those." The Tsar has many friends, but not all of them are that cynical.

Foma insists. Delete.

(Two votes in favor and 6 opposed). Foma's amendment is defeated.

Foma. I motion that item (b) be deleted and replaced by something else.

Lenin. I am in favor of retaining it.

Savva. Delete the word "cells" and replace it with another word.

Boris Ivanovich. I support Foma. The entire point must be deleted.

Pavel. This is the main part. To delete it means to reject the entire resolution.

(Two votes in favor and the majority is against). Foma's amendment is defeated.

The next point (c):

Savva. I motion that the words "of beginning of the revolutionary" be deleted.

(Seven votes for and none against). Passed.

The resolution is unanimously (adopted) in its entirety (* For the definitive text see "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh...", vol 1, pp 394-396).

Ninth Session

22(9) January 1912

Continuation of the ninth session.

Boris (chair). Debates on hunger have been concluded. I motion that we discuss the draft (resolution) on the law on worker insurance⁷³.

Albert. (On the extraordinary declaration). Bearing in mind that in Paris the VPERED people are blabbering about the conference, and have even promised one of the conciliationists our address and told him that we would soon have to move, I motion that no reports on the proceedings be issued and no correspondence be maintained, with the exception of correspondence related to the conference.

Lenin. I motion that nothing about the conference be mentioned in the correspondence.

Pavel. We have no possibility of controlling the mail, for which reason I motion that we interrupt all correspondence, perhaps for one week.

Valentin. I object to control, but if matters have reached that point, I will mail my letter personally. No one has the right to interfere with private correspondence.

Sergo. No one is interfering with private correspondence. I only suggest that in the interest of secrecy correspondence be halted for 3-4 days.

Pavel. I am indignant at Comrade Valentin's words. If he were to put a letter in the mailbox, this would be a provocation. An entire conference must not be wrecked because of private mail.

The matter is put to a vote. The majority decides that all correspondence must be stopped.

Points one and two (of the resolution) on worker insurance are read (* The draft resolution written by Semashko has a correction made by Lenin).

(Resolution on the attitude toward the Duma-government draft bill on state worker insurance.

(1. The share which hired labor receives from the wealth it produces, in the guise of wages, is so insignificant that it is barely sufficient to meet the worker's most vital needs, and the proletariat is deprived of all possibility of saving from its wages in cases of disability as a result of maiming, disease, old age, disability or unemployment, which is inseparably related to the capitalist production method. For that reason, worker insurance for all said cases is a reform imperatively dictated by the entire course of capitalist development.

(2. The best form of worker insurance is state insurance, based on the following stipulations: a. It should insure the workers in all cases of loss of ability (maiming, disease, old age, disability; furthermore, in the case of women workers, pregnancy and maternity; payments to

widows and orphans after the death of the bread earner) or in cases of loss of earnings because of an employment; b. Insurance should cover all hired labor and their families; c. All insured must receive payments based on the principle of true compensation for earnings and all insurance expenditures must be assumed by the entrepreneurs and the state; d. All types of insurance should be managed by unified insurance organizations structured territorially and on the basis of the principles of full self-government of the insured).

Albert. The Germans are demanding only two-thirds of earnings and perhaps (the resolution) is demanding too much.

Viktor. In this case we must not be guided by the Germans. The demand, as it were, will not be met even if we ask for one-half. For agitation purposes it is important to ask for full compensation for lost earnings.

Lenin. I believe that a provisional revolutionary government would be able to meet this request. We should not formulate unattainable objectives for a revolutionary government.

Boris. My question is, what is the importance of structuring this on the basis of the territorial principle, and could another principle be applied?

Stepan. I have the same question.

Zinovyev. The factory type could be one. This means assigning the worker to the enterprise and the fact that the capitalists will control the funds; the territorial principle means something like (organizing) a single bank for the Narva outpost a single fund for all plants and all workers in a given area. I quoted Narva as an example.

Albert. I would be against splitting them. Germany has central funds; Bohemia and Saxony have their own funds but controlling them is a single center. Each city is autonomous but is part of the single bank.

Zinovyev (interrupting). That is precisely what was suggested in the draft.

(Albert). I did not understand it. I thought that Zinovyev was suggesting that this be split into small units, such as the Narva Rayon.

Zinovyev. Let me also add that this is a universally accepted demand and that there is nothing new in it.

Matvey. So-so

Point Three:

(3. All of these basic demands for an efficiently structured insurance radically conflict with the governmental draft bill which was passed by the State Duma (with two

readings); a. It covers only 2 types of insurance, against accidents and illness; b. It covers only a small part (according to our most generous estimates, one-sixth) of the Russian proletariat, living outside entire areas (Siberia, and, in the governmental draft, the Caucasus), as well as entire worker categories, particularly those who need insurance (agricultural, construction, etc.); c. It provides for pitiful compensations (maximal compensation for total disability would be two-thirds of earnings, computed on a basis below the actual level) and imposes on the workers the main burden of insurance costs: it is at the expense of the workers that insurance will be provided not only in the case of illness but also "petty" and, in practical terms, most frequent maiming, which so far, by law, was exclusively the obligation of the entrepreneurs; d. It deprives insurance institutions of all independence, placing them under the concentrated supervision of officials (from the "office" and the "Council on Insurance Affairs"), the gendarmes, the police (which, in addition to providing overall supervision, are given the right to direct their activities in the main, to influence their personnel, and so on) and the bosses (the strictly entrepreneurial personnel of associations which insure people against accidents; the factory type of hospitalization companies, which insure against diseases; statutory influence on them exerted by the entrepreneurs, and so on).)

Zinovyev. I motion that the words "in two readings" be deleted.

Adopted

Point Four:

(4. It is precisely such a law, which most rudely mocks the most vital interest of the workers, that could be created at the present time by the rabid reaction, in a period of domination of the counterrevolution, as a result of long years of preliminary talks and agreements between the government and the representatives of capitalism. The definitive overthrow of autocracy and the establishment of a democratic system, which would ensure the full freedom of class struggle waged by the proletariat, is a necessary prerequisite for a reform which would be consistent, to a certain extent, with the interests of the proletariat.

(On this basis, the RSDWP Conference decrees the following: 1. It is the urgent task of clandestine party organizations as well as comrades working in the legal aspects of the labor movement (trade unions, clubs, cooperatives, etc.) to develop the broadest possible protest against the Duma-governmental insurance bill which, for the first time in the black Duma, affects the interests of the entire Russian proletariat as a class, and which violates these interests most rudely. 2. Approves the vote cast by the social democratic faction in the Duma against this draft bill and, in general, its principled abstention from speeches in the debates on the bill; the conference points out that such agitation must

be of a consistent social democratic nature, i.e., that in it the labor reform must be linked to the class status of the proletariat in contemporary capitalist society, the critique of bourgeois illusions promoted by social reformists and, generally, our basic socialist tasks; on the other hand, in such agitation the nature of the Duma-governmental "reform" must be linked to the current political moment and, in general, with our revolutionary-democratic tasks and slogans).

Valentin. I motion that the words legal and clandestine be deleted. The resolution is becoming too cumbersome.

Boris. I second the motion.

Motion put to a vote: Four are in favor and four against. Defeated.

Valentin. Amendment: Replace "develop" with "development," and so on.

Adopted.

(Valentin). I motion to delete "about it" and enter "Duma debates." To delete "in debates about it."

Adopted.

Zinovyev. Statement out of turn. A representative of the the Organization Committee Abroad⁷⁴ has come to us. I motion that he be admitted in a consultative capacity.

Adopted unanimously.

Zinovyev. I also motion that we continue to discuss the points and to vote on the entire resolution tomorrow, after the report to be submitted by Comrade Aleksandrov.

Four votes for and two against.

The reading of the points continues.

(3. The conference draws the attention of the comrades to the tremendous and valuable materials which the Duma debates on this draft bill have provided in terms of clarifying the attitude of the different classes toward worker reforms; the conference particularly emphasizes the aspirations of the representatives of backward capitalism, among the Octobrists, clearly hostile to the workers, and which were obviously manifested in the course of the debates, and the hypocritical statements, concealed behind social-reformist phraseology, concerning "social peace," and the speeches by the Cadet speakers who essentially spoke out against the autonomy of the working class and who, filled with hatred, fought the basic amendments submitted by the social democratic faction in the Duma concerning the bill.

(4. The conference most firmly cautions the workers against any attempts on the part of liquidationists (see the article by Khizan in VOZROZHDENIYE, no 8, 1910; the article by Olenich in VOZROZHDENIYE⁷⁵, and others) to curtail and totally to distort the nature of such agitation, reducing it to the level of the legally admissible during the period of domination of the counterrevolutionary bloc. Conversely, the conference emphasizes that the main feature of such agitation should be to explain to the broad proletarian masses the truth that without a new revolutionary upsurge no real improvement in the situation of the workers is possible; and that anyone who wishes to achieve a real labor reform should struggle above all for a new victorious revolution.

(5. If despite the objection of the conscious proletariat the Duma-governmental draft bill becomes a law and is enacted, the conference invites the comrades to use the new organizational forms which are established for them (worker hospital insurance) in order to wage within these organizational cells as well energetic propaganda in favor of the social democratic ideas and thus turn this law, which was conceived with a view to a new enslavement and oppression of the proletariat, into a tool for the development of its class awareness, strengthening its organization and intensifying its struggle for full political freedom and socialism).

Comrade Aleksandrov was asked to redraft the resolution from the stylistic viewpoint.

The session was closed after the completion of the reading.

Footnotes

1. Conference delegates with deciding vote rights:

1. A.K. Voronskiy (Valentin) (1884-1943), RSDWP member since 1904, delegate representing the Saratov RSDWP organization;

2. F.I. Goloshchekin (Boris, Boris Ivanovich) (1876-1941); RSDWP member since 1903, delegate representing the Moscow RSDWP organization. Member of the RSDWP Central Committee.

3. M.S. Gurovich (Gurvich) (Matvey) (Born 1890). Worker, delegate representing the Dvina and Vilno RSDWP groups;

4. A.I. Dogadov (Pavel) (1888-1937), member of the RSDWP since 1905, worker, delegate representing the Kazan RSDWP organization.

5. P.A. Zalutskiy (Foma) (1887-1937), RSDWP member since 1907, metal worker, delegate from the Petersburg RSDWP organization.

6. Ya.D. Zevin (Savva) (1888-1918), RSDWP member since 1904, menshevik-party member, representing the Yekaterinoslav RSDWP organization.

7. G.Ye. Zinovyev (Grigoriy) (1883-1936), RSDWP member since 1901, delegate representing the Moscow RSDWP organization. Member of the RSDWP Central Committee.

8. R.V. Malinovskiy (Konstantin) (1876-1918), participated in the conference as the representative of the trade union organizations (agent of the Moscow secret police department).

9. Ye.P. Onufriyev (Stepan) (1884-1969), RSDWP member since 1904, metal worker, representing the RSDWP Petersburg organization.

10. G.K. Ordzhonikidze (Sergo) (1886-1937), RSDWP member since 1903, headed the work of the Russian Organizational Commission on convening the conference, representing the Baku RSDWP organization. Member of the RSDWP Central Committee.

11. A.S. Romanov (Georgiy) (Born 1882), delegate representing the Central Industrial Rayon (agent of the Moscow secret police department).

12. L.P. Serebryakov (Yerema) (1888-1937), RSDWP member since 1905, metal worker, representing the Nikolayev RSDWP organization.

13. S.S. Spandaryan (Timofey) (1882-1916), RSDWP member since 1901, representing the Tiflis organization. Arrived at the conference on 22 (9) January. Member of the RSDWP Central Committee.

14. D.M. Shvartsman (Viktor) (1884-1968), RSDWP member since 1904, menshevik-party member, representing the Kiev RSDWP organization. Chairman of the conference mandate commission. Member of the RSDWP Central Committee.

Conference delegates with consultative vote:

1. V.I. Lenin (1870-1924), delegate representing the editorial board of the party's central organ, the newspaper SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT. Conference chairman, guided the entire proceedings. Member of the RSDWP Central Committee.

2. L.B. Kamenev (1883-1936), RSDWP member since 1901, delegate representing the editorial board of RABOCHAYA GAZETA.

3. O.A. Pyatnitskiy (Albert) (1882-1939), RSDWP member since 1898, delegate representing the RSDWP Transport Group.

4. N.A. Semashko (Aleksandrov) (1874-1949), RSDWP member since 1893 and until June 1911 member and treasurer of the RSDWP Central Committee Foreign Bureau, representing the Committee of the RSDWP Organization Abroad.

2. The Russian Organizational Commission on convening the Sixth All-Russian Party Conference (ROK) was created by decision of the June 1911 conference of RSDWP Central Committee members at the end of September 1911, at a meeting of representatives of the party organizations in Russia, which took place in Baku and Tiflis; functioned until the opening of the conference. The ROK did a great deal of work to restore and unify the party organizations, to prepare the selection of delegates and thus to ensure the holding of the conference.

3. Referring to supporters of the political line of the newspaper GOLOS SOTSIAL-DEMOKRATA (1908-1911) the menshevik organ abroad.

4. The Rozhkov people were mensheviks-liquidationists, who shared the views of N.A. Rozhkov who, after the defeat of the 1905-1907 revolution became one of the ideological heads of liquidationism.

5. NASHA ZARYA was the legal journal of the mensheviks-liquidationists; published between 1910 and 1914 in Petersburg.

6. At that time the Caucasian Oblast committee was one of the strongholds of liquidationism.

7. The elections for the Fourth State Duma were held in the autumn of 1912 on the basis of the reactionary electoral law of 3 June 1907.

8. The legalists were members of the so-called "initiative groups of social democratic leaders of the open labor movement," which had been created by the liquidationists starting with the end of 1910, to counterbalance the clandestine party organizations. Such groups existed in Petersburg, Moscow, Yekaterinoslav and others.

9. Reference to the Fifth All-Russian RSDWP Conference, held in Paris on 21-27 December 1908 (3-9 January 1909).

10. Reference to the SDKPiL (Social Democrats of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania) and the SDKL (Social Democrats of the Latvian area), who had been member of the RSDWP since 1906. A split occurred in the ranks of the SDKPiL in 1912: part of it was headed by the Main Board, which had held a conciliatory position toward the liquidationists; the other (the "Rozlamovtsy") supported the RSDWP Central Committee line.

11. The Narodovtsy were members of the "Narodova Demokratiya" party, a reactionary nationalistic party of the Polish landowners and bourgeoisie, closely related to the Catholic Church.

"Levitsa" (PPS-"Levitsa") was a Polish labor party. It was founded in 1906 as a result of the division within the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). It was headed by Pilsudski; under the influence of the bolsheviks, the SDKPiL gradually assumed revolutionary positions.

12. Reference to the position held by the Bundt Central Committee at the Fifth All-Russian RSDWP Conference (See note 9): although with hesitations, the Bundt delegation joined the resolution "On the Reports," which condemned liquidationism as an opportunistic trend.

13. Reference to the Latvian social democrat menshevik K.Ya. Elias (Shvarts), who became a member of the foreign buro of the RSDWP Central Committee in 1911, representing the SDKL, and Liber (M.I. Goldman), one of the Bundt leaders, liquidationist, who represented the Bundt in the RSDWP Foreign buro Central Committee in 1910-1911.

14. Mikhail, Roman and Yuriy, were, respectively, the mensheviks-liquidationists I.A. Isuv, K.M. Yermolayev and P.A. Bronshteyn, RSDWP Central Committee members and candidate members, elected at the Fifth (London) RSDWP Congress in 1907; at the beginning of 1910 they refused to participate in the work of the Central Committee Russian Buro, declaring that they considered the very existence of the RSDWP Central Committee harmful.

Also referring to the rejection of the Central Committee Foreign Buro by the majority, in the first half of May 1911 (representatives of the GOLOS, the Bundt, and the Latvian social democrats) of the bolshevik suggestion of convening a Central Committee Plenum.

15. Conciliationists were able to consolidate their positions in the leading authorities of the SDKL and its Central Committee, in 1911-1912. Ignoring the will of the majority of local organizations, the SDKL Central Committee refused to participate in the Sixth RSDWP Conference.

16. The OCA was the Organizational Commission Abroad, in charge of convening the Sixth All-Party Conference. Initially it provided certain assistance in the preparations for the All-Party Conference. Subsequently, the conciliationist majority which predominated in the OCA hindered the work of the ROC, taking the path of an open struggle against it.

17. At the beginning of January 1912, even prior to the official opening of the Sixth Party Conference, a group of delegates representing the Saratov, Yekaterinoslav, Kazan, Kiev, Petersburg and Nikolayev organizations,

addressed itself to the SDKL Central Committee, the Bundt Central Committee and the Main Board of the SDKPiL with the suggestion to send representatives to the conference.

18. Reference to the political campaign for the release of the social democratic deputies to the Second State Duma, who had been detained on 3 June 1907 and sentenced on the basis of a charge of engaging in military conspiracy, fabricated by the secret police. The campaign, which was headed by the Petersburg RSDWP committee, assumed a most active and mass nature during the discussions which were held on 15-18 November 1911 by the Third Duma of the question submitted by the social democratic faction concerning this provocation by the secret police. The question was discussed at several sessions in the Duma and subsequently was submitted to a special commission, where it was rejected. Lenin provided an assessment of the campaign in his article "On the Slogans and Organization of the Duma and Non-Duma Work by the Social Democrats" (see V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 21, pp 11-21).

19. The "petition campaign" was organized by the liquidationists and by Trotsky, on the subject of the "petition" for freedom of associations, assemblies and strikes. It was drafted by the Petersburg liquidationists in December 1910. The intention was to submit this "petition" to the Third State Duma on behalf of the workers. However, the "petition campaign" was unsuccessful among the working masses and no more than 1,300 signatures were collected.

20. The resolution passed by the Yekaterinoslav RSDWP group was a response to the resolution of the June 1911 conference of RSDWP Central Committee members living abroad. It called for taking urgent steps to convene an all-party conference. D.M. Shvartsman (Viktor) was assigned to deliver a report to the Yekaterinoslav group, by G.K. Ordzhonikidze, the representative of the OCA. Ya. Sokolin (Mikhail), a menshevik-Plekhanovite, was the delegate of the Kiev committee and group at the meetings of the ROC in Baku and Tiflis on 29 September 1911.

21. Refers to the reports submitted by Zinovyev on the activities of the RSDWP central organ, the clandestine newspaper SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT. The texts of the report and the draft resolution have not been preserved.

22. Reference to V.I. Lenin's article "GOLOS Liquidationists Against the Party (answer to the GOLOS SOTSIAL-DEMOKRATA)" (see V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 19, pp 202-210) and the article by L. Martov "On the Right Way," which was published in the newspaper GOLOS SOTSIAL-DEMOKRATA, No 19-20, January-February 1910, attacking the newspaper SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT.

23. In speaking of Martov's participation in the TsO, clearly Lenin had in mind the work of the editors in 1909.

24. The International Socialist Bureau (ISB) was the permanent executive-information agency of the Second International.

25. The International Socialist Congress was held in Copenhagen (Eighth Congress of the Second International) from 28 August to 3 September 1910; this also refers to the ISB meeting of 23-24 September 1911 in Zurich, convened in connection with the so-called Agadir crisis.

26. Refers to the article by Trotsky, which reflected the views of the liquidationists on the situation within the RSDWP. The article was published anonymously on 28 (15) August 1910 (during the proceedings of the Copenhagen Congress) in the newspaper VORWERTS, which was the central organ of the German Social Democratic Party. In this connection, a protest to the Board of the SDPG was sent by the following members of the RSDWP delegation to the congress: V.I. Lenin, G.V. Plekhanov and A. Varskiy (A.S. Varshavskiy) and the representative of the Polish social democrats.

27. Refers to the discussion of the resolution on the colonial problem at the Stuttgart (Seventh) Congress of the Second International, held in August 1907. The draft submitted by the opportunistic majority of the colonial commission, headed by the Dutchman Van Kol, rejected the condemnation of colonialism in principle. The bulk of the SDPG delegation supported the draft, ignoring the opinion of the majority of the delegations to the congress.

28. G. Volmar (1850-1922) was one of the leaders of the right wing of the German social democratic movement. The speech by Volmar mentioned by Lenin has not been identified.

29. The Magdeburg SDPG Congress (18-24 September 1910). On this subject, see V.I. Lenin's article "Two Worlds" (op. cit., vol 20, pp 10-18).

30. Refers to differences between Czech and Austrian social democrats on the question of the unity of trade unions.

31. W. Adler (1852-1918) was one of the organizers and leaders of the Austrian social democrats. The speech by Trotsky to which Lenin referred has not been identified.

32. The ISB meeting in Zurich was convened on 23 September 1911 in connection with the Agadir crisis, which broke out as a result of the sailing of a German navy ship in the Moroccan port of Agadir, which led Germany and France to the brink of war. Fearing complications at the forthcoming elections to the Reichstag, the SDPG leadership was unwilling to mount a campaign of protest against the imperialist provocation of its government. G. Molkenbur, secretary of the SDPG Board, wrote a letter in which he opposed the convening of a special meeting of the ISB. R. Luxemburg expressed

her firm disagreement with the Board and published a letter to Molkenbur in the newspaper LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG. The SDPG leadership mounted a campaign against R. Luxemburg not only within the party but also in the ISB. At the Zurich session Lenin took up Luxemburg's defense.

33. Reference to the supplement to the draft resolution of the Copenhagen Congress of the Second International on the question of international arbitration and disarmament, submitted by E. Vaillant, leader of the French Socialist Party, which held opportunistic positions, and by D. Hardy, a leader of the British labor movement and a reformist. The supplement considers the general strike, particularly in the war industry sectors and in transportation the most efficient means of preventing a new war. This limited the variety of possible forms of mass anti-war actions. The RSDWP delegation opposed the supplement.

34. H. Quelch (1858-1913) was a noted leader of the British and international labor movement. Quelch's statement quoted by Lenin has not been identified.

35. P. Trulstra (1860-1930) was one of the founders and leaders of the Dutch Social Democratic Workers Party who stood on the positions of extreme opportunism.

36. Reference to the Sedan battle fought during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871, which ended with the capitulation of the French forces. In the domestic political struggle within Germany and the speeches by the ideologues of aggressive German imperialism the victory at Sedan was used to fan chauvinistic moods.

37. ZVEZDA was a legal Bolshevik Party newspaper which was published in Petersburg in 1910-1912.

38. Samara was to be represented at the conference by P.I. Voyevodin (1884-1964), RSDWP member since 1899. However, he was under arrest.

39. PRAVDA (Vienna) was a factional newspaper published by the Trotskyites (1908-1912).

40. Reference to I.I. Shvarts (1879-1951), RSDWP member since 1899. Member of the ROC from Yekaterinburg. Detained in October 1911 and exiled to Yenisey Guberniya.

41. I.I. Shvarts was conference delegate representing Yekaterinburg (see note 40). It was assumed that another delegate would be Ya.M. Sverdlov. However, after his unsuccessful escape from exile, he was detained. The delegate to the conference from Tyumen was N.N. Nakoryakov (1881-1970), RSDWP member since 1901. By the end of 1911 he emigrated to the United States and did not attend the conference. The name of the Ufa delegate has not been established.

42. N.M. Yegorov (born 1871) was a worker, menshevik, deputy to the Third State Duma, representing Perm Guberniya and member of the social democratic faction.

43. RABOCHAYA GAZETA was a clandestine popular organ of the bolsheviks. It was published sporadically in Paris from 30 October (12 November) 1910 to 30 July (12 August) 1912; 9 issues were printed. The question of RABOCHAYA GAZETA was one of the items discussed at the conference. A report was submitted by Lenin. No records of the report and the discussions and draft resolution have not been preserved. For the final text of the resolution see "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....," vol 1, p 401.

44. MYSL was a legal bolshevik monthly philosophical and general economic journal; published in Moscow between December 1910 and April 1911; a total of five issues were printed. Lenin managed the journal from abroad.

45. Possible reference to B.A. Breslav (1882-1938), RSDWP member since 1899. Worked in Petersburg and then in Moscow, where he was detained by the end of October 1911.

46. Zevin submitted this statement after the conference delegates received Plekhanov's letter. Plekhanov had refused to participate in its proceedings and rejected the all-party nature of the conference.

47. Reference to "Notes of the Political Journalist" (see V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 19, pp 271-276).

48. Reference to the article "Conversation Between a Legalist and an Opponent of Liquidationism," which Lenin wrote in connection with Rozhkov's article "The Necessary Initiative," which was sent to SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT. In the article Rozhkov developed his plan for the founding of a legal worker party under the conditions of the Stolypin rule. Lenin tried to convince Rozhkov of the wrongness of his views. After it became clear that Rozhkov insisted on his article being published, in "Discussion Leaflet" No 3 for 29 April (12 May) 1911, Lenin came out with the article "Conversation Between a Legalist and an Opponent of Liquidationism" (see op. cit., vol 20, pp 234-244).

49. In all likelihood, a reference to the pamphlet by N. Aleksandrov (N.A. Semashko) "The Social Democratic Faction in the Third State Duma," which was published by the RSDWP TsO in 1910.

50. Albert suggested that the TsO be made similar to NEUE ZEIT, the theoretical journal of the German Social Democratic Party.

51. Lenin's article (report) "On the Social Democratic Faction in the Second Duma" was published by the ISB Executive Committee along with materials on the case of the social democratic deputies to the second Duma in German, French and English. See V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 20, pp 381-386.

52. The Third State Duma was in session from 1 November 1907 to 9 June 1912.

53. In his article "Session of the International Socialist bureau" (see op. cit., vol 17, pp 233-249), Lenin described his speeches at the ISB meeting of October 1908 on the question of accepting the British Labor Party as member of the International. For the text of Kautskiy's resolution on this matter and Lenin's amendment to the resolution see op. cit., vol 47, p 166.

54. Discussions on the internal political situation and the party's tasks were continued at the seventh session. Lenin presented a report at the end of the sixth or start of the seventh session. He also authored the draft resolution "On Our Time and the Party's Tasks." Judging by the notes on the back of this draft it is assumed that the discussion of the matter continued at the fifteenth conference session. No minutes or the text of the report have been preserved. Some ideas contained in the report are mentioned in Zevin's and Ordzhonikidze's statements at the seventh session and in Lenin's statement at the fifteenth session.

55. In considering the views expressed by Rozhkov, Martov, and Yu. Larin, apparently Zevin referred to articles by these authors, published in the legal liquidationist press. Said articles, which characterized the nature of liquidationism, were criticized by Lenin in his article "On the Social Structure of the System, Future and Liquidationism" (see op. cit., vol 20, pp 186-207).

The 9 November 1906 Ukase "On Supplementing Some Stipulations of the Current Law on Peasant Land Ownership and Use" was drafted by the Stolypin government.

56. The resolution "On Our Time and the Party's Tasks" of the Fifth All-Russian RSDWP Conference stated the following: "The contemporary political situation is characterized by the following features: a. The old serfdom autocracy is breaking down, taking another step toward becoming a bourgeois monarchy, concealing absolutism behind pseudoconstitutional forms" ("KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....," vol 1, p 312).

57. V.M. Purishkevich (1870-1920) was a big landowner and a monarchist.

58. Referring to the 3 June 1907 tsarist manifesto disbanding the Second State Duma and amending the electoral law.

59. On the view held by Martov, Larin and Rozhkov see also Lenin's article "From the Camp of Stolypin's Worker' Party" (op. cit., vol 21, pp 23-28).

60. Probable reference to M. Aleksandrov (M.S. Olminskiy) and his book "State, bureaucracy and Absolutism in Russian History." Saint Petersburg, 1910. Lenin criticized Olminskiy's erroneous views in his articles "On Trotsky's Diplomacy and on a Party Platform," and "Old and New," written in December 1911 (see op. cit., vol 21, pp 32, 58) and elsewhere.

61. F. Lassalle (1825-1864) was a German petit bourgeois socialist, founder of one of the varieties of opportunism in the German labor movement.

62. Zevin noted a certain coincidence between the views of bolsheviks and mensheviks-party members concerning the "petition" as a form of political struggle waged by the Russian working class (see the resolution "On the Petition Campaign," adopted at the resolution. "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....," vol 1, pp 398-399).

63. S. Volskiy (A.V. Sokolov) (born 1880) was one of the leaders of the VPERED left-wing opportunistic group.

64. F.I. Dan (Gurvich) (1871-1947) was a menshevik leader. Dan's statement referred to here has not been identified.

65. N.N. Zhordaniya (Kostrov) (1870-1953) was a menshevik leader.

66. Reference to raising worker combat detachments during the period of the armed uprising. Lenin wrote on this subject in 1905 in his articles "In the Combat Committee of the St. Petersburg Committee," and "Tasks of the Detachments of the Revolutionary Army" (op. cit., vol 11, pp 336-343).

67. Reference by Ordzhonikidze to the mass struggle organized by the Chartists in the 1830s-1840s for parliamentary adoption of the Popular Charter they had drafted, which was presented as a petition to the parliament.

68. Reference to Plekhanov's article "All-Russian Ruination" (SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT, No 4, 1892; G.V. Plekhanov "Soch." [Works], Moscow, 1928, vol III, pp 313-357).

69. N.N. Kutler (1859-1924), leader of the Cadet Party and one of the authors of the draft Cadet Agrarian Program.

70. N.Ye. Markov (Markov II) (Born 1876) was a big landowner and reactionary political leader in tsarist Russia. On his speech at the session of the Third State Duma see Lenin's article "Three Questions" (op. cit., vol 21, pp 104-116).

71. The Octobrists were members of the "17 October Alliance" Party, which was founded in Russia subsequent to the publication of the 17 October 1905 tsarist manifesto. The party defended the interests of the big bourgeoisie and the landowners.

72. The Trudoviki were a group of petit bourgeois democrats in the Russian State Duma, consisting of peasants and intellectuals with populist leanings. The Trudoviki faction was established in April 1906 by peasant deputies of the First State Duma.

73. In 1911 the Third State Duma considered government bills on worker insurance.

74. The RSDWP Organizational Committee Abroad (ACO) was elected at a conference of bolshevik groups working abroad, held in Paris in December 1911. Its proceedings were chaired by Lenin. The ACO terminated its activities in 1917.

75. Khizan and B. Olenich (B.O. Bogdanov) were political journalists and mensheviks-liquidationists.

(The second and final part will be published in the next issue)

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First Phase. Analysis of the Mechanism of Departmental Expansion

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No 8, May 88 (signed to press 17 May 88) pp 74-86

[Article by Yegor Timurovich Gaydar, editor of the political economy and economic policy department, KOMMUNIST; and Viktor Afanasyevich Yaroshenko, KOMMUNIST special correspondent]

[Text] Has anyone ever asked the following questions: How does the real (and not the textbook) mechanism for making large-scale economic decisions function? How do such decisions appear, who drafts them, and how are they implemented? How does this organized departmental pressure mechanism operate under the changing conditions of the economic reform and intensifying democratic processes?

In his book "The Economics of Scarcity," Janos Kornai, the noted Hungarian economist, proves that if the enterprises have extensive opportunities for acquiring financial funds to compensate for losses ("self-finance limitations," to use his terminology), a scarcity in the economy is inevitable and development resources are directed into solving bottleneck situations. In our view, this last assumption is not free from economic romanticism and stems from an ideal model rather than real practice.

Actually, if we acknowledge the validity of this view, we should have to agree with the fact that for a number of decades in our country the greatest scarcity was found in the various ditches, canals, excavations, levelings, dikes and dams and by no means in the areas of housing or high grade food products. The principle of distribution "based on bottlenecks" (as in a poor family in which the overcoat will be bought for the child who would wear it the most) presumes that the system as a whole can be efficiently managed from the center, which would be able to determine the bottlenecks and would channel resources precisely into that area.

At a first glance the very formulation of the question of the efficiency of control provided by the center may seem strange, for the entire management system was created precisely as a hierarchy of intersubordinated agencies. Even now, with the development of the economic reform and the enactment of the Law on the State Enterprise, the departmental pyramid issues from the top mandatory assignments, hastily renamed "state orders," and demands accountability on their implementation. As in the past, an enterprise is not allowed to solve even basic problems without the knowledge of the superior authority. Nonetheless, the studies indicate that the "omnipotence" of the center is fictitious.

The 5-year plans for the commissioning of production capacities for the most important variety of goods has regularly remained unfulfilled. Despite the wish of the center, construction continued to expand. The most frequent report on the results of resolutions passed by the supreme party and state authorities at the start of the 1980s was the statement: "Construction was not started."

Following is a fresh example: In recent years efforts were made to improve the condition of the environment which, in a number of areas, had become critical. What happened? According to the USSR Goskomstat, the installation of treatment systems and systems for the recirculation of water and for tapping and rendering harmless substances which pollute the air are being implemented extremely unsatisfactorily. The funds appropriated for such purpose remain unused.

The widespread nature of such cases itself leads us to consider the reasons which make this situation possible. It may appear as though the explanation may be found on the surface: If instructions issued from the center are not being implemented systematically and on a broad scale, the reason may lie in low individual responsibility. Consequently, the culprits must be punished more strictly and managers who fail to cope with such assignments should be fired. The trouble of this prescription, however, is that its universal efficiency has not been confirmed by practical experience. In the period between the 1930s and beginning of the 1950s, when strict penalties abounded, the actual results of development of agricultural production were strikingly inconsistent with the plans. It was then that the problems of the dragging

of constructions appeared in their full dimension. Since then efforts to correct the situation by frequently replacing managers have been regularly made. They created the illusion of energetic leadership without, however, improving the situation. The eventual result was that after a project had failed there was no one to hold accountable.

Lack of direct control by the consumer over the supplier (through the market), and restricting socialist democracy inevitably lead to the overloading of the superior management authorities. If enterprises in different sectors are unable to organize normal and mutually profitable relations in the procurement of minor items, the arising conflicts must be resolved by the USSR Council of Ministers. If the local self-governing authorities are either unable or unwilling to solve the problem of a leaking roof, a flood of complaints reaches the CPSU Central Committee. Meanwhile, truly grave and pressing problems keep appearing, demanding the attention of the higher party and state authorities: preparations for the winter (faulty boilers and heat supply systems could result in catastrophes), the organized harvesting of the crops (the use of equipment may be stalled for lack of fuel) and innumerable other problems. However, the possibilities of any authority to analyze the information, make substantiated decisions and control their implementation are not unlimited. Overloading inevitably leads to singling out a relatively small range of particularly important priority parameters and lumping together other problems, the official resolution of which assumes an essentially ritual nature.

One may think that attention should be focused on the essential problems of socioeconomic strategy. However, the gravity of current problems and their vital link with present collective interests, the course of the production process and the relative simplicity of identifying those who are specifically responsible for one failure or another, direct the main attention precisely on current affairs. Correspondingly, control over long-term processes is reduced. Naturally, the central authorities try to identify bottlenecks and to remove them. However, there are too many bottlenecks, there is no set of priorities for their elimination, and the available resources are limited and firm. Constant efforts are needed to bring together skilled cadres, infrastructure, machinery and materials needed to implement a decision. Hence, the center is not always able to accomplish this.

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Officially, all parts of resolutions passed by the supreme authorities are of equal status and identically backed by their authority. However, knowledgeable people can immediately single out projects which can be actually built and those the construction of which will not be initiated for many years to come or possibly ever.

Following are a few facts which may initially seem unrelated:

Broad decisions on the chemicalization of the national economy were passed at the end of the 1950s and

beginning of the 1960s. The tasks which were set at that time of increasing the production of chemical fertilizers have now been overfulfilled, and in this area we have become the world's leader, having outstripped the United States by more than 50 percent. However, in 1986 the production of synthetic resins and plastics was approximately one-quarter the figure planned for 1980 (18 percent of the U.S. output). The grave shortage of economical plastics is the most important factor which holds back the lowering of metal intensiveness nationally.

At that time the decision was made to create a powerful center for hydraulic and thermoelectric power production in Siberia. In addition to the completion of the Bratsk and Krasnoyarsk GES, the plan called for building the Sayano-Shushen, Ust-Ilim, Boguchan, Sredne-Yenisey, and Nizhne-Tungus hydroelectric power plants. The construction of the majority of these plants is either completed or is under way. We assumed world leadership in the area in artificial water reservoirs for hydroelectric power plants. The plans for the creation of two large groups of powerful thermoelectric power plants in the Kansk and Achinsk areas have remained unfulfilled one 5-year plan after another. The violation of the optimal ratios (based on objective technological and economic requirements) among the various types of power generation in Siberia led to the fact that a significant percentage of the capacities of hydroelectric power plants in that area (more than one-third according to the specialists) remains idle and unused even during peak load periods. The sharp drop in the generating of electric power during a low-water period was paralleled by interrupting the work of big plants and resulted in national economic losses into the billions.

The general long-term plan for the development of the national economy in 1961-1980 called for reaching an area of irrigated land of roughly 28 million hectares. Although in fact in 1986 this area covered "no more" than 20 million hectares, in terms of this indicator our country outstripped the United States, although its growth rates were quite low. Meanwhile, the lag in the processing sectors of the agroindustrial complex became chronic. One 5-year period after another a significant percentage of appropriations for the development of the food and meat-dairy industries remained unused. However, it should have been obvious that the gravest shortage was in the production of finished agroindustrial goods and by no means the lack of irrigated areas.

The full cost of industrial construction, computed in 1987 for no more than a few of our departments (Menergo, Mingazprom, Minnefteprom, Minvodkhoz, Minchermet, Mintsvetmet and Minudobreniy) totaled approximately 330 billion rubles. This applies to activities in which we hold leading positions. But what about those in which we are lagging? That indicator was 1.9 billion for the Minpribor, 4.3 billion for the Minkhim-mash, and 5.9 billion for the Minlegprom. We see, therefore, figures of a different order.

A sensible person cannot basically oppose the production of chemical fertilizers, hydraulic power or irrigation. However, if the tempestuous growth in the volume of resources invested in such sectors is combined with a chronic lag in other no less important activities, and if this ratio is the direct opposite of contemporary global trends and the progressive structure of perestroyka, it is time to consider the reasons and consequences of this type of fund allocation.

The distinguishing feature of many sectors in which we are leading in the world is the relative simplicity of the applied technologies, frequently requiring huge volumes of displaced earth and rocks.

There is no malice involved in this. Some of the reasons are entirely prosaic. A chronic shortage makes the problem of material and technical procurements one of the most difficult. The more difficult become the production and economic ties of an enterprise, the more difficult its work becomes.

The AvtoVAZ association, which is an enterprise with hundreds of suppliers, is constantly in difficulty because of breakdowns in supplies, which cost it annually between 25 and 30 million rubles of additional expenditures. In order to develop a solid fuel (coal) power industry today we must ensure the production of high-grade and reliable equipment which will burn low-grade fuel, scrubbers, grinding machinery, control equipment and many others. However, each of these problems has a long tail of difficulties which can be surmounted with a great deal of effort and over long periods of time. It is not a question of well developed technologies related to shifting millions of tons of dirt, shifting rocks or laying concrete. We have learned how to do this and the equipment for such work, perhaps not the best, is nonetheless being produced.

If a decision has been made to build a machine building enterprise for the production of a complex resource-conserving equipment, a prediction as to its future would be difficult. We could be confident, however, that work on building a dam, digging a canal or a ditch, as stipulated in directives, would be willingly undertaken.

Under the conditions of shortages and weakened centralized control over the process of development of resources, the tendency is to channel them not where they are most needed from the viewpoint of the social interest but where they can be most easily channeled, obeying the law of least resistance, filling depressions, ditches and canals, where it becomes easier to waste them or, as we like to say, to "master their use."

The easiest way to spend funds is in sectors in which production activities require virtually nothing other than fuel, earth-digging equipment, cement and spare parts. Andrey Platonov brilliantly surmised the tendency of the developing economic management system to be concerned with "ditches."

Sectors which extract ore, petroleum, natural gas and mineral raw materials, and fell timber (although here as well much of what is necessary for their activities is in short supply) are in a relatively favorable position. Even stronger are the positions of sectors which, for many years, have had the possibility of reporting not real results of items delivered to the consumer (whether tons of cement, or, fertilizers or cubic meters of timber and natural gas), but millions of cubic meters of earth removal and billions of rubles of "used funds." Particularly attractive from this viewpoint are so-called "first phase projects."

If we combine, quite arbitrarily, all types of activities, the exaggerated development of which is explained by the lack of or weakness of public control over the dynamics of resources, under the concept of "first phase sector," and analyze their interconnection, it would become clear that they are largely self-sufficient. They exist and work for the sake of ensuring their reciprocal existence, and not ours; they form by themselves their own "first phase." It is precisely in order to meet their needs that the lion's share of the produced electric power, fuel, cement, ores and timber goes. The "first phase" efficiently and dynamically "masters" virtually any volume of such resources, creating and maintaining their permanent scarcity, which is the main guarantee for its further growth.

The state of affairs in the electric power industry is quite eloquent. The chronic shortage of electric power of late has been frequently written about. Yet the construction of electric power facilities by industry reached the level of the U.S. indicator in 1985. Whereas in the United States industrial power consumption is being lowered, we are marching forth. Yet we use less electric power for lighting and household requirements than the United States by a factor of eight. For the same purposes we spend one-third less electric power than is used for general purposes.

The real attitude of the departmental structure concerning the need for output, a need which it must meet, is clearly manifested when scientific and technical progress offers the possibility of drastically reducing the volume of resources used in "first phase" operations.

Here is a typical story I was told by V. Romanov, head of the electric machinery department, Leningrad Polytechnical Institute, laureate of the Lenin Prize, and by A. Dukshtau and A. Lurye, designers at the Elektrosila Association, in Leningrad. It applied to the developed and serially produced capsule hydrogenerators with full water cooling, made in our country. Their use, combined

with low dams enables us drastically to reduce the amount of concrete works, to shorten construction time for hydroelectric power plants and the installation of equipment and, above all, to eliminate the need for flooding vast areas of land.

Four capsule units have been successfully working at the Sheksninskaya and two at the Saratov GES since the 1960s. Similar units were installed in a number of other power plants. What happened then? No major development of Soviet hydraulic power industry took place. Was it that the units turned out to be badly made, uneconomical or technologically poor?

None of this applies: Abroad, interest in the Soviet units increased. Series of capsule machines were sold to foreign countries and are functioning at hydroelectric power plants in Canada, Syria, Romania and Yugoslavia. Currently Yugoslavia and Romania are building the powerful Dzherdap-2 GES on the Danube, where capsule hydrogenerators, procured from the USSR or else produced under Soviet license, are being installed. Yugoslav specialists are grateful for the high quality and reliability of the machines and point out that their efficiency exceeds guaranteed levels.

Such capsule hydraulic generators, built by Elektrosila, which are convenient and reliable and meet the highest world technical and economic standards, will be used in the very big hydraulic power plant (48 turbines of 65 megawatts each) which is under construction on the Parana River in Argentina; our country is participating in this project as the head of an international consortium for this project.

Is this not quite interesting?

However, you would vainly seek any mention of the developing opportunities for upgrading the efficiency of power industry construction in the latest speeches by the heads of the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification or Gidroyek and in the development concepts they are formulating. What prevails there is something else: flooding on a mass scale, big dams, huge volumes of earthen and concrete projects and a very slow pace.... Incidentally, at a time when the public is noting the high extent of secrecy and anonymity of the main decisions related to the Energy Program, starting with its first variant which was drafted during the period of stagnation, it is difficult not to suspect that this indicates the aspiration to hide the predominant departmental approach to the adoption of alternate choices.

Many honest workers are employed in the sectors which artificially inflate the amount of their production activities, the expediency of which is problematical. They should not be blamed in the least for the fact that the state is unable to redirect their efforts toward problems the solution of which it truly needs. However, the departmental apparatus and its allies categorically oppose such reorientation, for it openly conflicts with

their interests. If a powerful production-economic system has been created, which can waste billions of rubles, it is natural for its apparatus to be concerned with procuring such billions of rubles.

The very fact that a department is successfully mastering its resources and implementing its plans for capital investments enhances the prestige of its leadership, which gains the reputation of people who are energetic, initiative-minded and act as "real owners." The most favorable is the situation of departments which have been able to develop an efficient system for defending their plans and place their reliable representatives in agencies called upon to protect the national interests.

Such departments, which are totally indifferent toward any idea which may promise a lowering of expenditures, remain very open to so-called "big ideas." Furthermore, if such ideas have influential supporters, this would ensure them a long and trouble-free future and the fact that as a result society will come off the loser is unimportant.

An instructive and sad story was recently published in STROITELNAYA GAZETA. It was about the designing and building of the first magnetohydrodynamic electric power plant in the world (MGDES). In his time, Academician A. Sheyndlin, who was then director of the Institute of High Temperatures and general designer of MGD systems, wrote: "... From the very start a power plant equipped with MGD generators could reach a 50-percent efficiency and, subsequently, as much as 60 percent."

Studies have been under way for one-quarter of a century at a cost of some 300 million rubles. The scientific leadership of this project was assigned to Academician V. Kirillin, the then chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology. Great interest in this scientific development was shown by P. Neporozhnyy, former USSR minister of power industry and electrification, and today USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member and scientific associate at the Institute of High Temperatures. It was with his assistance and support that for the past few years the first MGDES in the world has been under construction in Novomichurinsk (Ryazan Oblast). It is being built at a leisurely pace and no one knows when it will be completed. The project's cost estimate was in excess of 400 million rubles. According to Minenergo, when the power plant begins operations the cost of the energy it produces will be 3.2 kopecks per kilowatt hour or triple that of today's thermoelectric power.

But could it be that science demands sacrifices? Could it be that half a billion rubles may not be the highest cost for this future ocean of power? That may be so. However, we cannot fail to ask ourselves the following: Why precisely were funds allocated so generously for this project instead of for other? This was not for a modest experimental project (which would have been entirely

natural) but for the largest project of its kind in the world, the first experimental-industrial project, even before the promised results of an experimental facility could be confirmed?

Why was financing undertaken and construction initiated when we bear in mind that to this day, years afterwards, there are no blueprints, the essential technical problems have not been clearly solved and, finally, there are no economic substantiations? Is it expedient to throw hundreds of millions into something which is much more expensive than currently used technology?

In their answer to the newspaper, the heads of the project formulated a question on a somewhat unexpected and even philosophical level: "Should we develop essentially new technology with a certain incomplete amount of knowledge and take deliberate technical risks, entrusting this project to specialists who assume responsibility?"

The words are noteworthy but we would like to know the following: What specifically is the nature of this responsibility if the funds, which are approaching the half-billion level, turn out to be wasted? Naturally, new technology must be developed and the people must be trusted. One should also take an occasional risk. However, one should also be responsible for those who "assume responsibility."

Today the new Minenergo leadership has no love for this unsuccessful offspring of science and of the previous leadership. A. Dyakov, USSR deputy minister of power and electrification, who acknowledged that the article in STROITELNAYA GAZETA was accurate, believes that "the building of a project on such a scale and for such a purpose was initiated in its time without a critical evaluation of experimental results and the long-term technical and economic indicators of this method." What is happening now, in mid-1988? The current leadership deemed it expedient to continue with the construction project, postponing its completion by yet another 5 years. As the folk saying goes, "either the shah will die or the donkey will expire." Meanwhile, virtually no work is being done in the country on the promising steam and gas turbine systems, which are being extensively built throughout the world; we have fallen substantially behind in the development of contemporary efficient and ecologically clean coal-burning power plants; we have not truly developed research on the so-called nontraditional energy sources—wind, solar and geothermal. Half a billion rubles on an unfinished MGD generator means that the possibilities of hundreds of researchers have remained unused, time has been lost and enthusiasm has been dampened.

The social institutions which hold the real power over resources are entirely satisfied with a situation in which the responsibility to the people and to history for anything that happens is borne by the party while they are merely those who implement resolutions. The departments have long learned to be like the "smart woman"

who pretends that at home it is her husband who runs things. It is precisely excessive participation in daily economic life that made the party helpless in the face of the bearers of departmental expansionism. A dramatic interweaving has taken place between political strategy and daily economic matters; as a result, administrative turnover has adopted a new strategy and proclaimed itself a political turnover. Created by Stalin's authoritarianism, the claim to total control over all aspects of social life has turned into a loss of real control over the formulation of a strategy for the development of the country.

II

Most people can or at least try to balance income with expenditures within the family budget. Since the beginning of perestroika we are learning to do this on the enterprise level. However, an efficient democratic mechanism for the allocation of our national resources (on a level superior to the enterprise) is as yet to be put together. Cost accounting instruments cannot operate in the administrative area; this makes even more necessary to have reliable democratic institutions which can protect the country's economy from economic adventures, inefficient outlays running into the billions of rubles, and departmental self-interest.

The well-being of the people is inevitably affected if major funds spent by a department have yielded no benefits. You cannot make a coat or cook a meal with a dike. Furthermore, the question of retail prices, which is so sensitive today in society, is most closely related to the uncontrolled spending of the people's billions, inevitably resulting in a redistribution of losses among the different population groups. Naturally, one could and should argue as to who should bear the burden of the consequences of inefficient decisions and to what extent. However, blocking the channels for the waste of national wealth is much more important.

"In our country nothing is allocated so easily as large funds," we were bitterly told by a very well-informed official in the decision-making apparatus. Let us try to illustrate this with the example of the "gas-pipes" deal which, in its time, was resoundingly described as "the contract of the century." From the departmental viewpoint its efficiency was never doubted. Indeed, the deal stipulated the following: 1. A huge volume of earth removal and pipe laying work; 2. Guaranteed equipment deliveries from abroad; 3. The possibility of distributing among foreign suppliers several billion rubles in foreign currency, borrowed by the country.

Let us turn to the documents to determine the way the departments handled a portion of these huge funds.

Excerpt from the substantiation of the expediency of importing a system for control of the Urengoy-Yelets-Uzhgorod main pipeline

"The Urengoy-Yelets-Uzhgorod main gas pipeline is a unique gas transportation system.... In accordance with the directive-ordered deadlines for laying the gas pipeline—the first parts to be completed in the first quarter of 1984—the design of the automated control system is to be completed in 1981. The extremely short time allocated for designing, installing and tuning up a system on such a scale necessitates the use of available, serially produced technical and programming facilities."

Let us note the typical arguments: 1. There is a short deadline, which means that we are impatient; 2. Deadlines must not be discussed, for they are based on a directive, i.e., they have been issued by superiors.

We read on: "... The creation of a gas pipeline control system on the basis of equipment produced by CEMA countries does not seem possible given the stipulated deadline." At this point the author of the argumentation has obviously become exhausted by the number of attractive assignments abroad. He went on to say that "... The control system... which would be consistent with the required technical stipulations, could be completed within the stipulated deadline by purchasing a system from a developed capitalist country. M.M. Mayorov, general director of the Soyuzgazavtomatika VNPO. 6 March 1981."

From the USSR Mingazprom order

"The following purchasing groups will be set up for participation in discussions with foreign companies on the subject of export gas pipelines and gas extraction, consideration of proposals for the procurement of equipment and drafting related technical conclusions, and drafting and ratifying contract projects: 4. For the gas pipeline control system: M.M. Mayorov, Yu.B. Shufchuk, V.V. Lysenko,...."

From the technical and economic conclusions on the choice of a company as supplier of technical and program facilities for the Urengoy-Uzhgorod main gas pipeline control system

"... It would be expedient to purchase the gas pipeline system... from France, providing that the Thomson-CSF company will be the general system supplier. The deadlines for the procurement of the system, suggested by the Thomson-CSF company, enable the Mingazprom to commission the system within the directive deadlines and, specifically, to make possible the transportation of the gas as of January 1984 and commission the entire system in 1985.... M.M. Mayorov, general director of the Soyuzgazavtomatika VNPO."

From the note of the USSR People's Control Committee to the USSR Council of Ministers

"On the basis of the technical stipulations issued by the Mingazprom, in September 1981 the Ministry of Foreign Trade signed contracts with the French company Thomson-CSF.... Taking into consideration the cost of designing, developing a program for mathematical support, transportation, installation control and training Soviet specialists by the company, the total cost of the contracts amounted to 243 million rubles in foreign exchange.... The expected economic results from the installation of this system were no less than 100 million rubles per year, with a release of more than 2,000 members of the operational personnel. In 1983-1985 the Thomson-CSF company delivered, and Mingazprom accepted for storage equipment... with an overall value in excess of 107 million foreign exchange rubles. However, all 466 computers were received without any software support and the ministry did not undertake their installation and tuning. As a result, in August 1984 the Urengoy-Uzhgorod main gas pipeline was commissioned without a system of automated control and radio relay communications.... As indicated by the investigation, the main reasons for the unsatisfactory use of the equipment purchased abroad were the errors made by Mingazprom and Minvneshtorg in signing and ensuring the implementation of the contract with the foreign company.... They signed a contract with a company which had virtually no experience in the automation of powerful gas transportation systems.... V. Manayev, USSR People's Control Committee deputy chairman, 1 August 1986."

From the letter of the USSR Gosplan to B.I. Aristov, USSR minister of foreign trade, and V.S. Chernomyrdin, USSR minister of gas industry

"The Urengoy-Uzhgorod gas pipeline control system will begin to operate at full capacity in 1991-1992, on the basis of morally obsolete technical facilities developed in the 1970s. I.M. Lalayants, USSR Gosplan deputy chairman, 26 February 1987."

From the order of the USSR Ministry of Gas Industry and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade, dated 17 April 1987

"A task force for the efficient management of the work on the creation and commissioning of the Urengoy-Uzhgorod gas pipeline control system is set up, consisting of the following: M.M. Mayorov, general director of the Soyuzgazavtomatika VNPO, in charge of organizing the work on commissioning the control system...."

This closed the circle.

Many similar stories on deals related to the "contract of the century" may be told. This would include the purchasing in England of equipment for an automated control system for repairs of the gas pipeline and procurements of complete housing settlements, gas cooling stations and repair bases. Another one is the way in which the personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Trade frequently became the advocates of firms which violated

their obligations, and concealed their own ineptitude or unwillingness to defend the interests of the country by referring to high policy considerations; the way in which, under the guise of equipment, cases containing video recorders and televisions sets, video cassettes and personal computers for use by ministry officials were shipped. Some such cases are currently being dealt with by the USSR People's Control Committee; others, as we usually say, are being dealt with by the competent authorities.

This was a typical example: The need for a contract was motivated by the strict deadlines based on a directive. Indeed, a decision had been made and had to be executed. The fact that both the document and the deadlines it stipulated were the result of the efforts of the department itself could be conveniently forgotten. The logic is faultless: The implementation through one's own forces within the stipulated deadline is impossible. Consequently... purchasing is necessary, something which had to be proved! It was only after a number of years had passed that it became clear that the economic substantiation of this multibillion "contract of the century" was questionable. Substantial funds were wasted on inoperative equipment, prices of exported gas on the foreign market dropped sharply, major difficulties appeared in selling the gas; domestic outlays for gas extraction and deliveries, based on data of the USSR State Committee for Prices Price Scientific Research Institute are approximately 80 percent higher than was estimated in substantiating the expediency of the contract; in any case, the results of the deal are significantly below what we were promised.

A great deal is being accurately said today that as a result of the adverse situation on the world market, foreign exchange income has dropped. However, after an eight-fold increase in petroleum prices in the 1970s (and, in our trade with the developed capitalist countries, an increase by a factor of 15) a flood of petrodollars rushed into our country. Income from petroleum and petroleum product marketing between 1975 and 1984, totaling 176 billion foreign exchange rubles, had a strikingly modest impact on improving the living standard and on the structural reorganization of the economy. The departments convincingly proved their unique ability to redistribute resources in favor of the "first phase."

III

As we study the history of the way our expensive investment projects appeared, starting with the power industry, such as the MGD electric power plant in Ryazan Oblast, and ending with the transfer of Siberian waters to Central Asia and the building of the Volga-Chogray and Danube-Dnepr canals, one can only be amazed at how weak their economic substantiations were and how inadequate was the reasoning used to justify the hundreds of millions and billions of rubles, the building of enterprises and entire sectors and the purchasing of complete plants. No one is astounded by

the fact that in frequent cases a decision is made first and its expediency is subsequently assessed on an optional basis. As a rule, its assessment must be urgent and simple: Time does not wait and the decisions must be executed.

The primary problem in promoting a project wanted by a department is to include it into a governmental resolution, along with other construction projects, which are truly needed, and many of which, subsequently, will not even be started. In substantiating the expediency of the project, the department usually emphasizes the following: 1. The scarcity of the respective resource (in the economy, where access to the people's money is very easy, the overwhelming majority of resources is, naturally, scarce); 2. The existence of real opportunities for initiating the project (if it is suitable to the department, it means that it is consistent with reality); 3. High economic efficiency (which subsequently is frequently not confirmed: The cost turns out much higher than planned and the results lower. However, this becomes clear much later). The main thing is to obtain as soon as possible ("time does not wait") permission to start the construction project, after which it could go on for decades (try to stop a major construction project after substantial expenditures have already been made).

The building of the Astrakhan gas complex was undertaken with the same type of urgency. Here as well "at the beginning was the word." There was a superior resolution the implementation of which was mandatory (imposed and promoted by departments joined in the common interest of having the entire construction based on imports). In this case as well the controlling electronic equipment, which had been purchased from the French Technip company, used for automated management and control, was inoperative. As we can see, the story of the Urengoy-Uzhgorod gas pipeline was repeated and, once again, with the participation of the same organizations—the Mingazprom and Minvneshorg.

The building of the Astrakhan gas complex was substantiated by citing the urgent need for sulfur. Meanwhile, thermoelectric power plants release in the atmosphere over our country more than 8 million tons of sulfurous anhydride. A technology for separating and obtaining pure sulfur from effluent gases has been developed abroad. Obviously, from the economic and ecological viewpoints this would be the most promising way. This was not taken seriously into consideration. Nor was proof provided of the greater efficiency of obtaining sulfur from sulfur-rich natural gas.

Most important and most controversial proposals were accepted as axiomatic. It was on their basis that subsequent decisions, haste, shortcomings of designs and lack of coordination, low quality of installations and increased danger to the ecology followed....

On 1 March 1988 20 systems and projects at the gas processing plant were idling. No single technological system had reached its planned parameters. In many of them the automatic blocking and signaling systems had been deactivated; there were no meters showing pressure, temperature, level of the liquid phase and the gas-air ratio. The automatic gas analyzers for hydrogen sulfide had not been activated.... This most complex machinery, handling most dangerous hydrogen sulfide, is being essentially run by eye.

Is it astounding that as a result of unfinished work and defects in the equipment and the low quality of installation the basic technological systems broke down on 210 separate occasions in 1987? The plant had to close down entirely on 28 occasions because of accidents. Losses from mining the deposits and plant operations exceeded 30 million rubles in 1987. About 1 million tons of highly toxic sulfur dioxide was released in the air, or dozens of times more than stipulated in the project. The pollution of the Volga waters reached critical values. There were cases of human poisoning and several people died.

The simple conclusion is that an emergency situation, fraught with the threat of catastrophe, has developed at the Astrakhan gas complex. This is triggering the justified indignation of the people and public protest, to which there has been no suitable reaction on the part of party and soviet authorities.

We are as yet unfamiliar with the answer to all the problems which have developed at the Astrakhan complex. Yet, not far from it, work has already been started on an even larger international project for the creation of a gas-chemical complex on the basis of the Tengiz petroleum deposits. Naturally, here as well everything is based on the decision stipulating its faster completion. The project calls for a truly huge joint enterprise: On the one hand, the USSR Minneftprom; on the other, Montedison Spa (Italy), Occidental Petroleum Corporation (United States), ENI (Italy) and the Marubeni Corporation (Japan).

It is entirely possible that this project is truly necessary and will be highly efficient. However, remembering extensive previous experience, this concept cannot be axiomatically accepted. We need proof. The obvious profitability of the project alone demands of the departments to make a serious and comprehensive study of the deal. Such a project would have to be protected from the rising Caspian Sea by a dam which will cost hundreds of millions of rubles. In order to secure both the complex and a new city with fresh water, a big canal from the Volga will be necessary. Extensive amounts of equipment will have to be purchased from the developed capitalist countries. The information which we have today raises more questions than provides answers. Several billion rubles will have to be spent and, for the time being, the prospects of the global market and the possibility of solving the ecological problems which will develop remain unclear. However, although there still is

neither a contract nor a technological-economic substantiation, work is already under way and the construction project is gathering speed. Once the technical and economic substantiation will be submitted to the experts (presumably in December 1988), the already made expenditures and assumed obligations will provide a most substantive argument in favor of continuing the work even if the concept of the project turns out to be insufficiently attractive.

Let us re-emphasize that under the existing practices what matters most to the departments is to prove the need for an urgent start of the construction project, to loosen the strings of the public purse, after which one can dip into it freely. The departments have mastered this method like virtuosos.

Based on the scale of construction projects, Minenergo is among the leaders, accounting for more than 40 billion rubles, even outstripping the Minvudkhov. In terms of construction deadlines it has fallen behind by an average of 4 years. When the decision to shorten the construction front and bring deadlines to their regulatory level was passed on the highest circles, based on common sense, the ministry should have started feverishly to work on tabling some of the construction projects in order to complete faster the others and not initiate any new projects at all. However, common sense plays no role here and the departments have their own logic. Working through the USSR Council of Ministers Fuel and Energy Bureau, Minenergo is energetically promoting the start of building the Turukhansk GES, which will be the largest and most expensive of its kind in the country.

A great deal is being said lately about the scarcity of paper in the country, the reasons for it and the numerous consequences of this shortage, which violate the normal course of the cultural and political life of society. Indeed, on a per capita basis we produce less paper than in the United States roughly by a factor of six. It is of some interest that the cost of building the Turukhansk GES would exceed the capital investments appropriated for the cellulose-paper industry over the past 10 years.

But if this hydroelectric power plant is so vitally needed, perhaps the decision should have been made to abandon the building of a large number of enterprises in Krasnoyarsk Kray, on the basis of previously made decisions, enterprises which should have been completed some time ago? They include clothing factories, meat combines, bakeries, and pastry factories. The construction of many of them was simply not undertaken: These projects were of no interest to any of the powerful departments which actually handle the funds.

Let us quote from a document drafted by senior personnel of the USSR Gosstroy which, by the logic of things, should be aware of the nature of events: "The water reservoir of the Turukhansk GES, with a capacity for 409 cubic kilometers, will result in the flooding of nearly 10,000 square kilometers of land and forests (a timber

reserve in excess of 50 million cubic meters).... Because of the lack of technical and economic substantiations, no reliable cost estimate has been provided for the building of the Turukhansk GES and, consequently, for its economic efficiency. In terms of its indicators, the Turukhansk GES is a particularly large and complex project and, in accordance with stipulated procedure, the technical and economic substantiation for this hydroelectric plant should have been submitted to state expert evaluation by the USSR Gosplan and USSR Gosstroy prior to its approval. Without waiting for this to happen, the USSR Minenergo is urging the earliest possible start of preparatory operations."

But could it be that the collectives of hydraulic power construction workers in Siberia have nothing to do? Could it be that the country is experiencing in that area a sharp energy hunger and a surplus of funds and manpower? No, the same document proves. The building of hydroelectric power projects in Siberia has been developed on a broad scale but has been dragging for decades. "According to the approved plan the duration of the construction of the Boguchansk GES was 10 years. Actually, in the 11 years since work on this project was started only 422 million rubles (about 25 percent) of the planned capital investments have been spent. In the Kureysk GES, in 10 years 252.5 million rubles have been spent (about 55 percent)." Hence a conclusion with which one could hardly disagree: "Initiating the construction of the Turukhansk GES in the absence of any type of study and coordination of technical documentation in accordance with stipulated procedures would inevitably result in loss of or unjustified outlays, and waste of capital investments and material and technical resources." The date of this document is April 1987.

Its 12 April 1988 issue PRAVDA carried a short note under the heading "On the Sly." It informed the readers that preparatory work has been initiated and an all-weather road is being laid, to link the Svetlogorsk settlement with the hub of the future Turukhansk GES. "We keep asserting the need for strictest ecological expert evaluations," wrote N. Krivomazov, PRAVDA's correspondent, "while in fact what happens is that 'the dogs keep barking but the caravan goes its way'."

Such is precisely the case, and those were precisely the same words that were used by an honored hydraulic power worker from the rostrum of the general meeting of the Hidroproyekt labor collective. It is true that somewhat more politely and not with indignation but with obvious pleasure the speaker said that "someone is barking but the caravan is going its way. Meanwhile, the decree is being drafted." Applause burst in the hall.

The first information we obtained on the fact that the decree, within the framework of which the Turukhansk GES is only an isolated project, is being drafted by the interested organizations, and that they intend to defend this document from a concerned public and the initiated reform, was from the "Open Letter" which was sent to

the editors by the members of the student environmental protection units in 36 cities, who gathered in Odessa last March. The students wrote that in a number of its essential points this project conflicts with the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "On Radically Restructuring Environmental Protection in the Country," dated 7 January 1988, and is totally imbued with a narrow departmental approach.

The department is putting everything at stake: Its plan calls for the building of more than 90 big and very big hydroelectric power plants until the year 2000. It intends to submit to nondepartmental expert evaluations by the USSR Gosplan, Gosstroy and GKNT only projects whose cost estimate amount to 1 billion rubles or more. According to the designers anything under 1 billion is entirely under the jurisdiction of the department.

The supporters of a "first phase" economics are mounting an offensive, for the atmosphere of glasnost and democratization is hindering their "normal work." They could do a great deal to ensure their future well-being to the detriment of the well-being of the country, and if this requires to sacrifice perestroika, that is too bad.

At a general meeting of the labor collective of Hidroproyekt, the head of Lengidroproyekt complained of increasing hindrances to the work. He also told the story of the GES at the Zhupanov River in Kamchatka. Everything would have been normal without the intrigues of the public. The village soviet banned surveys on its territory and was supported by the rayon soviet. Nor was its decision annulled in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsk.

The main objective of the departments is that everything should proceed smoothly, on oiled tracks. If it has to stop, a mass of questions would arise. For example, why should it accelerate hydraulic power construction in Kamchatka and block the path of the salmon in this spawning river, when for decades the question of the use of the richest possible energy resources of the geothermal waters concentrated in this area has remained unsolved? The power workers at the meeting laughed at the complaints of the village soviet of "arbitrary behavior." However, this was not an exceptional case of obstruction of the department but an insurmountable and powerful force—the manifestation of the will of the people. With every passing day we hear reports on the growing activeness of an awakening public opinion.

In Volgograd the public opposed organizing the production of the highly toxic pesticide Bazudin. The letter sent to our editors included thousands of signatures by the city's population. Here as well there was a hitch and a heap of questions were asked: Did we have to purchase from the FRG (the Lurgi company) equipment worth tens of millions of rubles for the production of a highly toxic and obsolete preparation which penetrates the

plant organism, is stable in water and remains in the ground for a long time? A governmental commission acknowledged that continuing the building of this enterprise was inexpedient.

In Estonia and in Leningrad Oblast the USSR Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production was trying to build large mines for the extraction of phosphorite. The project was assessed at costing approximately 1.3 billion rubles. Here again the public interfered. It asked simple questions: Why? How much would it cost? What harm will be caused? It now becomes clear that, having invested half that amount of funds in measures to reduce the loss of apatite concentrate, one could additionally obtain 400,000 tons of chemical fertilizers.

This article was already prepared for publication when we received a letter from the public in the city of Nikolayev, objecting to the building of the Danube-Dnepr canal and blocking the Dnepr-Bug estuary with a dam. The letter was signed by 25,700 people, including a USSR Supreme Soviet deputy, a member of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, heroes of socialist labor, and heads of the largest enterprises. So far no one has approved this expensive and ecologically dangerous project. However, the Minvodkhoz intends this year to spend 22 million rubles on building the dam, ignoring the view of the public and the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences. At the present stage the main task of Minvodkhoz is to make this situation irreversible. We shall return to the questions raised in that letter in greater detail in one of our future issues, when we discuss various viewpoints on problems of water resources.

The public in Georgia is concerned with the building of the railroad along the Kavkazskaya Pass, which will include the Arkhotsk Tunnel, 23.4 kilometers long, which will pass under the main ridge of the Caucasus. This will be a most difficult track necessitating huge expenditures but having very questionable ecological and economic substantiations. Here as well the project has not been approved yet, but again "on an exceptional basis" preparatory work has been started.... On 12 May 1988 the CPSU Central Committee Politburo deemed necessary to submit this project to an expert evaluation and further work, taking into consideration the remarks and suggestions expressed by the public.

It is not our intention to assume the role of umpire in such most difficult arguments on the need to implement one project or another. We are discussing something else: the fact that the departments should not determine the fate of the people or the future of entire areas without control, to eliminate settlements and villages or sign secret contracts, concealing both the course, objectives and results of talks. They are concealing them not from some kind of "outside powers" but from you and me.

Now, when the logic of the economic reform is questioning the very existence of a number of departments, a difficult phenomenon is noticed. The personnel of the

functional management authorities say that they do not recall ever experiencing such powerful pressure the purpose of which is to extract from them as much funds as possible for the longest possible time into the future. The departments are hastening to take more from our common purse while it is still open. Unless this pressure is stopped the failure of the reform becomes predetermined: To increase the economic autonomy of enterprises without control over the financial levers of management, and without making the appetite of the departments consistent with available resources would mean simply to convert the economy from a condition of suppressed inflation to a condition of galloping inflation with unpredictable sociopolitical consequences. In this situation we need unparalleled firmness in the defense of the state budget; it is becoming obvious that we need a mechanism of democratic control over making and drafting decisions.

Available experience convincingly proves how right V.I. Lenin was when he called, as early as the spring of 1918, for not confusing nationalization with socialization. The prevalence of state ownership can be perfectly combined with ignoring the interests of the public. We are currently seeking ways of developing public control over economic activities on the level of enterprises. Their economic responsibility for production results is being increased, their autonomy is being expanded and production democracy is being promoted. However, a substantial part of the resources is distributed and, as is always the case in a socialist society, will continue to be distributed on a level above that of the enterprise. Unless efficient control exercised by society is extended to the shaping of economic strategy and a reliable counterbalance is created to departmental pressure we could not hope for success of the reform. Under contemporary conditions this problem can and must be solved not on the basis of a return to the policy of "strong power," which gets along splendidly with outbreaks of departmental hare-brained scheming, but only by developing economic management methods and promoting the systematic democratization of social life.

The area of free allocation of public resources with no cost accounting is clearly overinflated. Many construction projects, currently financed out of state budget funds, could be financed out of the cost accounting funds of interested enterprises, the collectives of which are answerable for their results through the ruble, if such projects are indeed necessary. In areas where state financing is truly irreplaceable, strict mechanisms for public control over the efficiency of such financing is needed. A system of truly independent nondepartmental expert evaluation, maximal glasnost, the extensive use of the competitive choice among projects, and the detailed discussion of the most important among them by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the supreme soviets of Union and autonomous republics and their working bodies are needed.

The "first phase" economy is characterized by indifference toward the real vital interests of the people and by

excluding them from the decision-making process. The very idea that society is being given a voting right in discussing the use of public funds is triggering the sincere indignation of the departments. Such an economic reality could exist only in the guise of social mimicry, replacing the interests of the people with those of the department and backing such decisions with the power of the state apparatus of coercion and the philosophy of secrecy. It can be duplicated only in the absence of a real manifestation of the will of the people. In order to eliminate it, release the resources related to it and channel them into improving the people's well-being and the technical reconstruction of the economy, glasnost and all-round democracy are absolutely necessary. It is only the development of these processes that can block the path of uncontrolled waste of public labor and natural resources with impunity. It is important to understand the links and reciprocal need for one another of obsolete economic and political structures and their stubborn opposition of revolutionary perestroika, for success of perestroika means loss of departmental structures of uncontrolled power. That is why the problem of the ways of taking our economy out of its pre-crisis condition and eliminating the threat of becoming a second-rate power is that same old problem of the development of democracy and addressing the real vital needs of the nation and of individuals.

Democracy means that the people decide how to spend their funds, forces and time and where. This means the people, its deputies and representatives who are answerable to them.

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Explanation of Behavior

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[Article by Pavel Vasilyevich Simonov, academy member, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Higher Nervous Activities and Neurophysiology]

[Text] The people long ago reached the conclusion that a person must be judged not by what he says and, even less so, by what he thinks of himself, but by what he does. However, it is action, behavior, that provides the only possibility of self-knowledge. How can one know oneself? Goethe asked. Only through action but never through contemplation. Try to do your duty and you will find what is in you.

If such is the case, what motivates human behavior? What motivates a person to commit one act or another? Unable to understand the true reasons for their behavior, for centuries on end the people looked for them on the outside, laying the responsibility for their actions on the

spirit of their ancestors, demons and gods, fate, circumstances, education, or good or bad heredity. However, such an objectivizing of the reasons for actions became, on the one hand, increasingly degrading to the developing self-awareness which was unwilling to tolerate the role of puppet in the hands of mysterious external forces and, on the other, undermined the feeling of personal responsibility, which is absolutely necessary in order to coexist with one's kind. Hegel justifiably claimed that the prime idea in any ethical system is that of the concept of oneself as a free being.

Actually, the idea of free will, which is so pleasing to the human mind, entails rather puzzling consequences. Although insisting on the personal responsibility of the subject, society demands of him to observe behavioral standards inherent in that society. Even if a person has committed actions resulting from poor upbringing, failure to punish him, (i.e., to act "justly" toward the perpetrator of the crime) means a manifestation of lack of humaneness and lack of fairness toward the other members of the community. Responsibility to society becomes the inevitable consequence of the social nature of man. The dependence of human actions on the environment and on educational conditions motivates the people to try to improve their environment and their upbringing. Society can counter free ill-will only with the same type of cruelty.

The stupid tale about free will (V.I. Lenin) and the undetermined nature of human actions hinder the analytical approach to human behavior. This was well understood by L.N. Tolstoy. Actually, the entire second section of the epilogue of his brilliant novel "War and Peace" deals with the question of the freedom and necessity of human actions, including his polemics with physiologist I.M. Sechenov, whom he does not identify by name. "... As is the case with astronomy," Tolstoy writes, "... we do not feel the movement of the earth but, if we admit its immobility we come close to absurdity; if we admit its motion, which we do not feel, we accept its laws. Such is the case with history as well.... By assuming our freedom we come to absurdity; by admitting our dependence on the external world and the time and its reasons, we come closer to the laws." Bertrand Russell developed the same idea 50 years later: "The only real result of the theory of free will is the fact that it prevents the people from... drawing a proper conclusion from the facts.... The people behave more stupidly toward other people than toward automobiles."

In our days the discussion of free will is no less sharp and tense than it was during the times of Sechenov and Tolstoy. According to one of the greatest American psychologists, B.F. Skinner, the individual is not responsible for his actions, for they are entirely predetermined by external circumstances and his upbringing. The concept of free will and moral responsibility must be as thoroughly expelled from behavioral science as, in its time, physics parted with "thermogen," astronomy, with the concept of the earth as being the center of the

universe, biology, with the "life force," and psychology with the myth of the immortality of the soul. Another outstanding natural scientist and Nobel Prize winner, John Eccles, objects to Skinner's ideas: "I believe that as human beings we have freedom and dignity. Skinner's theory and the technique of instrumental conditioned reflexes are based on his experimentation with doves and rats. Let them have such reflexes!"

The discovery made by Marx and Engels of the role of **need** as the determining reason for human actions and as the prime source and motivation of human activities, marks the beginning of a truly scientific interpretation of man's purposeful behavior. All other ideas used in describing human behavior, whether concepts, values, interests, motivations, dispositions, etc., are derived from need and caused by it. We must not forget the exceptional wealth and variety of such needs which are by no means reduced to food, clothing, housing and procreation.

It may have seemed that a profound study of the true variety of human needs and capabilities would become the central task of the Soviet scientists—physiologists, psychologists, economists, sociologists and educators—as the representatives of a society which proclaimed as its objective the fullest possible satisfaction and harmonious development of needs and, as its ideal, the implementation of the principle "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his needs." Unfortunately, such is not the case. The majority of authors do not go beyond the classification of needs into material and spiritual, biological and sociohistorical. Can we seriously speak of any scientific substantiation for the satisfaction of needs and a scientific substantiation for the determination of capabilities with such limited knowledge concerning both?

Biologists and biophysicists are as yet to study the manner in which, in the course of the evolution of animate nature, the passive absorption of food from the environment turned into an active **search** for sources of nutrition. The origin of zoosocial needs of animals, which have a group way of life and which can coordinate their behavior with that of the other members of the group, is even more complex.

Let us cite as an example the results of experiments which were conducted quite recently by the French scientist S. Colin. Rats were trained to look for food in an aquarium filled with water. In order to be able to use this food they had to move it to dry land in their house cells. After the rats set up groups, they were immediately stratified: Some rats continued to procure the food while others began to wait for the "procurers" in the living cell and to eat at their expense. After the rats became divided into groups which procured food and "loafers," some of the producers stopped procuring the food and some of the "loafers" began to look for it. Such studies, particularly conducted among superior anthropoid apes, make unlikely the concept that prior to the development of

tools and ownership of the extracted product, our distant ancestors were equal and free in their behavior. It is rather the progress of technology, the mastery of tools, the possibility of storing food, and so on, that became imposed on the already existing rigid and hierarchically organized structure of primitive societies.

The mechanism of the "selfless" need for new information, the vital importance of which is unknown to the animal, is even more puzzling. Curiosity, and attraction for something new and previously unfamiliar, are so great that they successfully compete with hunger, thirst and even the powerful instinct of self-preservation. Naturally, in the course of the process of cultural and historical development, under the influence of articulate speech and social labor, the vital zoosocial and orientational-research instincts of animals experienced qualitative changes before they became vital, social and ideal (spiritual, creative-cognitive) needs of man. The social origin of need is yet another topical problem in the contemporary study of man.

Work on this problem is complicated by the fact that needs are reflected only partially and with a great deal of bias in the human mind or are realized by man. Let us note that in the context of this article the term "awareness" is used to mean knowledge which, with the help of words, mathematical symbols, technological images and images of works of art could be transmitted to the people, including our descendants, in the guise of monuments of culture. To be aware means to gain the actual or potential possibility of communicating one's knowledge to someone else, and making one's personal knowledge a cknowledge, i.e., a knowledge combined with that of someone else, a socialized knowledge. A real dialogue with the other members of the social group becomes a secondary mental dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor and, subsequently, a dialogue with oneself, i.e., self-awareness.

As a result of the limited access of the awareness in the realm of needs, the study of the true reasons for one action or another becomes extremely difficult. We see in daily practice that a relatively simple action is the result of an entire world of most complex motivations which become the more difficult to analyze the more we plunge into their origin. Awareness, actually, is by no means a reliable conduit along this way.

At a meeting where my comrade was unfairly condemned, I remained silent. A feeling of guilt and shame is still clutching my heart. However, my mind immediately erects up an entire system of justifications. I lack sufficiently convincing arguments. In some areas, my comrade was indeed wrong. Furthermore, why did he speak so sharply? Why did he set the majority of those present against himself? Generally speaking, what could I do, by myself? Alas, the mind is an obliging offspring of need and the need for truth in this case did not prove to be dominant among competing motivations.

That is why the identification of profound motivations for actions, concealed not only from someone else but from one's own internal "look," is the prime task of any specialist who must influence the fate of a person: manager, educator, investigator, or psychotherapist.

Activities and actions do not always lead to the simultaneous satisfaction of a number of coexisting needs. We frequently must face a choice among competing motivations. What are the mechanisms of this choice? What determines it?

It is only in exceptional cases that the choice depends exclusively on the power of the dominant need at the given moment: A mother who is saving the life of her child needs neither willpower nor the assessment of her forces or the consequences of her actions. She is not concerned with her own life or the opinion of those around her. Actually, we encounter such situations also in the actions of a person in the throes of the overwhelming need to assert a truth he has reached. This is my stand and I cannot do otherwise. Such is the explanation of this type of behavior, which was formulated with extreme accuracy by Luther, several centuries ago.

Usually man makes a choice among simultaneously activated and competing needs, taking into consideration the possibility of their satisfaction under the specific circumstances or in the future. The development of living beings required the creation of a special mechanism which would "weigh" competing motivations taking both factors into consideration: the power of the need and the likelihood of its satisfaction. Necessarily, this mechanism appeared in the course of the evolutionary process, and was described as emotion. It came from needs and the assessed possibility of satisfying them (subconsciously in many cases); emotions in turn influence needs and forecasts of the likelihood of achieving an objective. I shall illustrate this with a personal example.

I remember to this day my first parachute jump. The comrade who was scheduled to jump ahead of me took fright. The airplane landed and, surrounded by our silence, he deplaned.... When I was ordered to jump, I stepped on the wing and froze: There was an abyss under me. A powerful force was pulling me back. This was fear triggered by the natural need for self-preservation. At that point I recalled my predecessor and clearly (quite unwittingly!) imagined that it was not he but I who was stepping off the plane under the eyes of my comrades. A strong feeling of shame (emotion triggered by the social need to observe the behavioral standard accepted by my peers) imbued all of me. Fearing this shame, thinking of nothing, I jumped into the abyss....

Since positive emotions confirm an approach to the objective (i.e., to the satisfaction of the need) while negative emotions indicate the difficulty on the way to the objective, man (if he is mentally normal, not a religious fanatic or a masochist) tries to maximize positive emotions and minimize negative ones. Negative

emotions, which are based on the lack of information about the means which are necessary and adequate for attaining the objective, motivate the search for such means, ways, knowledge, skills and, finally, time if it is precisely time that is short in making use of skills and means. The role of positive emotions is similar, with the essential stipulation that the full satisfaction of needs and full information, guaranteeing this satisfaction, eliminate not only negative emotions (which is excellent!) but also positive ones: the joy of life disappears.

Evolution—a process of eternal self-development and self-dynamics in animate nature—“invented” the outstanding mechanism of this development, in the guise of positive emotions. In aspiring to experience them again, the living beings are forced to behave paradoxically from the viewpoint of the passive-adaptation (homeostatic, “equal-balanced”) theories of behavior: They must **actively seek unsatisfied needs** and, based on full information, aspire to new, previously unknown information, for it is only the **increase** of information that can bring the joy of discovery and creative inspiration. Whereas negative emotions suffice in terms of the need for preservation (of oneself, one’s progeny, social status, etc.), positive emotions serve primarily **the process of development, increased complexity and enhancement of needs**. The fact that they contain the potential threat of a distortion of their initially progressive role is a different matter. Self-seeking pleasure assumes distorted forms, becoming increasingly less discriminate in the means needed to obtain it. Behavior begins to be oriented toward easily obtainable objectives and the search for the shortest way to primitive pleasure, whether it is sex without love or a drug. This “Achilles’ heel” of emotions demanded of evolution the creation of yet another mechanism which determines the choice of an action, known as **the will**.

I.M. Sechenov considered the will to be a “motivation which overpowers all other.” We have already seen, however, that in the case of a need which clearly dominates other motivations, no will is needed. Furthermore, the will is manifested whenever the motivation which has initiated a given activity turns out to be insufficient.

After a long and difficult march, a group of travelers reached their place of rest for the night. They ate, warmed themselves up and laid down. All their needs were met. However, there were a number of indications that a snowstorm was approaching and that their stock of wood was low. Surmounting their fatigue and sleepiness, they had to go into the cold to look for dry wood. Conveniently, their minds suggested to them that perhaps the available wood would suffice. Perhaps the snowstorm would be short. Some of them voiced these thoughts. Nonetheless, someone becomes the first to get up and go outside.

What motivates this person? Is it the need to keep warm? This need, at the present moment, has been satisfied! Neither the mind nor the will can artificially create a

need. A need cannot be imagined. The imagination can extract from the memory only a **situation** in which such a need was not satisfied (let us recall the emotions of a novice parachute jumper before the jump!). The deliberate concept of people huddling around a cold stove triggers a negative **emotion**, and this emotion, which has appeared on the basis of the need for self-preservation, will prevail over the need for rest and the fatigue.

Actually, the person can be helped by yet another mechanism or, rather, another need: the need to surmount an obstacle, a lack of freedom or degrading dependence on his weakness or desire to sleep.

This very old need appears in animals as well. It was discovered by I.P. Pavlov who named it the “reflex of freedom,” and which was, much later, rediscovered by Western ethologists as the “motivation of resistance to coercion,” which is manifested particularly strongly in wild animals. The freedom reflex can successfully surmount hunger, sexual attraction and pain. Even in animals the reflex of freedom varies with individual species: In some it is manifested very strongly; in others it has weakened and converted into the “reflex of obedience,” which was also described by Pavlov. In man the need to surmount is even more individualized. It has genetic instincts and can be greatly intensified or suppressed by upbringing. It is important to remember that to a person an obstacle is not only an external obstruction but also a competing element which makes the subject not free, which makes him the slave of his weakness or habit.

What proof can we provide in support of the assertion that will means need? The proof is the fact that emotions appear at the time of surmounting (or not surmounting) obstacles, although the end objective has still not been attained and the need, which has become the prime reason for behavior, has not been satisfied as yet. The joy of surmounting obstacles, of a victory over oneself is so attractive and sharp that man himself creates such obstacles and from easily attainable objectives aspires to more difficult ones.

Could this also mean “freedom of will,” to which we referred so skeptically at the beginning of this article? No, it does not! The point is that will does not exist by itself. It is always “grafted” to another need, which has initiated a given behavior. The willful traveler, who goes after fuel despite his fatigue, was motivated by concern for preserving his own life and that of his comrades. It is precisely the need, “serviced” by the will, that gives it its social value. In itself, the will does not have such value and a willful criminal is much more dangerous than one without it. It is true that the will could also acquire a self-satisfying significance. At that point, however, it is no longer will and turns into senseless stubbornness.

We cannot eliminate the contradiction between determinism and freedom of choice without addressing ourselves to the principle of additionality, i.e., without

taking into consideration the viewpoint from which the action is considered. In the psychological sense, the idea of additionality belongs to L.N. Tolstoy. In the epilogue to the novel "War and Peace" we cited, Tolstoy wrote: "... In considering man as an object of observation..., we find the general law of necessity, to which he is subject like any living being. Looking at him as something of which we are aware, we feel ourselves free."

In other words, a person is determined by hereditary features and educational conditions (i.e., he is not free) from the viewpoint of the outside observer. At the same time, he is free in the choice of his actions from the viewpoint of his own reflecting consciousness. This subjective experience of an objectively nonexistent freedom is what triggers the most valuable feeling of responsibility, which motivates us again and again to analyze the possible consequences of a given action. In this analysis we rely on our own experience and the experience of others, including that of previous generations. The information retrieved from the memory through the mechanism of emotions intensifies a need which persistently dominates in the hierarchy of motivations of a given individual ("the super-supertask of life," according to Stanislavskiy), enabling him to counter circumstantial motivations caused by the existing situation. As a result, we make decisions not impulsively, not thoughtlessly, not under the influence of the moment, or as a result of a blind imitation of other people's behavior, but in accordance with the system of values dictated by our "supertask," which is the dominant in our life.

The need which firmly dominates the structure of motivations of an individual triggers the creative intuition ("the superawareness," according to Stanislavskiy). The mechanism of the superawareness does not simply harness practical experience stored in the mind and the subconscious of the subject but recombines it and offers to the conscience alternatives of possible actions which are not found ready in the memory. Such essentially new decisions are legitimately considered a type of **self-determination** of behavior, although, once again, social practice, sanctioning or rejecting the results of the individual superconsciousness, will be the judge of the rightness or wrongness of any decision.

We accurately consider the development of production forces the motor of history, the factor which revolutionizes and changes social relations. However, changes in the realm of production forces begin with technological discoveries, which are born in the specific, the individual mind of a person. In precisely the same way the discovery of new standards of new human community life, new morality and new ethics will have been prepared by the entire course of previous history, and will take place, once again, in the mind of the philosopher who is the first to have formulated the objective need for this new world order. We owe Marx the outstanding thought that the Protestant revolution began in the mind of the monk Luther (see K. Marx and F. Engels "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 1, p 422). The superconsciousness is the prime source for

the motion of animate nature in the social stage of its planetary life, the transformer of the biosphere into the noosphere, described by V.I. Vernadskiy. We can say that it is precisely creativity—scientific, technical, artistic and legislative—that gives a positive meaning to the ancient idea of the freedom of will. In the cultural-historical revolution the products of the activities of the superawareness (new ideas, hypotheses and discoveries), and social practice which sanctions or rejects them, play a role similar to variability and natural selection in the biological evolution of living beings.

But what about awareness? What is its influence on the behavior of the human masses? It is tremendous, if appealing to the mind takes accurately into consideration the vital needs of these masses. Seventy years ago the bolsheviks were by no means the largest or, even less so, the only political party in our country. However, their slogans reflected with maximal accuracy the most profound and urgent needs of the multi-million strong peasant masses: peace and land. While the other parties continued to demand war to its victorious end and a land reform based on stipulated conditions and only after a constituent assembly will have been created, the Bolshevik program was simple: immediate peace and immediate division of the landed estates. The course of world history changed in a period of 10 days.

For many years we failed to understand why the property of the whole nation was considered as belonging to no one and why was it that a person who would carefully grow vegetables on his garden plot would indifferently pass by mountains of vegetables which were senselessly perishing in the public fields? This paradox was ascribed to vestiges of private-ownership mentality, egotism and a great "unconsciousness," which explained everything. Things were given their proper names at the April Central Committee Plenum and the 27th Party Congress.

As Academician S.S. Shatalin rightly said, for a long time the main obstruction to progress in the economic area was precisely the lack of efficient incentives, for the motivational mechanism which had developed did not ensure the efficient use of production resources. The author reasonably considers that the global historical task of socialism is its radical restructuring (see KOMMUNIST No 14, 1986, p 62).

However, the problem of motivating labor activities of man does not end with its practical relevance. It assumes a most important methodological significance. As recent sociopolitical obligations have noted, the most serious methodological breakthrough in our entire social sciences should be expected at the point where vital and unstudied economic and social, material and spiritual and private and social problems come together.

For many long years man has been the subject of a number of areas of knowledge: philosophy, sociology, psychology, physiology, anthropology, medicine, pedagogy and art studies. Nonetheless, the simple adding of

information obtained by each one of these sciences and their comparison in the course of discussions, in which every specialist speaks in the language of his trade, has failed to yield the desired results. Man remains "divided" among the areas of individual scientific disciplines and, alas, the systemic quality does not appear by itself.

We consider that the solution of this situation is found in the elaboration of theoretical concepts which would be initially interdisciplinary. They would be heuristically fruitful not in one but in several specialized areas of knowledge which are included in the system of contemporary studies of man.

The need-for-information approach, which can be considered one of the possible concepts of this kind, excludes a direct influencing of the mind on the area of needs and motivations; it rejects the view that awareness and will are the "superregulators" of behavior. If there is a competition of motivations, one need can be opposed only by another need and the struggle of motivations develops on the level of the emotions triggered by such needs. Hence arming the subject with means for the satisfaction of his needs, which have a maximal value in the development of society and the application of the essential forces of man, becomes an educational instrument. Naturally, it is a question not of "formal information" (in this case we go back to relying on "consciousness") but of information converted into activity, into an action and a line of behavior.

In defining education as the shaping of socially and personally valuable needs of the pupil, we must pay particular attention and give priority to the shaping of spiritual needs, the ability to live with **one's own** thoughts and **someone else's** feelings (L.N. Tolstoy), and the ability to act on the basis of respect for what is good and just and not out of fear or self-seeking praises and awards.

The most sterile and senseless occupation in this case is that of appeals to be good, responsive, eager to learn, selfless, and so on. Altruism should be learned the way one learns a language. Since the need for knowledge and the social need "for other people" are potentially inherent in every normal person, we must steadily arm him with the ways and means for the satisfaction of such needs. Increasing such means would increase the possibility of satisfying them, i.e., the appearance of positive emotions which, in turn, will increase the needs which have created them and ensure for them if not a dominant at least a sufficiently high position in the hierarchy of personal motivations.

In the same way that Stanislavskiy called for presenting the "life of the human spirit" of the personage recreated by the actor, using the truth of the simplest, most

elementary physical actions, an education in spirituality begins with an observation of the elementary rules of community life, courtesy and attention to people surrounding us.

It is thus that the educational impact on the area of needs assumes the following aspect: arming the subject with information on socially valuable means for their satisfaction—enriching this information with activities-emotions-transformation and upgrading the spiritual needs and motivations.

Actually, there is yet another and perhaps most reliable and direct way for shaping a socially valuable individual: the power of the example. Thanks to the imitation mechanism, which is particularly strongly developed among children, the models of behavior which the child finds in his closest surroundings, even if not interpreted and substantiated through logical analysis, is established in his subconscious. Thus, behavioral norms, morality and morals become the internal guidelines for decision making, the voice of the conscience, the call of the heart and the imperative of duty. If from the very first months of his life the child is surrounded only by bold, humane and truthful people, no special education is needed. There would be no need for a theory of education, with the exception of genetic deviations or as a result of illness.

Whatever the case, personality begins with action. Try to fulfill your duty and you will find what there is within you. That is why man is the equivalent of action.

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05003

Legal Regulation of Economic Activities

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[Text] "Adjustment and order," Marx wrote, "are precisely the form of social strengthening of a given production method, for which reason they constitute its relative emancipation from simple randomness and arbitrariness.... Regulation and order are the essence of the necessary aspect of any means of production, if it is to be socially stable...." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 25, part II, pp 356-357). This precisely is the function of the law. In defining the behavior of the

participants in public production, it also affects production relations based on existing needs and the real possibilities of society which must reflect them suitably.

However, if legislation unjustifiably outstrips the course of events or simply ignores the fact that certain types of social relations must correspond to means of legal regulation, specific to each of these types, regardless of appeals to observe legal regulations or whatever measures of state coercion may be applied, such legislation will not achieve its desired objective and will actually remain unused. If the legislation and the practice of its application fall behind the timely requirements of life (as was frequently the case in the period of our economic stagnation) they may have an obstructing influence. Another reason for a disparity between laws and real life and their actual inaction is the conservatism, the obsolete stereotype of behavior on the part of those for whom these laws are drafted.

All legal acts, starting with the Decree on State Industrial Trusts of 1923, including the USSR Law on the State Enterprise (Association), stipulate that as a juridical person the enterprise is not responsible for the obligations of the state and the state bears no responsibility for the debts of the enterprise. The same laws stipulate that the state enterprise has, uses and handles state property assigned to it in order to carry out its tasks. This means that the state enterprises act as socialist commodity producers. Today this is codified in the Law on the Enterprise; a juridical person is a legal form which enables the commodity producer and independent participant to engage in commodity-monetary relations.

Specialized publications have suggested various foundations for correlating the property rights of enterprises and the rights of the state as the owner of the national property. Those who consider that the right of ownership ends with the right of possession, use and handling, suggest that the state enterprise should be declared the owner of the property covered by such rights. As early as the 1920s the theory appeared of the so-called shared ownership between the state and the juridical person—the enterprise. This theory was substantiatedly criticized for actually voiding the unity of state ownership.

As a result of the debates and theoretical studies, the point of view expressed by Academician A.V. Venediktov, which he substantiated in his basic monograph "*Gosudarstvennaya Sotsialisticheskaya Sobstvennost'*" [State Socialist Ownership] (1948) became prevalent. Proceeding from Marx's concept of ownership as the attitude of the individual or the collective toward things (means of production or production results) as being **their own**, a relation codified by law or custom, A.V. Venediktov reached the conclusion that the ownership, use and handling of objects can be separated from the owner who nonetheless retained the right of ownership over them. Such is the position of the Soviet state, as the one and only owner of state property; the enterprises possess, use and handle the property assigned to them

within stipulated limits. This structure, legally described as daily management, was subsequently intensified and developed in works on the science of civil law and adopted by Soviet legislation (Foundations of Civic Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics of 1961; and the civil codes of Union republics of 1963-1964), and ratified with the supplements of 1981 in connection with the adoption of the 1977 USSR Constitution. It was extended to the property of interkolkhoz, state-cooperative and other similar organizations, which are not the owners of such property. This is particularly important today, when such joint enterprises will be extensively widespread and will require a stable legal system.

Under the conditions of the prevalence of administrative economic management methods, the rights of the enterprises to own, use and handle the property assigned to them were quite limited. To a considerable extent they were formal and subject to a variety of prohibitions. Today, under the conditions of the extensive autonomy of enterprises and the self-regulating of their activities, on the basis of true cost accounting, the right to daily management is assuming a real and specific content.

This interpretation of enterprise rights is consistent with the socioeconomic characteristics of the enterprise's labor collective as the **owner** in a sector of the single front of ownership by the whole people, which is the base for production and other economic activities in which labor collectives are engaged. The enterprise cannot be separated from the labor collective. It is not only a set of means of production but an organized labor collective which applies its labor in said complex. By exercising the right of daily management of the objects assigned to the state enterprise-commodity producer, the rules governing state ownership apply to economic commodity-monetary turnover.

The Soviet economy is a single complex which encompasses all public production, distribution and trade units (Article 16 of the USSR Constitution). However, this is precisely a **complex** which links different, albeit interacting, social relations. For that reason the legal forms of organization of the national economy and its management may vary and use a variety of legal methods, and are exercised with the help of the various branches of Soviet law. All relations in the area of organizing the economy, managing it and engaging in economic activities could be divided into two large groups: 1. The so-called vertical groups, i.e., the power-organizational ones, in which one of the participants is given the right to manage the other participant in this relationship; 2. The so-called horizontal relations, in which there are no features of authority and subordination, and in which reciprocal rights and obligations, the overwhelming majority of which are of a proprietary nature, appear essentially on the basis of contracts, and on the basis of violations of the law, as well as other juridical facts. The second group consists either of direct commodity-monetary relations or relations which derive from and are based on them. We know that commodity-monetary

relations in themselves do not constitute an autonomous economic system and are subordinate to the dominant production method. Such relations, based on the equality of the parties, are regulated by civil law and cannot exist outside of it.

In order to narrow the realm of action of administrative management methods and mandatory orders issued to enterprises (associations) or avoid their petty supervision, we must clearly distinguish among relations based on power-organizational activities on the part of the state management authorities, on the one hand, and property relations among equal managing subjects, which arise in the course of their direct economic activities, such as the production of commodities (services) and their marketing, i.e., commodity-monetary relations, on the other. The lack of clear understanding of the distinction between such relations and of their differences triggers the illegal suppression of equal property relations by stronger administrative-power relations and limits enterprise autonomy.

In general, civil law is a necessary legal form of commodity-monetary relations. It has been such in the USSR as well since 1922. This was codified in the very first RSFSR Civil Code, which was drafted taking V.I. Lenin's remarks into consideration. With their specific regulatory methods, institutions, concepts and categories, the norms of civil law reflect what is common and inherent in said relations as well as the specific features which are derived from the specific nature of the prevalent production method to which such relations are subordinated. Hence categories such as the rights, capabilities and activities of its participants, the juridical persons and the variety of deals, such as contracts, contractual obligations, property liability for violating the property rights of another individual, above all of a party to a contract, losses, grounds for release of liability or reducing its amount, and many others.

In the final account, the purpose of socialist production is to meet the needs of the people. Under the conditions of perestroika and in order to achieve its objectives, it is particularly necessary to take into consideration the inseparable nature of feedback—the influence of consumers on producers, ensuring the unity of the entire economic turnover, including relations stemming from cooperative and individual labor activity, and economic relations between private auxiliary farms and kolkhozes (sovkhozes). Hence the essential importance of a uniform civil law regulation (taking into consideration the specific nature of economic relations among socialist enterprises and organizations, ties between such organizations and citizens and between citizens), which can ensure the normal and efficient functioning of commodity-monetary turnover as a whole in the aspect in which it exists at the given stage in the development of socialism.

Under contemporary conditions the accuracy of the definition of civil legislation as a branch of Soviet law which regulates property regulations based on the utilization of the commodity-monetary form in the building of

communism, regardless of the composition of its participants, emphasizes particularly strongly the accuracy of this definition, which was formulated as early as December 1961 in the Foundations of Civil Legislation of the USSR and of Union Republics. This also confirms the substantiation of the decision which was made at that time to reject the suggestion made by a group of jurists of singling out the administrative (vertical) and value-property, commodity (horizontal) relations within a single category of "economic relations." It was proposed, for their regulation, to issue an economic code which would exclude civil legislation which controls similar property relations between socialist organizations and citizens and among citizens, based on that same commodity-monetary nature of property relations.

However, today as well there remain supporters of the concept of "economic law," which insist on separating the legal control of property regulations, based on the nature of their participants, and the promulgation of a separate economic code. They substantiate their views by citing the need to "synthesize the methods" of administrative and civil-legal regulation within the same "economic-legal" relations (see V.K. Mamutov, "Sovershenstvovaniye Pravovogo Regulirovaniya Khozyaystvennoy Deyatel'nosti" [Improving the Legal Regulation of Economic Activities], Kiev, 1982, p 64), claiming the existence, along with administrative-legal and civic laws, of also "purely economic-legal laws which can in no way be classified as part of the groups we named" (ibid., p 193). The same was discussed by Academician V.V. Laptev who complained in KOMMUNIST (No 8, 1987, p 24) of the "absence of a legislative codification of the general stipulations of economic law" and argued for the need for an economic code and the allegedly existing need for such laws ("general provisions"). Characteristically, neither author gives examples of such laws.

A clear proof of the unsuitability of such universal common laws regulating commodity-monetary and power-management relations is provided in Article 12 of the draft economic code of 1986, which extends the possibility of the analogy of the law (i.e., the use of laws in situations not directly stipulated in it) to "economic rights and obligations" as a whole, including relations of power and subordination.

The use of civil law and obligations in the national economy is impossible without setting standards concerning the analogy of the law, establishing an open and unlimited enumeration of actions and other reasons for the appearance of such rights and obligations, providing that they do not conflict with the meaning and general principles of civil legislation (Article 4, Foundations of Civil Legislation). This rule ensures the initiative and autonomy of enterprises and citizens in economic activities. Legal power relations, conversely, should appear only by virtue of the competence and rights directly granted by the legislation to the respective authority. We cannot ensure legality in state management in general

and the economy in particular if power rights and obligations appear also as a result of actions which are not directly stipulated in the legislation.

The supporters of economic law reject the institution of the juridical person, substituting for it the loose and vague category of economic authority which would be subject to economic law. Such a subject would be also an agency of state administration in terms of power and subordination, starting with the ministry and the enterprise and their components (including shops). The separation between power-organizational and direct economic activities would be eliminated. However, the nature of rights and obligations in commodity-monetary relations (regulated by civil law) and relations between authority and subordination, is essentially different. The former are based on property separation and the permission, which is needed in order to carry out the tasks of the juridical person, to conclude contracts as deemed necessary and to engage in any other activities other than the ones prohibited by the law. The nature of the latter is the power competence in terms of management, which must be clearly defined by the law. That is why combining these two different juridical persons within a single legal category of "economic authority" conflicts with real life and the tasks of legal control. In this case, as well as elsewhere, we must take into consideration the instructive lessons of our own history. In 1936, when the chief administrations of industrial people's commissariats were given cost accounting rights, in fact this led to the creation under the main administrations of procurement and marketing departments, which were physically and organizationally separate, and which began to act as separate cost accounting juridical persons, operating in accordance with civil law (acting as economic managers and not as power-administrative bodies).

For that reason we cannot agree with the claim of the possibility and expediency of having contractual relations "on all levels of the economic system," particularly among authorities in charge of economic management and subordinate enterprises and associations or between associations (enterprises) and their subdivisions (see V. Laptev's article, p 31). In this case, violating the essence of contractual-mandatory relations, based on the equality between the parties, they extend to vertical, power-organizational (administrative) relations. A decision which must be obeyed cannot be the subject of a contractual-compensation relation. If the power authority signs a contract which creates property rights and obligations for both it and the other party to the contract, it acts as an equal partner of that party with all the consequences stemming from this act (material liability for nonfulfillment of contractual obligations, submitting disputes to arbitration, etc.). It is precisely such a civil-legal contract that a ministry would sign by purchasing a commodity produced by the institute. In this case it would not act in the capacity of an administrative authority, for otherwise the contract will not become "the basic document regulating relations between the scientific organization (association) and the customer of

a scientific and technical commodity, including a ministry or department," and the scientific and technical output will not be a real commodity, as is required by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "On Converting Scientific Organizations to Full Cost Accounting and Self-financing."

A contract without the equality of the parties is meaningless: "An agreement can be reached only among equals. In order for the agreement to be a real one and not a concealed subordination, the real equality between both sides is necessary.... This is as clear as a clear day" (V.I. Lenin, "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 32, p 5). An organizational contract in relations between an agency of state administration and an enterprise subordinate to it is not only unnecessary but harmful. Such a pseudocontract would open the way to increased administrative interference. In this case we need not a contract which, as Lenin said, is a concealed subordination, but the application of legal guarantees of the independence, rights and initiatives of the enterprise.

The same considerations lead to questionable suggestions on the legal unity of economic systems and their property. They open the way to covering the losses of poorly working enterprises as a result of the work of profitable and well operating entities, as long as they belong to the same system. It was precisely about the inadmissibility of such practices that we were cautioned against by the 27th CPSU Congress, for this undermines enterprise cost accounting and material incentives of labor collectives. Sectorial cost accounting can be conceived only as the sum total of cost accounting operations of profitably working enterprises.

The characteristic features of the concept of the single economic law are the clear underestimating of the role of commodity-monetary relations among socialist organizations, expressed in the acknowledgment of their "form of planned direct-social relations" (V.K. Mamutov, op. cit., p 64) and in replacing the term "commodity-monetary" with the terms "planned-value" and "planned-cost accounting." "Adopting the commodity and the noncommodity approaches as a basis for the classification of economic relations lowers the role of their planned operations," writes V.V. Laptev in the book "*Khozyaystvennoye Pravo. Obshchiye Polozheniya*" [Economic Law. General Concepts] (Nauka, Moscow, 1983, p 10).

These views, in our opinion, reveal the old interpretation of a contract only as a means of concretizing a planned assignment, consistent with specific (mandatory) administrative planning. Yet the main purpose of the contract today is to become an instrument for the formulation of the plan by the enterprise itself in accordance with the stipulations provided through the control figures of the plan and the economic regulations. The concept of the "single economic law" carries the birthmarks of the time of its appearance.

Practical experience also confirms the inefficiency of the current obligation on the part of the creditor to demand penalties from a delinquent supplier or any other debtor, under the threat of having to pay himself the fine to the budget. Contractual responsibility is a legal mechanism for the implementation of commodity-monetary relations and, therefore, an institution of civil and not administrative law. It is only the interest of the creditor that should motivate him to apply this institution and, above all, to make it economically efficient. Therefore, the solution of this problem should be left to his discretion. This is a contemporary example of the uselessness, inefficiency and, frequently, harm caused by the use of the regulatory method and the inadequate nature of this type of social relation.

All of this proves that the question of an economic code is not simply a legal-technical question of combining the basic stipulations of economic legislation and reducing the array of laws. As it were, this would not take place, as has been actually acknowledged by the supporters of the economic code (as confirmed by the content of references to more than 170 different laws, found in the suggested draft). The point is also that the draft would have to duplicate the almost entire set of regulations included in the Foundations of Civil Legislation and the civil codes. The adoption of an economic code, furthermore, would require the drafting and publication of the code for foreign economic relations, which would duplicate the same regulations but without which we would have no national civil legislation applicable to this area of relations, for the regulations of the economic code would apply only to domestic socialist organizations and not to foreign companies with which foreign trade contracts are concluded. Finally, the adoption of an economic code would create an impasse in the area of regulating relations involving the participation of joint enterprises, particularly those which are set up with the participation of capitalist companies.

The radical restructuring of the economic mechanism began with a revision of the functions and the economic and legal status of the basic production unit, the enterprise. Correspondingly, the first legislative act of the reform was the USSR Law on the State Enterprise (Association) which necessarily applies to a number of related problems, such as general problems of planning and functions of plan figures, state orders, the role of contracts, the range of competence of state arbitration, labor regulations, etc.

Many of the concepts of the Law on the Enterprise must be developed. Above all, we need legal guarantees for the real exercise by the enterprise of its rights and autonomy, particularly if they are violated by the superior organization. In particular, the right to appeal in such cases to arbitration, with the requirement that illegal orders be declared null, or else to demand a compensation for the losses they have caused (Article 9.3 of the Law on the Enterprise) has remained virtually ignored in practice. This right must be granted not only to administrations

but also to labor collectives which, unlike directors, have no "psychological barrier" in filing a claim with the arbitration system against the superior authority. This is a manifestation of the direct economic efficiency of the democratization of production management.

The procedure for placing and accepting state orders (Art 10.3) must be regulated and related to the conclusion and execution of contracts and the related property civil-legal liability which arises, without which they become direct mandatory planning of amounts and varieties under a different name. We must define the procedure for the creation of branches, including joint enterprises (Art 21.1) and the possibility of and procedure for managing them by the enterprises which have created them, in order to satisfy the interest of the latter. We must regulate the procedure for the creation and activities of contractual associations of enterprises, including MNTK, stipulated in that same article of the law.

Finally, we must define in greater detail the grounds for and consequences of declaring an enterprise insolvent and ways of surmounting insolvency, and discuss the question of the possibilities and ways of closing down such enterprises, involving in this process their creditors, which is important from the viewpoint of securing the cost accounting interest of the latter. This problem is related to the question of the extent to which the enterprise can dispose of its fixed capital (fixed assets), something not solved in the Law on the Enterprise, and the possibility of extending to such assets claims based on enterprise indebtedness. In turn, this touches upon the deep questions of rights related to state socialist ownership, which need further theoretical research and interpretation. The Law on the State Enterprise also includes other important problems which require additional regulations. Corresponding solutions should be included in the new draft of the Law on the Enterprise, otherwise they would ineptly be solved through departmental regulations which, as experience has indicated, frequently violate the initial basic stipulations of the law to the advantage of departmental interests, which is one of the most important causes for obstructions encountered by perestroika.

The legislative acts which define the juridical limits and general concepts of the activities of the authorities in charge of planning and managing the national economy should provide legal guarantees that the regulations they contain will be observed. Such laws should include regulations on the assigning of functions and, correspondingly, competences among them, the procedure governing state planning and issuing corresponding orders, including state orders, to the recipients; conditions and procedures governing their change and annulment; consequences of violations of stipulated regulations; ways of ensuring the balancing of plans and the consequences of imbalance; ways of eliminating it and of considering corresponding complaints and compensations resulting from uncompensated losses.

We must develop and expand the general part of the Foundations of Legal Legislation, which is excessively brief in terms of the development and increased complexity of property turnover; we must increase the regulations contained in the law governing the efficient management of property. The role of the contract must be reflected under the conditions of the gradual development of wholesale (nonfunded) trade, including as a means of correcting mandatory planned assignments which are based on state orders, for they retain their mandatory nature, and make them consistent with the real needs of specific consumers. Such consistency is achieved when the latter refuse to conclude contracts they do not need. In such cases the obligation of the authority which has issued the state order to compensate the enterprise for its losses must be established. The Foundations should include regulations on preliminary contracts and many others and the range of disposition regulations (i.e., regulations which apply only in the absence of a necessary solution included in the contract itself) must be broadened. This is dictated by the requirements of domestic and foreign economic trade.

Now, when economic policies are aimed at eliminating the monopoly status of the producer and when mandatory allocation of goods will be gradually replaced by wholesale trade, we must expand the freedom of consumers to consider both the choice of their partners in concluding contracts as well as replacing them if they are found wanting. Naturally, under the new economic management system the producer himself would be interested in marketing his goods in accordance with contractual conditions and, at the same time, would try to avoid additional expenditures. The threat of penalties, including compensation for losses, assumes a greater importance (as an incentive for the full implementation of obligations), compared to the stipulation which has been part of our law since 1934 and has remained virtually unapplied in procurement contracts, to the effect that the paying of fines and compensation for losses does not relieve the debtor from the proper implementation of the contract.

In the proper implementation of contracts, economic incentive will enable us to provide a new solution to the question of broadening the possibility of their one-sided annulment, should the other party become delinquent. Today this is allowed only in cases directly stipulated in the law, which explains the same old administrative methods of planning, for a refusal to sign a contract is considered a refusal of accepting a planned assignment on which it is based.

In our view, the Foundations of Civil Legislation should be expanded with a number of short chapters which would include the main rules governing the types of contracts and obligations considered important and assuming increasing significance (scientific research, design, experimental engineering projects, power and gas supplies and some others). The laws which would include such regulations should be promulgated not on

the departmental level but as laws or resolutions of the USSR Council of Ministers, so that departmental interests would not obtain unfair advantages.

Such laws and resolutions could be comprehensive as well. However, they should be promulgated only in special areas of activities (specific types of transportation, procurements, legal status of individual units within the economic system, etc.) in order to ensure the connection between mandatory regulation and the effect of the commodity-monetary mechanism consistent with the specific features of a given area. Comprehensive laws must stipulate that in terms of their legal nature, civil, administrative-legal, financial or other relations must observe all the regulations applicable to the corresponding legal sector unless different special legislation has been set for the individual cases. This is extremely important in order to ensure legality in the comprehensive regulation of economic activities and management, for this requires the use of a variety of legal mechanisms and the individual relations within the complexes are regulated by various legal sectors.

The stipulations contained in laws and other legal acts which regulate economic activities, are, unfortunately, frequently not supported by actual juridical responsibility. In many such laws, including governmental resolutions, responsibility for the implementation of obligations assigned to organizations and officials is merely proclaimed and become no more than appeals to observe a certain behavior. Yet we know that a law without a machinery which could **mandate** the observance of its norms is worthless (V.I. Lenin).

In order to ensure the real protection of rights, special authorities and procedures which can ensure the practical implementation of legislative stipulations, are needed. Historical experience confirms that the best means of protecting the rights of the participants in economic turnover is a well organized system of justice, equipped with efficient procedural guarantees, which can be enacted on the initiative of the bearers of the rights, who are interested in their implementation and defense. It is precisely such a system that is most consistent with economic and not administrative methods used in managing socialist production. Therefore, the overall reform of the judicial system—broadening the area of its effect and expanding and strengthening legal guarantees for ensuring the legality in its exercise—should, in our view, also encompass the area in which economic arguments are settled.

Today, in addition to the overall unified system of state arbitration authorities, a number of departmental arbitration systems exist, which are subordinate to and under the control of department heads. Departmental arbitration settles arguments between organizations and enterprises under the jurisdiction of a specific administrative authority. In this case the umpires are appointed or replaced by the head of the department, who acts as the final authority in solving a case. Long years of

uninterrupted practice by departmental arbitration authorities have proved their inability to put always and in all cases legality and the rights of individual enterprises above departmental interests.

The need for ensuring the real autonomy of enterprises and preventing violations of their rights in the interest of protecting the well-being of departments as a whole and covering the poor work of some with successes of others and meeting the vital tasks of development of the national economy requires the elimination of departmental and similar arbitration authorities and submitting all cases to the jurisdiction of a single and independent state arbitration system. Its main task, acting as an economic vessel, would be to provide jurisdictional functions and resolve disputes in the national economy and in relations among socialist organizations, similar to court procedures.

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05003

A Letter About Letters

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[Article by A. Aleksandrova, member of the USSR Union of Journalists]

[Text] A large cardboard box crammed with papers stands on my office desk. It was sent by a reader, despairing of a prolonged conflict with an administration. For the time being, however, I shall speak not of the conflict but of the box. Each of the hundreds of envelopes contains the stamped greeting: "Dear comrade! Your letter has been sent..." The signatory's and the organization's names were hand written or typed. These standard messages were being sent to the very same lower organization to which the author himself had turned several times, and if a superior institution was also indicated, as a rule, the complaint was also redirected to the provincial organization. You can imagine how all of these official forms circulated throughout the country in a paper blizzard, transported in the mail bags of trains, airplanes and automobiles, until finally last they were assembled in this "grievance box"... No, in my opinion, it is time to lift the veil of silence on this problem which is tripping even the boldest and sharpest pens.

I will not name the editorial office where I work in the letters department, since the majority of the capital's large periodicals and, to a certain extent, the oblast newspapers are in a similar situation. Once a week, this figure of several thousand letters proudly adorns the first page of the newspaper. What is its subsequent fate? Let us calculate: the correlation of newspaper associates, who write for the "columns," to those who only answer letters, is 5 (including the head and deputy) to 33. And

what is done? The "rate" for correspondents in the "big mail" (i.e., the absolute majority of letters, which are not printed) is maximal: 50 per day.

Following are the data for 100 letters, selected at random and processed by an associate: 38 were forwarded to various central organizations and 28 to local authorities; 2 were set aside as being redundant to an assortment of preceding complaints; answers were sent to the rest, in which the word "unfortunately" was repeated the most frequently. Only three were chosen "for the literary group," and one remark to the newspaper was sent to the secretariat. It should be noted that the department already does the primary selection of responses and letters for publication, so that now it is a question of a secondary selection, "just in case," although the handling capacity of the press is small.

Thus, we can confidently state that this figure, representing the number of letters received by the editors, modestly shows up after a while in its virtually full volume through in the letters department's reports and splits into two flows: the first makes the rounds of the city, and then to the entire country. Incidentally, I should also add that each author is sent a notice as to where his letter was forwarded. Thus, the number of letters sent from the editorial office is somewhat larger than that of those received.

After a certain interval, "dosed" with appropriate instructions, an "echo" is generated, a wave of "results," a rising tide against an already familiar shore. There are approximately as many "results" as there are "control" letters, i.e., letters assigned to the editors for mandatory response. They come close to 200 daily. Here is a sampling of 100 documents: half—"it has been explained to the author," 18—a categorical "the facts have not been confirmed" (including—"the roof has no leaks," "no rudeness was displayed in the hotel," "the complaint has not been verified, but we will soon send the militia to check"—even that!); one reader denied authorship, another declared having written in a fit of rage, one letter turned out to be slanderous, two authors were graphomaniacs, 11 letters were sent by higher to lower authorities, and six contained requests to extend the time for purposes of additional investigation.

Only 30 responding letters made any mention of measures which were taken, and these, as a rule, only in a most general form. However, in these extremely rare cases, as we have seen, there is no certainty that the editors' forwarding of the letters played any particular role. The readers' repeated letters indicate that the "energetic" measures are frequently taken only "for the record."

In general, in working with letters (without publishing them) the efficiency of our efforts is approximately 2 percent! This brings up a legitimate question: can such labor really be considered effective?

The nature of editorial mail on the whole is understood and its significance is difficult to overestimate. The letters—responses, suggestions and thoughts—in many ways help to pose problems more sharply and to consider them more thoroughly, and provide the richest practical data. However, the flow of complaints is also very large.

It is worth considering: why is the number of complaints so much higher compared to the overall number of letters? Evidently, excessive centralization is even affecting "the mind"—people have become accustomed to the fact that any, even strictly personal, problem can only be solved in the capital. The citizens' trust in local authorities has been undermined, and let us be frank about this. That is why, if the streets are poorly marked, if one has quarreled with a neighbor or even with one's own spouse or son, a motorcycle was broken or a pension withheld, Moscow is informed of everything; only Moscow can defend, support and unravel all knots.

And so, the center undertook to unravel all sorts of big and little knots, and even announced this with pride. The idea that "the top knows best" has been painstakingly instilled in our consciousness, and cases of interference "from above" in people's daily lives and the restoration of justice thanks to the actions of higher-placed persons have been extensively publicized. This mentality was built up and artificially maintained over the years.

Let us mention that the bureaucracy, in its intoxication with the omnipotence of command-administrative methods, was nonetheless aware of the need for correction, manifested as the right of citizens to complain to any authority. This should give the system an opportunity for self-correction and the necessary flexibility. In the 1930s, people were punished for so-called collective letters—joint addresses to one authority or another. That is, the plaintiffs had to address himself to the authority alone, with a specific request, and wait patiently for an answer. While the case worked its way through the courts, the heat of passion dissipated and sometimes "as an exception" compromises were even made. In this connection, if the brief period stipulated for considering a statement was kept, the correction could be considered effective (given a certain built-in intricacy of the laws and exceptions to them).

However, typically, as the figure of the "plaintiff" became more widespread, the complaint itself, naturally, became decreasingly "effective," and possibilities of exceptions declined. As a result, the number of petitions addressed to various authorities increased but faith in their positive resolution declined.

From a quarter-century personal experience in working with letters I can say that the tone of repeated addresses to the editors has changed. Whereas previously it remained pleading, the essence of the matter was again reiterated and the author relatively easily agreed to forwarding his letter to the appropriate organization, today the reaction is different. "I did not receive an

answer," writes one person, who encloses a document attesting to the fact that an answer was received. However, it was not a detailed or positive answer—so in the eyes of the author it is as though no answer whatsoever was received. Demands "not to forward this anywhere," "to handle this directly yourselves," and "to send a correspondent without fail" have become far more insistent. The main and, alas, logical result of our refusals is the disillusionment of our readers, who accuse the editors of bureaucratism, callousness, etc. There is gratitude as well, but as to their percentage... the less said the better. Suffice it to cite a typical tirade: "The editorial board and its members can be judged by your answer accordingly. Indeed, I myself could not have hit upon the idea of sending the letter not to your address, but directly to the ispolkom. Why is your opinion of the people so low? The letter has gone on the 'well-traveled bureaucratic rut'—which leads to the person I wrote about, so that the culprit turns out to be the one who wrote, who is actually the victim of red-tape mongers." When one has to read something similar several times daily, one feels more concerned than insulted. How is this?

In fact, having found out what had been happening not all that long ago in the law enforcement agencies, in Uzbekistan or Belorussia for instance, we cannot help but think about the fact that our readers' letters have been forwarded there for many years... Why? In the distant post-revolutionary years, when the population was largely illiterate and did not know where to turn on various matters, such explanations and forwardings (few in comparison with the present number) made some sort of sense. Now, however, just try and find someone in the country who does not know what ispolkoms and prosecutors do, or that legal consultation and libraries exist. The authors of the letters are simply offended by our "explanations," although they are even addressed to each one individually. Furthermore, copies of demands for the allocation of apartments, rescinding a court sentence, or organizing supplies are often sent to editors and "authorities" alike. No single instruction exists on distinguishing between the procedures for examining the statements and complaints by the press and by administrative organizations, although their functions and possibilities differ... Most of the letters concern the activities of law enforcement agencies. Complaints to the effect that thus and such person was wrongly convicted literally give insomnia. The editors may well answer that they "have no right to demand cases files from the courts and to examine them in their essence. If you have a complaint relative to supervision, you should turn to..." etc. We can send the letter to the republic or union prosecutor's offices, which are also flooded with complaints. Understandably, however, this is no solution. It is hoped that such letters will diminish following the upcoming reform of legal proceedings. The reasoning is simple: if a lawyer is allowed to be present during interrogations, complaints of unlawful investigation methods should fall off on their own accord. If they remain this would be an extraordinary occurrence, an exceptional case, and it would be possible to investigate it.

As reflected in the mail, the heating of emotions in labor conflicts is also disturbing. Here, however, as a whole, we should not expect the barometer needle to shift to "clear" in the immediate future. The ukase "On Changes in Labor Legislation" has come out, and a number of unexpected questioning letters have appeared, related to the reduction of rates and ranks, to transferring workers to other jobs, etc., at the administration's discretion. Some authors assert that the "changes" are somewhat superimposed on an ineffective law which persecution for criticism, and sharply narrows the possibilities for self-management in production. Someone has already outlined a simplified scheme for managerial arbitrariness. Simplified schemes in production relations often cause "stress points" to become hot and explosive. Therefore one should recall the well-known truth that the quantity of specific complaints is inversely proportional to how successfully one general problem or another is solved or else remains unsolved.

A simple example: a report was received stating that, regardless of a ban issued twice by the residents' assembly and ratified by the a rayon soviet, the local authorities were continuing to level the only existing park in order to construct an administrative building. We sent the letter to the oblast center for appropriate measures. After all, the executive committee is thus named because it is supposed to execute the decisions of the deputy sessions and the general assembly. It is a matter of improving the settlement, for which the session and the population's rally in such cases are the most competent authorities, the final decision-makers. Why is a directive from above, from the oblast or the capital, still needed? Our practice of sending complaints willy-nilly to the authorities also reproduces the command methods of management every day and every hour.

Officially, we have approximately 8 minutes in which to process a letter. However, suddenly one comes across an entire thick notebook, written in small, illegible handwriting. My colleague at the neighboring desk has a letter, a legal case—in several bound volumes. What can we do? You hold pages on which some person has poured out his soul and you feel like reflecting on it for awhile, "stopping and looking it over." But our function is to answer every letter—both senseless graphomania and shrieks of pain. With the existing "rate" all one can do is give a formal answer; there is no opportunity to become seriously involved with the truly alarming reports.

There is the "average" of 8 minutes, and the 2-week minimum which an on-site correspondent spends on the detailed investigation of a reader's conflict. The results, however, are different. Recently, one newspaper conducted an experiment: a complaint on the beating of a student by a militiaman was sent to the prosecutor and... "the facts were not substantiated." Yet when the editors became involved with the very same letter and went to the site of events, they not only confirmed the facts but also exposed a picture of rayon-wide corruption.

It seems to me that the time is ripe to submit to a broad discussion by the readers the question of whether or not the authors of letters need us to forward the letters to the authorities. We receive answers of the "thank you, but..." type. After all, work time is being wasted on this, hours are building up into years and decades, state funds and tons of paper are being expended, the postal system is being overloaded, etc. Some readers are surprised that we answer their responses to newspaper articles. After all, we could go on exchanging "thank you for your thanks" type letters with each other like this ad infinitum. We have no right not to answer! We are proud of the 100 percent "coverage" of our answers. But is this really anything to be proud of?

The Western press, so far as I know, throws unpublished letters into the wastebasket. This procedure is unacceptable for us. Our press has formed a tradition of extensive ties with its readers. True, at various periods in our social life the spring of the people's opinion now fills to the brim, and now dries up down to a thin trickle. It has also happened that the necessary "reverse communication" with the reader has been disregarded, preferring organized, even falsified "responses" to a true letter. Times have now changed and are forcing journalists to structure their relations with the authors of letters, including those of the so-called complaints, differently.

Sometimes, it is said, it is more effective to send a form letter with the editor's seal on it, than a citizen's simple statement to the organization. This, above all, is an illusion: the huge flow of such forms produces a set, standard counter-movement, and nothing more. The main thing is that, under the new conditions, it is important to fully establish the dignity and rights of each citizen. The power of social opinion and not the pressure of the authority, should become all the more significant.

Unquestionably, the forms of cooperation with readers must be improved. It is splendid that an All-Union Center for the Study of Social Opinion has been established in the country. However, we must also not disregard that segment of public opinion which is reflected in letters. Sociologists should also study this phenomenon. In the editorial offices, surveys are compiled on various topics and by regions, for internal use. They are sometimes published, but usually they settle somewhere on a desk. Why not publish them more often, even if only in the briefest form?

It is particularly useless to disseminate well-known instructions and regulations on work with working people's complaints to the press which, after all, has no administrative-economic power whatsoever. The press is an instrument of glasnost, and the bureaucratic element, built into the organs of glasnost, casts an ambiguous reflection on the printed word itself. The readers' reactions to "formal replies" and to the bureaucratic approach to letters leave no doubts on this account. In

my view, it is better honestly to tell the reader (on our own!) what we can realistically do and what, for the time being, we are not in a position to do.

In his last article, the noted journalist A. Agranovskiy, speaking on the reduction of the management apparatus, compared it to flying: "Anything that is unnecessary is harmful... The machine can be either large or small, but it must be expedient." What is the principle of expediency for the letters department of the press? It is the more extensive reproduction of glasnost and democracy.

Based on the principle of trusting the competence of the editors, in my opinion, we should grant them the right not to answer individual letters even if only as an experiment. Conversely, the reader's rostrum could be broadened and a regular supplement based exclusively on the editorial mail could be printed. It would be possible to sift the wheat from the chaff in the overall flow of letters, and to obtain the investigation of serious complaints and the solution of problems raised by our authors. Different forms of work with the readers would help put the newspaper's functions as a collective organizer into practice. Above all, the reader expects from the editors an open discussion of the problems which trouble him and efficiency, efficiency! For a socially-minded person, it is not all that important whether or not he receives a personal answer in an envelope.

Possibly, released from the torrent of letters which pour down daily out of various editorial offices, the authorities themselves would have greater chances of becoming involved precisely in the problem, and not to become trained in the science of writing "successful responses."

The letters department could in fact become a good school for young journalists, just joining the editorial office. In this connection, not only the five "select" journalists could work usefully on the problems, but the entire 30-odd staff members. We should not train ordinary clerks to serve the department, but raise active fighters for restructuring, who would be taught to be in touch with letter-writers, and to give advice, survey and analyze the state of affairs in a few lines in a small newspaper column. I would like to direct attention to yet another essential point. For the time being, our press is authoritarian in relations with the reader. In the reader's "tribune," the decisive word should belong to the authors of the letters (and why not expand the editorial staff by including those whom we call "chief correspondents?").

We must discuss how to do this in practice. However, in my view, it is impossible to go on working as we do now in the letters department.

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05003

The Key to the Forbidden Kingdom

18020014k Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian
No 8, May 88 (signed to press 17 May 88) pp 107-110

[Article by Yu. Burtin, senior scientific editor, "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" Publishers, member of the USSR Union of Writers]

[Text] Today a great deal is being written about the need for filling the "blank spots" in our history. The idea is unquestionable, but at times somewhat simplistically understood. Just lift, they say, the unnecessary bans (make archives generally accessible, open the special sections of libraries, and so on)—and the "blank spots" will disappear virtually by themselves. Alas, this is far from true. The point is that, to a tremendous extent, that which is not at all secret and never was also remains closed and unknown to us, particularly (the topic of this letter)—Russian literature and social thought of the 19th century and the prerevolutionary period in general.

It is hardly necessary to mention the spiritual riches contained in this area and how vitally necessary they are to our society, especially now, in the present split in its historical path, or how direct and comprehensive their participation could become in the development of contemporary historical, sociological, economic, moral and philosophical thought, in shaping a democratic consciousness, problem-oriented, open to any dialogue and internally free and responsible. However, how can we reach these treasures? They are not beyond access: you can go to the library, order any book, journal or newspaper of the last century, if it is there, and read it—nothing prevents you. However, which of the thousands of books should you pick, in order to find precisely the one you need? The articles (novels, poems) by such authors, which seem as though written specially for you, ready to provide the necessary food for your curious mind, are slumbering, unrequested by anyone. In precisely which newspapers and journals should you look, for what years, in which issues? If you do not know, the rows of catalog drawers appear before you not like a conduit to the past, but more like a guard, defending the entry to this forbidden land. The same is true for the archives: without the exact "address" of the documents of interest to you (the number of the stacks, lists and files, you will fail in unbinding the hundreds of files and leafing through the tens of thousands of illegibly written pages. No life is long enough...

Thus, it turns out that the existence or lack of access to the spiritual wealths of the past is determined to a decisive extent by circumstances not, so to speak, of the first order, but by the quantity and quality of generally accessible referential publications: guides through the archives, general and special bibliographic references, bibliographic dictionaries of writers, scientists, and so on. Yet in this case, it appears, nowhere are matters as deplorable as with this type of literature.

This is an old problem of ours. Its roots go back to the Stalinist era, when the real picture of the past yielded bit by bit to a sort of ideological legend about the past, used to reinforce the present, in particular, supporting it with a respectable historical pedigree. Hence arose this particularly selective approach to our cultural heritage, in which attention is devoted only to the literary classics (plus a small number of "second rate" writers), to a few great scientists and the bearers of the revolutionary tradition and, what is more, selected strictly according to their extent of agreement with the above-mentioned "legend." Understandably, given such an approach to the past, the demand for referential literature was minimal. Although their publication was somewhat increased later, nonetheless even in our time it continues to be provided out in extremely small doses, without any apparent system and, with few exceptions, in the form of separate, uncoordinated booklets. When something truly fundamental is undertaken in this area, it turns out to be very difficult to place it within the framework of current publishing practice.

Those obstacles, which faced the creation of the bibliographic dictionary "*Russkiye Pisateli. 1800-1917*" [Russian Writers, 1800-1917], are indicative in this regard. It is the first part of a multiple-volume series of dictionaries planned by the publishing house "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," covering the entire history of Russian literature from the 11th century to the present (not to be confused with a popular two-volume publication by the same name, also being prepared for release by the "Prosveshcheniye" Press).

Much can be said in favor of this dictionary, the first volume of which (about 800 articles from letters A to G) should come out at the beginning of next year. The fact that approximately two thirds of its articles are devoted to writers of the 19th to early 20th centuries, the facts of the lives and works of whom have never before been collected and studied, already attests to its significance. A relatively detailed encyclopedic article should be dedicated here to each one of them, as well as to the more or less well-known writers, with information mandatory for this type of reference work: the precise dates and place of birth and death, social extraction, education, service and social activities, the first publications of all significant works by the writer (with publication data and critical excerpts), and so forth. All of this, not considering the features of critical literary studies of these same basic works and creativity of the writer on the whole, is the literary background of the era.

The restoration of an entire class of unjustly forgotten names and talented works to active cultural use is already important in and of itself. But there is more to it. For the first time in our entire history, as though implementing S.A. Vengerov's broad-scale idea, a dictionary is being created which not only includes a handful of the selected, greatest literary names, but uplifts all strata of our homeland's humanitarian culture. Not only is a sum of individual writer biographies several times

larger than usual being written but, for the first time, a collective biography of Russian literature and, more broadly, Russian spiritual culture in general, which in the 19th century (and earlier) existed primarily in the form of literature. An opportunity is being created to see a moving panorama of literary development not only in its highest manifestations but in its entirety and real complexity, in the vital unity of its exceptional diversity. However, that is not all. A dictionary, in which all trends of literature and their related courses of social thought are presented without any discrimination whatsoever, in which there is an obvious attempt to present the creativity and views of each of the writers included within it with equal objectivity—be he a revolutionary or a conservative, a pro-Westerner or a Slavophile, a militant atheist, an adept of any particular religious heterodoxy or a defender of the Orthodox Church—such a dictionary, I believe, cannot help but have a serious influence on our present-day spiritual situation. In the face of this gigantic *whole*, which displays Russian literature of the 19th century, the promotion of any narrow-group cultural bias—in names, works or ideas—should be greatly depreciated. Will not the Dictionary of Russian Writers help teach us at last to value *diversity*, to see the grains of truth and humanity, even in the militantly opposed literary phenomena of those days and the social thought inherent in them?

There is yet another, and not simply technological, feature. It is clear that in the overwhelming majority of cases it is simply impossible to write an article for such a publication without researching a broad range of primary sources, both printed and filed. For the first time in encyclopedic practice, hundreds and thousands of articles are passing through both central and oblast literary and general historical archives. Thanks to this, just as many elaborations and supplements are being made, even about some relatively well-studied personalities! As a result, literary criticism not only acquires a solid historical base in the form of a fundamental national dictionary of writers (moreover, for the first time, although in many other countries such dictionaries have existed for a long time), but a kind of general cultural "information bank" is also created, which can be extensively utilized both for the study of local history as well as the history of Russian social thought, the history of journalism, the history of the revolutionary movement...

In a word, the work is, to say the least, valuable, one of those works which is undertaken perhaps once in a century and, in general, *only once*, for it can change critical literary interpretations and evaluations, and nobody will have to rediscover the facts which are gathered here (and the sources of these facts themselves).

Nevertheless, here is reality: right now there is no one in our country to compile such a dictionary. Not in the sense of people, but of institutions. It seems that it would suffice for Pushkin's House (the USSR AS Institute of Russian Literature) in Leningrad to undertake this task,

the more so since its own manuscripts department contains a significant share of the most important archival sources for Russian literature of the 19th-20th centuries. However, the institute has in the past tried to push this cup away from itself, for understandable reasons: academic institutions are sluggish, their activities are poorly oriented toward the "final product," and it is senseless to force their doctors and candidates of science, specialists on Turgenev or Chekhov, to gather bits of information about some little-known authors, to sit for this purpose in Leningrad, Moscow or, for all one knows, oblast archives, in order to compile an article 2-3 typed pages long as the result of many weeks work. Who else is there? Although occasionally our largest libraries undertake such fundamental publications, these are purely bibliographic projects. Therefore the only one left is "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," which has a number of obvious advantages in this sense: both a mastery of the genre, experience in "packing" comprehensive bibliographic information into brief encyclopedic frameworks, as well as skill in creating mobile authors' collectives, as large as necessary, and a well-suited "factory" organization of production. However, even for this publishing house, which, as opposed to many others, itself orders and prints the books it produces, the above-mentioned work turns out to be excessively difficult. The reasons are completely understandable.

A typical encyclopedic article is almost always a second-hand work and a compilation, for an encyclopedia is a collection of information already extracted and more or less verified by science. Everything is adapted precisely to this nature of the material: the pace of the editorial-publishing process, the rates for author's royalties, the editors' output rates, etc. Yet here, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the material is being gathered and interpreted for the first time and almost every article is a piece of original research. Moreover, as a rule, it is being carried out collectively, with the unprecedentedly extensive and untraditional participation of editors, scientific consultants (primarily associates of that very same Pushkin's House), bibliographers and archivists in this work. It is entirely natural that the alien nature of the dictionary became evident to the publishers rather rapidly: its inability either to be written in forms accepted in publishing or to be released from them, for an period of time and only partially, with the help of any sort of palliative measures, and overwhelming organizational and financial difficulties. The result is a deceleration in the work and a sharp drop in the enthusiasm of the editors and authors, whose labor will not receive any adequate compensation for years.

Many of these difficulties could increase under the conditions of cost-accounting (for the next few years at the very least, while the book market remains unbalanced).

Where is the solution?

The solution, not only for the sake of compiling this dictionary quickly and without loss of quality, would be

to create a special scientific-publishing center, able to systematically publish reference-bibliographic works and source studies on a broad range of questions of national history and culture. Such a center, incorporating the functions of both a scientific research institution and a publishing house, would ensure the inventory (and thus the preservation and utilization as well) of our national cultural wealth and could be established, for instance, under the Soviet Culture Fund.

This, so to speak, is the maximum program. As a first step, not requiring large initial expenditures, it would be possible to set up an autonomous scientific-publishing group controlled by the publishers of "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," which would be assigned the compilation of the Dictionary of Russian Writers. It would have its own budget and the possibility of concluding contracts for various types of work related to compiling the dictionary, based not on the final amount of text but on actual labor expenditures. It would have the right to temporarily employ additional editors, which would make it possible to prepare all volumes of the publication simultaneously. In this connection, if the group is provided with paper and granted some freedom in publishing maneuvers, its activity could become not only self-supporting but also highly profitable for the publishing house and the government. After all, in addition to the dictionary (not to its detriment, but conversely, in support of it) the same group could simultaneously produce a number of reference works on Russian literature and journalism of the 19th-20th centuries which would enjoy demand and require little labor, such as for example, tables of contents from the most important literary and social journals. Even the dictionary itself could be published as two parallel publications: first in the form of small books (for instance, on individual periods of literary development—"The Writers of Pushkin's Day," "Writers of the 1860s," etc.) which, after being "broken in" by literary and scientific critics, would be combined after the necessary revision into the fundamental volumes of the basic publication.

Other solutions are probably also possible. Only one is impossible: to put down our hands and wait, to see if the Dictionary of Russian Writers, this truly nationally significant work, either sinks or swims on its own. Perhaps, it was possible to even begin this work only by acting regardless of any difficulties and obstacles, not stipulating earlier favorable conditions for oneself or waiting for science to prepare the necessary bibliographic, source study and theoretical base, etc.—only thus, through the selfless labor of a few enthusiasts, the more so under the past conditions of stagnation, otherwise it would probably take yet 100 years. However, today, when the first volume is already ready and has proven its feasibility in principle, it now has the right to rely on the firm hand of state and societal support.

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05003

Playing at Dialectics

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No 8, May 88 (signed to press 17 May 88) pp 110-112

[Letter to the editors by N. Petrakov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, and B. Rakitskiy, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] The social sciences must become the foundations of socialist democratization and the radical reform in economic management. In science as well, however, a radical restructuring is needed. It is taking place in the course of a sharp struggle against conservatism. Naturally, dogmatism and scholasticism may change their forms without, however, changing their substance, which is their alienation from real problems in life.

Usually, scholastic publications are ignored by the specialists and, as a rule, trigger to discussions, for scholasticism does not predispose for a serious exchange of views. That is what makes noteworthy the praising of a dogmatic and clearly antirestructuring work (M.V. Popov, "*Planomernoye Razresheniye Protivorechiy Razvitiya Sotsializma kak Pervoy Fazы Kommunistizma*") [Systematic Solution of Contradictions in the Development of Socialism as the First Phase of Communism]. Leningrad University Press, Leningrad, 1986, 157 pp). We read in NASH SOVREMENNİK (No 12, 1987, p 160) that the author "has made a detailed study of the advantages of socialism and brought to light contradictions as a source of our development. What makes this book particularly valuable is that the author discusses the problem in an area where philosophy and political economy intersect." PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO (No 12, 1987, p 118) rates the book as a substantial contribution to the study of the process of solving contradictions in socialism, contributing to the advancement of the theory and practice of the planned development of socialism. As we can see, the book is being promoted, which makes it necessary for us to consider the ideas it contains.

This is a monograph on the contradictions within socialism and their systematic resolution. Few problems offer such opportunities for coming closer to reality and rejecting obsolescence in science. Alas, this opportunity was lost. Furthermore, the old and dogmatic way of thinking conflicts in this book with the ideology of perestroika. This makes the analysis of Popov's work methodologically and practically instructive, for stereotypes of deformed concepts of socialism are by no means inherent in that book alone.

Above all, what is the author's concept of socialism? The general formulation that "socialism is the first phase of communism" triggers no objections. Developing this concept, however, he essentially denies the qualitative specificity of socialism as a socioeconomic system. He absolutizes the fact that historically socialism stands between capitalism and full communism to the utmost extent. He tries to depict the discussion of the qualitative

determination of socialism as an effort to pit socialism against full communism and to deprive it of its humanistic (communist) trend. How can we help someone who conceives of everything so metaphysically that he interprets any indication of the qualitative features of the first phase of communism as the opposition to full communism? By advising him to master the dialectical method.

It is true that such efforts have been made. "In as much as communism," Popov writes, "contains a negation of itself as its feature, the conclusion is possible that said negative aspect is that same communism but considered from the angle of its negation, i.e., communism in its negative manifestation which it acquires as a result of having come out of capitalism" (pp 13-14). Such "dialectical" exercises lead the author to absolutize the transitional nature of socialism and to a denial of any "specific socialism nature" (p 14). This means that the essence is inherent in communism as a whole and that its first phase has no qualitative specifics. Yet any successful practical action is as impossible without understanding the linkage, the unity between the phases of communism as it is without determining the features of socialism as a system of social relations. For many long years the underestimating of these features was the basis for "whipping up," for refusing to consider the real possibilities and led to the deformation of socialism and deviations toward "barracks communism."

The author repeatedly reiterates the formula of the universal contradiction in socialism. Here is one of its variants (p 43): "The contradiction between the direct social nature of socialist production and the commodity factor concretizes the contradiction between the communist nature of socialism and its internal negation." Apparently, in this case the extremely schematized presentation of discussions structured on the basis of the simplistic case of "pro-commodity versus anti-commodity" continues to prevail. After the April Plenum, However, and after the 27th Congress to reduce the basic problems of the country to such a system means totally to ignore the course of democratization and perestroika as the social renovation of society. Both the congress and the subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums clearly stipulated that it was time to get rid of the prejudice about commodity-monetary relations and their underestimating in planned economic management, and to restore democratic centralism and eliminate command-administrative management methods.

However, no place has been assigned in this book for the problems of restoring democratic centralism. The author has reduced perestroika to a struggle between "the centralized planning principle" and the principle of spontaneous development (meaning the commodity factor) (see pp 107 and others). Any decentralization of functions is considered a boosting of spontaneous development and weakening of the planning principle. The

author stigmatizes "efforts to give priority not to natural-physical indicators and procurement assignments but value indicators; totally to exclude volume indicators and convert the plan into a sum, a combination of economic contracts" (p 106) and appeals "to replace the planned allocation of means of production with wholesale trade in such means" (ibid.).

The present task is to manage through interest, i.e., not to ignore the real interests of the participants in public production but organically to combine the two, to guide individual and collective labor activity toward the public good. "That which is advantageous to society must be advantageous to the enterprise." This is a simple and clear principle. The fact that we were unable properly to apply it in the 1960s did not make it reflect any less accurately the nature of cost accounting incentive. Popov writes something similar: "That which is advantageous to society is advantageous to each collective and every worker. This is the foundation of the unity of interests under socialism" (pp 48-49). But pay attention: the concept of "should" is no longer present. All must be unconditionally, mandatorily advantageous. This reminds us of the ideas of monolithic unity, total coincidence and consistency, etc. The question of stimulation, interest and voluntary approach to labor is dropped.

The choice, according to Popov, is predetermined once and for all not only in principle but in each specific situation also. Repeated references are made concerning the social interests, although no substantive description of this category is provided. The author considers sufficient two expressions in depicting the attitude of the working person toward the public interest: "priority" and "at the base." Whenever we come across this "at the base" we feel like asking what does this mean? Instead of explaining it, the author uses this expression as a mystical incantation.

If we were to believe Popov, socialism is a strange society. According to that author, people either put the social interest "at the base" and watch over it (in which case they are entirely fine fellows), or else they have become contaminated by the petit-bourgeois spirit, and although they may not be exploiting someone else's labor or steal, put at the base not the general good of all working people but the desire to increase their own possessions" (p 66). It is an either-or proposition. There neither is nor could there be any middle ground. You are either for the future or for the past. You cannot be for the present, for it can not be qualified. "Putting not the social but other interests at the base of progress leads to petit-bourgeois deviations from socialism" (p 68). Popov does not include in his interpretations putting at the base the social interest but not as an icon or a command, but as a realized need, as a moral, creative and material incentive which enhances the interest of man in labor and his social and labor activeness. "Weakening the priority of the public interest intensifies the commodity factor" (p 48). To the author "commodity factor" is

equivalent to a petit-bourgeois system. Socialism is "a society of conscientious working people, who jointly and systematically use their combined manpower in the interest of the entire society" (p 81).

It is precisely this definition that, in our view, expresses the essence of the views on socialism as presented by the author. They have a precise scientific description, which is barracks communism. Under the conditions of such socialism, there is a constant struggle against the commodity and petit-bourgeois trends which must be "defeated, suppressed and restricted." Unfortunately, under such circumstances it is impossible to be interested in the work and voluntarily to display initiative and activeness and be free. Actually, communism (and socialism) are contrasted with capitalism not along the "straight societal-commodity" but the "freedom (voluntariness)-coercion" line. Since Popov's "socialism" is ruled by coercion it neither does nor could lead to communism.

Numerous passages in the book confirm that its author is insufficiently familiar with life, as well as his aspiration to discuss confidently things about which he knows little. For example, starting with page 123 he speaks in favor of making extensive use of the instrument of systematic price reductions. Abstractly, it is unquestionable that the growth of labor productivity can be expressed through a price reduction (although not necessarily in that way only). However, this suggestion should be correlated with an assessment of the material and financial balancing of the contemporary Soviet economy. The author fails to do this and his suggestion concerning price reductions merely proves the low level of his competence.

Here is another example. All positive trends are explained in the book as being the result of increased planning, and all negative ones as the outcome of greater orientation toward the market. Although one becomes somewhat accustomed to this author's system, one is nevertheless amazed when all of a sudden the increased output of millions of nominal product containers is interpreted as increased commodity orientation (see p 39). This, furthermore, is written by a supporter of the prevalence of physical indicators.

Finally, the following: "In answer to the question of whether a 10 percent annual growth of labor productivity is possible," Popov writes, "the answer is an unequivocal yes. Any other answer would indicate a refusal to acknowledge that socialism enjoys radical advantages in the development of production forces. If in capitalist Japan labor productivity is growing by 7-9 percent annually, it would be a clear neglect of the laws of social development to believe that higher growth rates would be inaccessible to a socialist country (p 90). How could such clear "proof" be refuted?

To sum it up. "This monograph," we read in the preface, "is an effort, as we consider the dynamics of socialism from the positions of dialectical materialism, to expose the contradictions within the advance from incomplete to complete communism..." (p 3). Alas, this effort has patently failed, mainly for the lack of a dialectical-materialistic viewpoint on the part of the author. Such a viewpoint presumes the summation of real practical experience and taking a broad view on the economy and the society. Instead, a pseudodialectical system and views on the Soviet economy alienated from life are being drilled into the readers' heads, involving, furthermore, the concepts of "commodity" and anti-commodity" factors.

Let us thank the press and the editorial and publishing council of Leningrad state University and the four scientific reviewers for helping the author in the publication of this monograph, for without them one could have naively assumed that groundless "theorizing," dogmatism and scholastic contrivances have become things of the past. It appears that they have not. Once again we are reminded of the major inertial force of conservatism in the science of economics.

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Transformation of Poland's Political System

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[Article prepared especially for KOMMUNIST by the journal NOWE DROGI, theoretical and political organ of the PZPR Central Committee]

[Text] At the beginning of the 1980s the PZPR adopted a program for socialist renovation. It was based on the belief that the previous ways and means of leadership used in building socialism had outlived their usefulness and were restraining the efficient utilization of the possibilities of Polish society.

The rich and somewhat bitter experience gained in building socialism in our country, particularly the lessons of the hard 1980s, the present course of the CPSU and the experience of other parties unquestionably confirm that socialism, if it is to develop, should be restructured. Reforms, however, are not programmed in the historical process. It is the party of the working class that must become the conscious initiator and promoter of such reforms, based on specific conditions.

Our party has repeatedly been late in making pressing decisions, although it is precisely within its ranks that an awareness of the urgency of change arose. It was only the

open protest of the workers against the negative consequences of such delays that urged it to take practical actions. Today, remembering this, it tries to be on the level of historical requirements.

Political and socioeconomic changes are closely interwoven within the framework of socialist renovation. The roots of democracy will not reach a sufficient depth without profound changes in production relations. Furthermore, the democratization of the political system calls for further economic change. The economic reform requires strong political impetus.

In the past few years the Polish economy was literally pulled out of a state of profound crisis. The economic reform is being implemented under the difficult circumstances of imbalance between supply and demand. Nonetheless, the process of democratization and improvement of the political system is continuing. The scale of change in this area is significantly broader and deeper than could be expected. We do not exaggerate in the least by claiming that revolutionary changes are taking place in the means of exercising the power, aimed at developing a new state model. We wish to replace the excessively centralized state system, which unifies and regulates civic activeness, with a state based on partnership and social participation, a state which would give preference to indirect methods of influence or, in short, a state which, while releasing social energy, will contribute to the accelerated development of the country. Today the entire structure of the exercise of power is analyzed from the viewpoint of strengthening that which inspires energy and inventiveness, strengthens social relations and broadens political freedoms.

The purpose of the economic and governmental reform in Poland is to ensure the essential expansion of horizontal social relations. One of the principal weaknesses of state-bureaucratic socialism was, above all, the fact that social relations were established almost exclusively on a vertical basis. They were determined by administrative acts and provided petty supervision over made by economic, state and party authorities. Until recently, horizontal integrating relations were an insignificant element in the sum total of regulators of social life. If their organization within the gminas or provinces or between them was allowed, this did not include the freedom of handling the funds necessary to this effect.

The reforms under way must ensure the possibility of establishing independent contacts and achieving agreements not only between establishments and enterprises but also between sociopolitical organizations operating within various economic, social or administrative units.

The previous state-bureaucratic model of socialism was aimed at ensuring the maximal politicizing of society, achieving an essential uniformity and mobilizing the available forces. The principle of participation in social life was conceived as the implementation of assignments formulated by the center and regulated with the help of

detailed directives and stipulations issued by superior authorities. As a result, no difference was made between a political and a civil society.

Currently phenomena which could be described with the overall concept of a civil society are rapidly developing in Polish social life. Phenomena pertaining to the concept of the political (governmental) society are being restricted and, to a certain extent, even eliminated. This process was triggered by the initiated economic and governmental reforms. It is a question for Polish society to be a society of people participating in discussing and publicly solving problems, a society which can successfully eliminate the passive social stance held by individuals, groups and collectives.

The development of self-government must become the core of further democratization in Poland. The only way to achieve this is through the profound "socialization" of the process of exercising the power, and strengthening socialist democracy and the feeling of independence of the working people. Self-government should be considered not simply a temporary answer to vital needs. It is above all a historical law governing the building of socialism.

Poland has already gained substantial experience in the area of social self-government—worker and territorial in particular—which will be used as a starting point for its further development. Our party believes that conditions are now available for the local authorities of gminas and cities to be entirely based on self-administration. The people's councils of this basic and primary unit must become authorities of territorial self-government, with juridical and civil rights, answerable to the state authorities for observing existing laws and to the population for the socioeconomic results of the administration of a city or gmina.

The self-governing city and gmina authorities must be given financial autonomy based on possession of communal property and economic and fiscal functions. Under the new circumstances, they can assume greater responsibility for efficient economic management and for upgrading the living standards, maintaining peace and order in the city and gmina, solving contradictions and conflicts and ensuring the efficient work of administrative and consumer services and the proper utilization of the social infrastructure. At the same time this would free the superior governmental authorities from the need to solve individual problems and enable them to concentrate on problems of a strategic nature, going beyond strictly territorial limits.

Changes must be made also in the current procedure of elections to people's councils on all levels. The principle of full freedom in the choice of candidates, the right to nominate candidates for deputies at electoral meetings and the elimination of any preferences must be applied.

The various mechanisms within the political system could contribute to the release of social energy. However, we must not forget the spontaneous sources of such energy. For many years any initiative from below was simply suppressed. Anything which could be developed in a gmina, school, house of culture, microrayon or plant without official approval, was considered suspect and illegal. Matters went so far that the spontaneous organization of the management of a housing cooperative was considered as just about antigovernmental activity.

The attitude toward such manifestations of social active-ness must be changed radically. The initiative of the most enterprising people is still being restricted by the excessive number of instructions and orders. We must streamline legal regulations and provide independent activities with broader opportunities outside the official structures of governmental bureaucracy.

A number of social organizations exist in Poland. However, changes in their structure and functions are not always in step with the times and the new requirements. These are the reasons for the tremendous popularity and fast expansion, for example, of the recently appeared ecological or consumer movements. One should not fear this. Let nothing hinder the establishment of new social organizations if their objectives do not violate the constitution.

While developing the self-government and system of social organizations, we are also trying to change the area and methods of work of state authorities, so that they may become more efficient; we must focus the efforts of the central departments on strategic problems and eliminate bureaucratic obstructions.

We shall not defeat bureaucracy merely by criticizing unconscientious officials. The very grounds for bureaucracy must be removed. The source of its strength lies in the excessively expanded functions of the state apparatus, the result of which is an abundance of regulations, red tape, enhancing executive overrepresented authorities and over various forms of self-government, tendency to centralize decision-making and erosion of the personal responsibility of officials.

The need to implement the new concept of the structure and functions of the center for the administration of the state and the economy has become pressing. In this area reform is manifested in reducing the number of ministries and central institutions but, above all, changing and curtailing their functions. They must become conduits of national rather than local or departmental interests. The changes are based on eliminating the rule according to which the minister is the one who sets up the majority of enterprises. The transfer of constituent functions to banks, various local state administrative units and territorial self-government will contribute to the division

between central and local planning and executive authorities and will help the center to concentrate on providing overall management (the formulation and implementation of strategic objectives).

Although no one has voiced any objection to the radical restructuring of the central authorities, practical experience has indicated that it has a number of opponents, some of whom influential. Conservatives and opponents of the reform have realized that it is unnecessary to fight at all cost the various daring formulations included in the programs and that it suffices to distort the nature and to hinder and block the actual renovation processes. They can do this quite skillfully.

One of the main functions of the political system in Poland is to create conditions which would guarantee the rights, honor and dignity of man. The achievements of the Polish People's Republic in this area are the right to work, recreation and education, environmental protection and participation in cultural life, which give the people social protection and confidence in the future. However, we do not consider human rights under socialism as frozen on a given level. We must constantly meet the growing social and individual needs, particularly important among which are the civic feeling of the person as the subject of political life, human dignity, social justice and political democracy.

Efforts to use the broadening democratic freedoms for antigovernmental purposes have been and will continue to be made. Realizing the inevitability of this, nonetheless in no case should we obstruct the process of increasing rights and freedoms under socialism.

The question is frequently asked how, in practical terms, under the new circumstances, does the PZPR intend to exercise its leading role in the state? How does it intend to share its power with its allies? These questions are not rhetorical in the least and the answers to them reveal the nature of the political line of the Ninth and 10th PZPR Congresses.

The actual single-party rule model underwent serious changes between 1980 and 1982. Since then a democratic model of power has been gradually developed, the purpose of which is the rejection of administrative methods, replacing them with political ones, pursuing a more flexible cadre policy, nominating several candidates for leading positions, increasing the responsibility of party members to party committees for the implementation of party policy and engaging in explanatory work in governmental and social agencies. The forms of indirect party influence on the process of governmental decision-making are becoming predominant.

This model is only beginning to crystallize and for the time being it is more a theoretical postulate than a reality. It is based neither on tradition nor on any

somewhat significant experience. However, it is a fact that the party is seriously abandoning the exercise of direct control over all areas and forms of social life.

Studies have indicated that the majority of party members support the so-called mandate-issuing party model. They limit their activeness to electing party authorities and determining the area of their activities. The political activeness of the party members had been reduced to naught in work with nonparty members and outside the workplace (which is the result of the crisis we experienced). This questions the expediency of preserving the mass nature of the party on its present high level, particularly if we take into consideration the totally passive attitude of some PZPR members and many primary party organizations.

On the outside, the party continues to act as a monolithic organization. Internally, however, it is heterogeneous from the socioprofessional and ideological viewpoints (within the Marxist framework), bearing in mind the role which the party members play in society. Hence the differences existing in their interests, views and assessments. This was specifically indicated by the results of the studies which were published after the 16th PZPR Central Committee Plenum (1984).

For example, the television viewer can frequently say that the majority of participants in a given sociojournalistic program are, unquestionably, members of the same party. Despite this, however, they express different views and opinions. Officially, the party does not consider differences an inseparable element of the decision-making process. Yet the making of decisions by the majority is accompanied by clashes between two or three groups of views. These facts must be considered manifestations of intraparty democracy, which is a necessary prerequisite for democracy in a country, and of the social trust in the party.

The totality of the reforms, whether under way or planned, clearly proves that the previous methods of party activities conflict with its objectives. This requires the substitution of political for administrative management. However, this does not mean that our ideology changes radically, for the Leninist foundations of the approach to reforms are unquestionable. Unfortunately, so far this approach has never been properly applied for a number of reasons, including the real dangers which threatened the new system.

The circumstances have substantially changed now and require new forms of organization. Let us draw the attention to no more than two elements suitable for use in structuring the new form of party activities. The first is related to the attitude toward allied parties and the institutional guarantee of the leading role of the PZPR. Conditions already exist for a broader democracy, for strengthening within it the positions of the allied forces. However, the agreement of society will be necessary for adopting the rules governing the interaction among

individual political forces and a clear definition of the areas in which the actions of such forces are coordinated, as well as the areas of relatively free competition among them.

Let us illustrate this with an example. Today there are party quotas in assigning positions to heads of gminas and cities and chairmen of people's councils. This situation triggers a number of problems and nondemocratic restrictions on those levels. Occasionally it is impossible to find a worthy candidate for the position of head of a gmina, for it is part of the quota allocated to the United Peasant Party, which may not have a suitable candidate. Such problems arise within the PZPR as well. As a result, unsuitable people are frequently nominated, the only argument in favor of them being their affiliation with one party or another. The same situation exists in electing chairmen of primary councils. The PZPR Central Committee Organizational-Political Department has statistical figures indicating how frequently deputies have violated representation quotas set on the provincial level. No less than 10 such examples may be cited on the basis of individual studies conducted in two provinces.

In the majority of cases the principle of quotas is implemented successfully. However, it is frequently accompanied by major disappointments in the deputies and by substantial political costs. This level should be left open for free competition among allied forces. As practical experience has indicated, secretaries of local PZPR organizations can perfectly well organize free elections and quickly acquire the corresponding skills (being the only professional politicians in the gmina). It would be more difficult to apply this approach on the governmental level. However, here as well something could be done to broaden the competitive area. This would demand of the PZPR aktiv and membership greater daily political efforts and rallying supporters for the implementation of specific ideas or supporting specific individuals. The party apparatus itself must provide the type of conditions in which replacing painstaking work with the people with orders issued by telephone would become impossible.

The second element of a possible new reform in party leadership is related to the principle of party democratic centralism. What happens in practice is that there is more centralism than democracy, although the proportions may differ. The very principle of democratic centralism will be retained. However, various solutions should be provided which would increase democracy within the party. One such solution could be drafting program platforms within the party during pre-congress electoral campaigns. Similar experience exists in the history of the CPSU (to a certain extent, naturally, an example of this could be the discussion held at the 10th RKP(b) Congress). Possibly, in our circumstances, making party discussions public would offer such a solution. This would concretize viewpoints, increase responsibility for adopted concepts, revive party life and shape a

new type of party cadre politicians rather than bureaucrats. We are already facing manifestations of a variety of pluralism within the party. The political line followed by the weeklies *POLITIKA* and *SPRAWY I LYUDZE*, the newspaper *TRIBUNA LUDE* and the journal *NOWE DROGI* varies somewhat. The appearance of such differences should be secured and not merely tolerated for a while. The principles of unity of action and inadmissibility of factional activities, however, should remain inviolable.

The journal *NOWE DROGI*, the theoretical and political organ of the PZPR Central Committee, plays an essential role in discussions on the topic of democratization of the political system. Of late it has dealt extensively with problems of the exercise of the guiding and leading role of the party, particularly that of the place of the PZPR within the system of socialist democracy.

The periodical sponsored a debate on "socialist pluralism." It helped to put in political circulation this concept and, at the same time, proved the essential differences existing between socialist pluralism and political pluralism in bourgeois countries, identified with the "free play of political forces." The essence of socialist pluralism, understood as unity within variety, includes the manifestation and combination of different interests, united on the basis of a dialogue in such a way as to convert into a motive force of development. Polish society consists of people with different world outlooks, political views and value concepts. Socialist pluralism is a platform on which citizens who may have different ideas agree on the most important national values, thus serving the intensified integration of society rather than the strengthening of existing differences.

Another important problem discussed in the party journal was that of the method of exercising power through coalition. In Poland the leading and guiding role of the PZPR is exercised under conditions of close interaction between the Communist Party and two allies: the United Peasant (OKP) and the Democratic (DP) Parties. This cooperation is a firm element of the Polish political system. Although in the 43 years of existence of people's Poland all sorts of events have occurred in the practice of interparty relations, the PZPR has never abandoned this principle. A new stage in the development of interparty relations began after 1981. The importance of the OKP and DP increased and now we can speak of a truly allied-partnership relationship among the parties. The new situation reflects the popularization of the term "coalition method for the exercise of power" which became popular at that time. It grants any party the right to have its own program and submit its suggestions for the solution of a variety of problems, as well as the right to reciprocal criticism which serves the strengthening and development of socialism.

By the end of 1987 a very democratic and original sociopolitical debate took place in the form of a referendum on the second stage of the reform. This was an act

of direct democracy on the broadest possible nationwide scale, unprecedented in more than 40 years of practical experience, and worthy of total trust. The course and results are known. They have been subjected to comprehensive evaluations and comments.

The people's vote performed its important function. It proved that nearly one-half of all Polish adult citizens supported further intensive economic and political change. It also revealed a wide range of fluctuations, fear of the new, exacerbation in connection with sensitive social ills, poor work, manifestations of disorder and influence in various social areas which, unquestionably, influenced the attitude toward national problems. Today we are significantly better informed of the moods, of what is accepted by the broad public circles and what concerns them.

However, the results of the referendum did not become mandatory, unilaterally final scenarios and deadlines for political and economic change. This was due, in particular, to the fact that our law on the referendum is unlike similar laws in other countries. Its requirements are significantly stricter. In order to make a definitive decision we need the agreement of the majority of the electorate and not only of those who cast their ballot.

The study of the preparations for and holding of the referendum allow us to draw a number of essential conclusions. First, in the course of the referendum no one formulated a real alternative to the new stage in the reform. For that reason the reform will be energetically pursued in the already established area. Second, the scale of fluctuations and fears make it necessary correspondingly to correct the scale and pace of the implementation of decisions without changing their nature or internal interconnection. Third, the party, on whose initiative the drafting of the new form of socialist renovation appeared, taking into consideration the complexity of the sociopsychological atmosphere, must implement more energetically and efficiently the changes, to which there is no alternative.

The decisions have been made. However, as a rule, the path from plan to results, and from a concept to its implementation is, as a rule, difficult, twisty and full of contradictions. Unfortunately, we have few examples of successful implementation of intentions. "The history of each nation," Wojciech Jaruzelski said at the Sixth PZPR Central Committee Plenum (November-December 1987), "consists not only of accomplishments but also of defeats, implemented projects and projects abandoned halfway. Many such have existed in our past. Hence, probably, the bitter saying about the notorious Polish 'straw fire.' Today's generation of Poles have assumed the special obligation of developing a Polish school of firmness, consistency and carrying projects to their end."

It is very important today for this school to work at full capacity during the second and decisive stage in the economic reform, the democratic reorganization of the political system and the process of national harmony. Otherwise our daring and far-reaching plans, which are quite difficult in terms of their nature and their sociopsychological and personality dimensions, will not turn into significant results. Whether they will be justified or not and the results which they will yield will depend on the people and on the level of the organization of their work and life.

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**Peace and Security for the Asian-Pacific Region;
Roundtable Meeting of the Journals
KOMMUNIST and KULLOJA**

18020014 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian

No 8, May 88 (signed to press 17 May 88) pp 120-126

[Text] History has assigned the Asian-Pacific region (APR) exceptional importance in the development of international relations. This area accounts for over 50 percent of the global industrial output and nearly one third of world trade. It is inhabited by two thirds of the earth's population. All of this makes us recall the words of the founders of scientific communism, who wrote more than a century ago that the life of mankind will concentrate around the Pacific Ocean and that it will "play the same role which is played now by the Atlantic Ocean and, in antiquity and the Middle Ages, the Mediterranean..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 7, p 233).

Many confused tangles of contradictions exist in this vast area in which the interests of dozens of countries are intertwined. The roundtable meeting between KOMMUNIST and KULLOJA, respectively the theoretical and political journals of the CPSU Central Committee and the Korean Labor Party, involved a discussion on the search for ways of building Asian-Pacific security and determining the leading trend which could contribute to solving painful and seemingly insoluble problems facing the peoples of the APR, particularly those affecting the Korean Peninsula. The meeting, which was held in Moscow, was attended also by Soviet scientists specializing in Asian-Pacific problems.

Journal associates G. Cherneyko and Ye. Shashkov prepared the following report on the proceedings of the roundtable meeting.

Platform for Joint Action

More than ever before in world history, today international relations demand a new type of political thinking, rejecting the old simple rule that if you maintain relations with someone this must inevitably be to his detriment. Contemporary reality dictates a different morality, different laws, which convincingly prove that today

one cannot build a long-term policy at the expense of someone else; one must seek a balance of interests not directed against anyone but together with everyone, for the sake of everyone's well being. Briefly, this was the theme of the statements made by the roundtable participants.

In the case of the APR this means that peace and stability in the region must be maintained by the Asian countries themselves through their joint efforts and in accordance with the interests of all the nations in the area. It was precisely this principle that was noted by N. Kapitsa, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies, chairman of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries and USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member. It is a fundamental principle in the Asian-Pacific area of Soviet foreign policy and a structural component of the general platform for CPSU International activities, as developed at the April Plenum and the 27th Party Congress. The speaker emphasized that the Soviet concept of Asian security was further developed and concretized in M.S. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech and his speeches during his friendly state visit to India and in answers to the questions asked by MERDEKA, the Indonesian newspaper. The USSR suggested an extended program for action: settling regional conflicts, blocking the proliferation and growth of nuclear weapons in that part of the world, limiting the activeness of the navies and, in general, military presence in the Pacific and Indian Ocean basins, radically reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Asia and discussing measures of confidence and non-use of force in the region.

The essence of the Soviet initiatives is to take into consideration and put to practical use the views and interests of all countries in the APR. The USSR is not imposing on others any kind of prearranged system for general Asian security but merely appeals to all countries, big and small, to engage in the joint formulation of a mutually acceptable concept.

Why has this become necessary and does the global community need such a concept?

The participants in the roundtable meeting considered this question as almost rhetorical, for the world is indivisible and integral. A fuse lit anywhere on earth could bring about an explosion which would crack up the entire planet. For better or for worse, a process of dialogue, and of talks and agreements is operating in Europe. This introduces a certain stability and reduces the likelihood of armed conflicts. This process is virtually absent in the Asian-Pacific region. And if nonetheless something is changing, unfortunately, as noted Lee Chon-nam, deputy editor in chief of KULLOJA, it is taking place extremely slowly. Increasingly, the Pacific Ocean is becoming the arena of military-political confrontations. In slightly over 40 years since World War II,

there have been altogether no more than a few years during which the flames of a military confrontation have not burst out in one part of the APR or another.

As a socialist country which is in direct confrontation with the aggressive forces of imperialism in the APR, the KPDR is exposed to the greatest extent to the threat of aggression, Lee Chon Nam emphasized. That is why the republic's working people are particularly interested in peace. In his "Accountability Report of the Korean Labor Party Central Committee to the 6th Party Congress," and his works "For Strengthening and Development of the Nonaligned Movement," "Preventing War and Preserving Peace is the Topical Task of Mankind," and many others, Comrade Kim Il-song discussed, on the basis of a profound analysis of the contemporary international situation and the inflammatory intrigues of the imperialists, the fundamental views and principles and the tactical and strategic course which must be maintained by the party and government of the KPDR in the struggle for preserving peace and security in Asia and throughout the world.

Figuratively speaking, the area of the Pacific Ocean is larded with U.S. military bases, said Lee Gi-sob, head of KULLOJA's international section. There are some 350 such bases and American nuclear missile weapons are deployed in many of them (in Japan and South Korea). Professor D. Petrov, doctor of historical sciences and head of Far East Institute, noted that the second largest general-purpose concentration of American forces, second to Western Europe, is in the Pacific area. It numbers 500,000 men, about 180 ships and more than 1100 airplanes. Strategic nuclear forces are being steadily increased and modernized. The U.S. Pacific Fleet is the largest of the fleets of the United States. Its ships and submarines operating in this area carry more than 2,000 nuclear warheads of different types. The complexity and explosive nature of the situation in the APR were noted in their statements by Yu. Galenovich, doctor of historical sciences, deputy director, Far East Institute, Lee Gil-din, department head, KULLOJA, V. Tikhomirov, doctor of historical sciences, head of sector, Institute of Oriental Studies, Lee Won-gen, doctor of economic sciences and KULLOJA political commentator, and others.

What is one to do under these circumstances? To let things slide? In that case, however, Asia and the Pacific basin may remain an arena of serious conflict and, furthermore, new wars may break out!

N. Kapitsa said that the solution to this situation lies in the comprehensive approach to security problems in the APR, as suggested by the Soviet Union, and holding in the future an Asian-Pacific Ocean forum or else organizing a separate Pacific forum to seek a constructive solution to pressing problems. Our country has encouraged a number of steps the implementation of which would make possible a future meeting of representatives of Asian countries and the Pacific Ocean basin. The

policy of blocs, increasing tension and divisiveness and the creation of closed economic groups is countered by the USSR with a clear alternative: ascribing greater dynamism to bilateral and multilateral relations and organizing extensive cooperation; peaceful resolution of conflicts; and strengthening security by reducing the levels of military confrontation. These three areas must come together at a point which would become an Asian-Pacific Helsinki.

A political platform is not a system which could be applied to any situation but, rather, a set of principles and methods based on practical experience. It was on this basis that the roundtable participants tried to determine what is being done currently and what could be done to ensure the practical implementation of the concept of peace and security in the APR. It was pointed out that of late the Soviet leadership has made a thorough study of relations with all countries and is taking steps to promote interaction with other countries, to bolster the mechanism of consultations and talks and to make cooperation with such countries more varied and profound.

We actively support the peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union in Asia, Lee Chon-nam, the head of the Korean delegation, emphasized. Your country has assumed the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against any country. This is a universal obligation and covers the countries in Asia and around the Pacific rim. China has assumed the same obligation. Now it is the turn of the United States.

Taking into consideration the wishes expressed by several countries, the Soviet Union agreed, within the framework of the 8 December 1987 USSR-U.S. Treaty, to eliminate medium-range missiles deployed in the Asian part of the country as well. This should be considered as a step forward in the contribution made by the USSR to the elimination of nuclear weapons in the APR. The Soviet Union welcomed the proclamation of the southern part of the Pacific Ocean a nuclear free zone. It joined the Rarotonga Treaty and called upon all nuclear powers to guarantee the status of the zone. This was done by the PRC, whereas the United States, Britain and France refused.

The Soviet government suggested to Japan to conclude a treaty between the two countries, according to which Japan would pledge strictly to observe the three non-nuclear principles and the USSR not to use any nuclear weapons against that country. The Japanese authorities rejected the proposal. However, as M. Kapitsa noted, the Soviet Union would like to believe that this is not Tokyo's final word.

Lee Gi-sob, Lee Gin-din and Lee Won-gen, KULLOJA representatives at the roundtable meeting, described in detail the important contribution which the Korean People's Democratic Republic is making to the struggle for peace and security in the APR. All true friends of the

Korean people welcome with satisfaction the numerous peace initiatives formulated by the KPDR in recent years, said Yu. Ognev, candidate of historical sciences, senior scientific associate, Far East Institute. The most important among them are proclaiming the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone, a zone of peace, a gradual reduction of the armed forces of the North and the South between 1988 and 1992 to the 100,000-strong level, with corresponding gradual evacuation of American forces and their nuclear armaments from South Korea, the holding of tripartite talks (KPDR, United States and South Korea) and holding a military-political summit between the KPDR and South Korea. The Soviet Union studied with interest the new year's address by Comrade Kim Il-song in which he called for convening a joint North-South conference, attended by representatives of political parties and public organizations and various population strata, including the heads of the two countries.

Soviet and Korean APR specialists also said that the actions of the socialist countries in the Asian-Pacific region are today distinguished by greater coordination in international affairs. A kind of testing the "political waters" is taking place between them. In addition to the USSR and the KPDR, a number of important initiatives were submitted by Mongolia (on signing a pact on the non-use of force and non-aggression among APR countries), and Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (on creating zones of peace, good neighborly relations and cooperation in Southeast Asia). The process of surmounting difficulties and problems in bilateral Soviet-Chinese relations, Yu. Galenovich noted, and the clearly manifested aspiration of both countries to restore good neighborly relations will leave an increasingly profound mark, with logical inevitability, on the foreign policy behavior of the USSR and the PRC as the biggest parties to Asian-Pacific policy. In particular, they motivate both powers to use the new opportunities which appeared in connection with improvements in their relations, in their search for more efficient approaches to settling local military conflicts in Asia.

The reduction of the size of China's army by 1 million people, initiated, as Yu. Galenovich, not without the influence of the positive changes in Sino-Soviet relations, and the suggestion voiced in M.S. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech on a corresponding lowering of the level of Soviet and Chinese land forces are a blow against established stereotypes of concepts of Chinese and Soviet "threats" in Asia. The noticeable rapprochement in the positions held by the PRC and the USSR on problems of international security, paralleling the process of improvements in Soviet-Chinese relations (and in connection with it) strengthens the material foundations of the potential for peace in the Asian-Pacific region, ascribes increasing significance to the efforts of the two countries in their struggle against the threat of war and contributes to the enhancement and consolidation of social and other anti-militaristic forces in the APR.

All those who presented papers and participated in the roundtable discussion were unanimous in agreeing that a firm security cannot be established without settling regional conflicts. Such conflicts must be channeled into talks. Lee Won-gen, from KULLOJA, emphasized that the attitude toward the elimination of such conflicts is an indicator of the degree of responsibility displayed in the approach of a given country to the problems of peace and security as a whole. M. Kapitsa reminded of corresponding initiatives on the part of the USSR.

Yu. Vanin, candidate of historical sciences, department head, Institute of Oriental Studies, said that regional conflicts have their roots, their own "anamnesis," and specific cures. Each one of them is not a frozen or permanent value but a fluctuating, churning, matter. That is why it makes no sense to limit ourselves to describing them, turning them into "snapshots," for tomorrow the situation may change. Our task is to see the main trend, the main line which could lead to the elimination of the "critical points" not only in the APR but throughout the globe.

New Approaches to the Internal Korean Dialogue

The KULLOJA representatives emphasized that the KPDR and the USSR act on the basis of the same standpoint on problems of settling international conflicts. They particularly emphasized the situation on the Korean Peninsula, which for 40 years has been a zone of sharp and protracted contradictions of global and regional nature, potentially fraught with the possibility of developing into a military confrontation. The two opposite socioeconomic systems confront each other on the peninsula and around it, and constant tension prevails in relations between the KPDR and South Korea. As Lee Chon-nam noted, the American imperialists are constantly trying to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries in that area. They regularly hold large-scale aggressive exercises along the KPDR borders, such as "Team Spirit." The interaction and interweaving of these and many other external and internal factors determine the international climate and level of security in the subregion and affect the problem of the unification of the country.

The Korean comrades pointed out that at the present time this problem is inseparable from the struggle for detente and the elimination of the military and political confrontation between North and South. The KPDR considers the establishment of a federal republic an acceptable formula for the unification of Korea. The KPDR leadership favors the peaceful democratic unification of Korea without any outside interference whatsoever. This presumes above all the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.

V. Tikhomirov, **D. Petrov**, **Yu. Vanin** and **A. Buchkin**, Institute of Oriental Studies associate, pointed out that in the 1980s the U.S. administration began to ascribe increasing importance to the military aspects of the

Korean situation, considering Korea, its Southern part above all, a major military and political bridgehead and a strong point in its Asian-Pacific strategy. The involvement of Japan in the military-strategic plans of the United States in the Far East and the Pacific is continuing.

As a whole, Washington's course pursued on the Korean Peninsula clearly reflects the true intentions of imperialist circles and their scorn for the interests of the Korean people and the peoples of the other socialist countries, above all the Soviet Union and the PRC, which maintain close ties of friendship with the KPDR, codified in various treaties and agreements, and which are not indifferent as to the line followed in the development of events in Korea. Furthermore, the U.S. aspiration to restrict contacts with the KPDR and its activeness concerning Korean affairs at the summit meeting with representatives of other countries, and the familiar instigation of the South to adopt a certain line of compromise in relations with the North and various promises made for economic, medical or other assistance to the KPDR is, in the view of Korea specialists, dictated more by efforts to stabilize the domestic political situation in South Korea and to ensure the preservation of the status quo and to strengthen the American positions on the peninsula.

The Soviet participants in the roundtable meeting emphasized that the USSR is well familiar with the fact that the leadership of the KPDR is engaged in a persistent struggle for halting the arms race in the Korean Peninsula and is formulating one initiative after another. The USSR considers this a major contribution to improving the situation in the APR and in the world at large. Noteworthy among the peaceful initiatives of the KPDR are also those which, one way or another, are related to involving neutral countries in various aspects related to solving the Korean problem. Thus, in December 1986 the KPDR Supreme National Assembly considered the possibility of creating neutral troops from countries which are members of the neutral commission on the observance of the armistice in Korea (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Switzerland and Sweden) as a machinery which would observe the actions of both sides in the demilitarized zone of the demarcation line. The suggestions formulated by the KPDR government in July 1987 on holding talks in the spring of 1988 in Geneva between the North, the South and the United States on disarmament problems also stipulates the participation of observers from the neutral commission.

In the course of the roundtable proceedings, the participants noted that KPDR policy shows a clearly defined trend of broadening the range of countries which should be involved in solving problems related to ensuring peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. This trend must be considered realistic and promising, for the threat to peace and stability in Korea is based on the Washington-Seoul-Tokyo militaristic bloc, assembled by

American imperialism. It can be successfully countered only through the collective efforts of the KPDR and its friends and allies and all interested countries.

In that connection Yu. Vanin recalled the idea expressed by the Korean comrades on convening an international conference on Korea. More than three decades have passed since this suggestion were made but, unfortunately, no noticeable progress in settling the Korean problem has been achieved. Some of the reasons for this have been external. Nonetheless, this should hardly be considered an obsolete idea. It is believed that under contemporary circumstances it is assuming a new positive meaning.

As was emphasized in the course of the roundtable discussion, in no way would such an international conference try to solve the problem of Korean reunification. This would be the exclusive prerogative of the Korean people themselves. Finding mutually acceptable ways and means of rapprochement and reunification between the two parts of Korea should be the subject of talks held exclusively between representatives of the North and the South. The task of an international conference which would mandatorily be held with their participation, would be different: to eliminate any foreign interference in internal Korean affairs, the withdrawal from its territory of foreign forces and armaments, nuclear above all, and the formulation of reliable international guarantees to the effect that the Korean people would be able to solve their national problems under favorable peaceful conditions.

The struggle for peace and security in the APR would not be truly efficient, noted Lee Chon-nam, the head of the Korean delegation, unless it involves the active participation of the broadest possible public circles of all countries in the area. This unquestionable truth, the participants in the roundtable discussion emphasized, faces the public in the Soviet Union, the KPDR and the other socialist countries with the task of drastically expanding and increasing the efficiency of their activities in this part of the world, organizing business contacts and interacting with international, regional and national organizations in the area and involving them in the common struggle for lifting the threat of nuclear war and for disarmament, the peaceful solution of conflicts, the establishment of normal international relations and the development of equal trade and economic and cultural ties. In the USSR the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries, the Association of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with foreign countries, the organizations of scientists, men of literature and the arts, the young people and others are engaged in work on this problem. A National Committee for Asian-Pacific Cooperation is being founded in Moscow to coordinate their activities.

As far as the problems of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula are concerned, the entire tremendous and varied work which must be done jointly, the Soviet

participants in the discussion said, cannot be fully efficient unless it involves South Korea. As we know, ever since separate elections were held in the South in 1948 and a government was formed there, the socialist countries have maintained virtually no contact with that part of Korea. "But South Korea is not only and exclusively a ruling regime," said Yu. Vanin. "It is above all people's masses (about 42 million people) who deserve, like any other country, an attentive and respectful attitude. Naturally, we must not fail to take into consideration that in the course of 40 years bourgeois politics and propaganda have been quite successful in nurturing in the population in South Korea mistrust and hostility toward the KPDR, the Soviet Union and all socialist countries. However, it would be wrong on our part to continue to remain indifferent to this."

A similar viewpoint was expressed by V. Tikhomirov as well: "As a scientist who has long studied Korean problems, it seems to me that under conditions in which the American and South Korean sides are making no whatsoever serious moves in their essentially negative views and are rejecting all suggestions, even those which are not controversial, the task of the USSR and the KPDR is to coordinate their activities and to try to find, on the basis of a new political thinking in international policy and in accordance with the changes in the deployment of forces in the world, including in the Korean Peninsula, optimal possibilities of progress toward the set objective of ensuring peace and security and the development of cooperation."

In that connection, some Soviet roundtable participants expressed the view that obviously the time has come for the public in the socialist countries to initiate efforts to establish contacts with the public in South Korea. All available means must be used to this end, such as joint participation in various projects, tourism, exchange of books and newsprint, meetings among scientists and men of culture, inviting representatives to international fora, etc. Establishing and expanding public contacts makes it possible to bring to the popular masses in South Korea the truth about socialism, to destroy the anti-communist stereotypes imposed on them and to exert a stimulating impact on the further growth of demographic trends in society and, in the final account, making them maximally useful in implementing the principles of national consolidation formulated in the programmatic documents of the Korean Labor Party.

Such contacts are equally important from the viewpoint of ensuring peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. It would be very difficult to reach these objectives if the South Korean public is excluded. That is why in developing efforts to enhance and rally the peace-loving forces in the APR, the public in the socialist countries must take its ideas and appeals to South Korea as well, and involve in the common struggle for peace its progressive organizations (trade union, student, scientific, cultural, religious and others), promoting their support of the peaceful initiatives launched by the KPDR. This could

have a positive effect on the positions taken by the South on the internal Korean dialogue and concerning the efforts of the KPDR to ease tension on the Korean Peninsula. Unquestionably, this would be useful also from the viewpoint of the general process of strengthening Asian security.

Regional Security Through Economic Cooperation

It was pointed out in the course of the discussion that there is no universal and quick cure for solving APR difficulties. No one has such a magic wand. All the peoples of Asia and the Pacific Rim should join efforts and seek ways to peace, renaissance and prospering. This should be accomplished in a number of areas, including that of reorganized economic relations. However, the study of the state of economic cooperation in the APR, which was made at the roundtable meeting, indicated that by no means is the potential of the area used fully.

Yu. Galenovich pointed out that it was the artificial isolation of integration processes within the groups of countries in Europe, on the basis of their social structure, that was the base for increasing confrontation on the continent. Avoiding a repetition of this would be a great benefit to the peoples and countries of the APR. Conditions to this effect exist. To begin with, it is important to ensure the organizational structuring of integration processes in the nonsocialist part of the region, something which so far has not taken place, although efforts in this direction have been made for nearly 20 years. Under such circumstances it would be easier to channel the efforts toward the creation of a world organization for economic cooperation, open to all countries, regardless of social system. Second, today the international economic and political situation has drastically weakened the positions of the supporters of the separate development of West and East and of the capitalist and socialist worlds. The current stage in the shaping of the global economy and the tremendous scale and unparalleled gravity of global economic problems demand the broader and more varied interaction and cooperation between the two world systems. The developing countries are particularly interested in this, including those in the APR. Third, of late the socialist countries have begun increasingly to participate in the efforts to promote a more efficient approach to the problem of the organizational structuring of such processes.

Lee Chon-nam, the KULLOJA representative, pointed out the active role which the KPDR plays in international economic relations in the Far East. In the 1980s the republic took additional steps to develop its foreign economic relations. The emphasis at the 6th Korean Labor Party Congress (1980) and subsequent political fora held in the KPDR was on expanding exports and increasing their share in the national income and conscientiously fulfilling foreign trade obligations. The management of foreign economic activities was reorganized. Furthermore, special financial-industrial foreign trade organizations were created (of the Tesong type, the

Tesong-Bank), which include enterprises, commercial companies and minibanks oriented toward exports. The passing of the law on joint enterprises in 1984 was a major decision. Nonetheless, major difficulties exist in the cooperation between the KPDR and Far Eastern countries. There also are unsolved problems in the area of Soviet-Korean economic cooperation. As V. Mikheyev, candidate of economic sciences and senior scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, said, they could be divided into three groups: the first include problems of the mechanism of interconnections. Essentially, such interconnections are established on the governmental level. However, today traditional forms are no longer adequate. Soviet organizations helping the KPDR are actually not interested in ensuring the uninterrupted and efficient work of industrial projects after their completion. It is no accident that problems of spare parts, reconstruction and technological retooling are being solved with great delays. On the other hand, the forms of cooperation which are used, such as technical assistance, the construction of completed projects and projects based on compensation, fail to provide proper incentive to the receiving country in the utilization of the loans it receives. The USSR is forced to adapt to the specific conditions of KPDR economic activities.

Another group of problems has to do with structural assistance. Nearly 60 percent of the loans are channeled into the development of the power industry and ferrous metallurgy, and the funds allocated for the development of the processing sectors are substantially smaller: they account for about 10 percent in machine building and under 3 percent in light industry. The quantitative approach has been retained in planning cooperation, which presumes an increase in the number of projects and expanding capital construction. The strategy of interaction should not be based on yesterday's views on "modern technology" and industrial structures, and the mastery of the latest technologies is not considered the cornerstone. The problem of "skipping" natural technological stages has been virtually ignored. Programs for scientific and technical cooperation remain separated from economic planning and are not aimed at upgrading the technological standards of priority sectors.

The third group of problems is caused by some peculiarities of the economic situation in the KPDR.

In order to provide the necessary dynamism to national economic development in the Far East, taking into consideration the situation on the Korean Peninsula, V. Mikheyev believes, it would be expedient to advance, as a minimum, in the following directions:

The first is upgrading the efficiency of Soviet-Korean economic cooperation. The main objective here is the restructuring of its mechanism. An essential role could be assigned to the credit instruments through which cost-accounting enterprises in the USSR would be given incentives to engage in investment activities in the

KPDR. An important prerequisite for upgrading the efficiency of cooperation is the diversification of its forms, based on the level of sectorial profitability. This applies to granting state loans for the development of the power industry and the infrastructure in the KPDR, establishing relations on the level of ministries in the extracting industry, setting up joint enterprises or branches of Soviet cost-accounting associations in the processing industry of the KPDR, oriented toward exports. The advantage of such cooperation is that it could include partners from third countries. In the sectorial aspect of such interaction, it would be expedient to concentrate on the comprehensive development of production facilities for export and update the industrial potential. Cooperation in export sectors should be based on the needs of the vast market of the Asian-Pacific region, abandoning the view that the Soviet and Korean markets are the only customers for goods produced by joint USSR-KPDR enterprises.

The second area is the development of domestic Korean economic cooperation. In the mid-1980s, KULLOJA wrote, the KPDR submitted a number of constructive suggestions on joint economic activities in areas such as developing natural resources, fishing, agriculture and coordinating economic development on a national scale. South Korea as well is showing an interest in internal Korean cooperation. Thus, according to estimates made by Seoul economists, by the year 2000 "integrated" Korea could raise the GNP of the North and the South to the level of \$360 billion (about \$6,000 per capita) whereas if the present situation is retained, the total GNP of the two parts of Korea would not exceed \$260 billion.

Possibilities of intra-Korean trade and integrational interaction are based on deadlines for political settlements on the peninsula. Nonetheless, the initiation of trade contacts could provide additional incentive in the search for mutually acceptable political solutions. The importance of economic cooperation between the Korean North and South could exceed the limits of the Korean peninsula. It would contribute to the establishment of a new political thinking and new approaches to ensuring peace in the APR, based on the balanced interests of all interested parties.

The third area is that of joint Soviet-Korean efforts aimed at improving the economic situation in the Far East and involving in this process all interested parties. The idea of setting up a "zone of normal trade and economic relations" in the Far East could become the binding link in this case. The purpose of setting up such a zone would be to involve in cooperation, both bilateral and multilateral, all members of the area. A number of problems such as fishing, use of port facilities by neighboring states, the ecological problems of the maritime area and others demand as of now the formulation of a mechanism for stable multilateral consultations. The development of integration processes, not only on the basis of local raw material resources and inexpensive

manpower but also the active mutually profitable utilization of the tremendous scientific and intellectual potential of the USSR, offer great promises for regional cooperation. The creation of such a zone would be assisted by respective bilateral and multilateral agreements on a variety of economic problems, reciprocal granting of the most favored nation status, etc.

Naturally, the Korean problem is not the only obstacle on the way to the implementation of this idea, M. Kapitsa emphasized, although it is quite an essential one. However, it is precisely the Korean Peninsula that could become, both politically and symbolically, from a factor of "separation" of countries into a factor of unification of their economic efforts and political initiatives.

For any nation, universal peace begins at the threshold of its home. That is why for both the USSR and the KPDR stability and security in the APR, as confirmed in the proceedings of the roundtable meeting of the journals *KOMMUNIST* and *KULLOJA*, is a common concern. However difficult the process of ensuring peace in the APR may be, and it is indeed not simple, as the discussion indicated, it is necessary to undertake in this vast area more actively a search for new approaches along the entire front. "The present generations," noted M.S. Gorbachev in his Vladivostok speech, "inherited many difficult and painful problems. In order to make progress in solving them we must reject the burden of the past. We must seek new approaches, guided by our responsibility to the present and the future." No effort should be spared in attaining this lofty objective.

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Short Book Reviews

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[Text] "*Internatsionalizatsiya Opyta Stran Sotsialisticheskogo Sodruzhestva: Ekonomika, Politika Ideologiya*" [Internationalization of the Experience of the Members of the Socialist Community: Economics, Politics, Ideology]. Mysl, Moscow, 1987, 320 pp. Reviewed by V. Moshnyaga, doctor of historical sciences.

Many works have been written on the development of the world socialist system. Noteworthy among them for its comprehensive approach to the problem is the study made by a group of scientists from the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences Institute for the Exchange of Experience in Building Socialism.

The authors discuss the objective conditions and subjective factors which determine the pace and scale of the revolutionary transformation of society. They try to determine the common and specific features in the constructive process and bring to light the essence and

mechanism of implementation of the principles of proletarian and socialist internationalism. Their efforts are characterized by an analytical-critical approach and an effort to explain the difficult problems of building socialism, particularly the negative phenomena in the economy and the slowing down of the pace of economic growth at the turn of the 1980s.

Interaction among the national revolutionary vanguards plays an exceptionally important role in solving foreign and domestic policy problems: Intraparty relations are the core of the cooperation among fraternal countries and peoples. The book describes the rich potential of interparty relations, which include practical contacts on all levels, from regular meetings among general (first) secretaries of central committees to relations among party workers on the grassroots level.

Two sections of the book deal with problems of accelerating the socioeconomic development of the socialist countries and their economic integration. A study is provided of the various aspects of the economic strategy of the parties at the present stage.

The authors justifiably pay great attention to the practice of reciprocal economic relations. They provide an analysis of the growing role of CEMA in the acceleration of integration processes, the development of long-term cooperation programs and implementation of major joint projects. This presumes improvements in the integration mechanism and its legal and economic foundations, providing a new impetus in socialist economic integration and converting from primarily commercial exchanges to production cooperation among industrial enterprises and the creation of joint firms and associations.

In discussing the accomplishments of all socialist countries, the authors prove that they are recognizing the historical significance of the rich experience of the USSR, the first socialist country, although its application, as M.S. Gorbachev noted, "did not take place without paying a price, a stiff one at that."

The final section of the book explains the place and role of the members of the socialist community in solving global contemporary problems. Here as well the mastery and creative application of acquired international experience are relevant.

Today, in connection with the need to restructure relations among socialist countries in the economic, political and spiritual-ideological areas, the theoretical development of the problems of world socialism, and the complete restoration of the Leninist theory of building socialism assume prime significance. The monograph under review is a contribution to this most important undertaking.

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Chronicle. Meetings With the Editors

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[Text] A roundtable meeting between NOVA MYSL, journal of the CPCZ Central Committee and KOMMUNIST, journal of the CPSU Central Committee, was held in Prague on 25-25 April. The topic of the discussion included topical problems of socialist economic theory. Participating in the meeting were noted Czechoslovak and Soviet economists. A report on the proceedings will be published in a forthcoming issue of this journal.

John Slovo, secretary general of the South African Communist Party and other party leaders visited the KOMMUNIST editorial premises where they discussed with the journal's associates a number of theoretical problems related to perestroika in the Soviet Union and its influence on the cause of social progress throughout the world.

In the course of a meeting with KOMMUNIST editors, members of the delegation of the German Communist Party, who attended the Mayday celebrations, headed by Joseph Mayer, member of the Secretariat of the GCP Board, were interested in the successes and problems of economic changes in our country; discussions were held on the principles governing the principles of restructuring and the basic trends in the journal's theoretical work.

This journal was visited by a group of party workers from the Cambodian People's revolutionary Party. The guests were informed on the participation of KOMMUNIST in providing ideological support for perestroika in the country and the preparations for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference.

A wide range of problems of the work and cooperation with the fraternal journal ERA SOCIALISTE were discussed with K. Florea, the journal's deputy editor in chief, at a meeting with KOMMUNIST editors.

The editors were visited by Gandi Burbano, Politburo member and secretary of the Equadorian Communist Party Central Committee, and Jose Regato, member of the ECP Central Committee. The talk dealt with problems related to the developed process of all-round democratization of the party and Soviet society.

The editors were visited by Keith Clark, correspondent for the British newspaper MORNING STAR, who showed an interest in problems of preparations for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, its agenda and guarantees of the irreversible nature of perestroika processes.

The editors were visited by Yves Paniez, French ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary. A talk was held on problems of soviet economic restructuring.

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